Court of Justice

The defendant, an animal rights activist, was charged with mischief to property under section 430(1)(c) of the Criminal Code for giving water to pigs in a transport truck stopped at a traffic light in Burlington, Ontario.

The Crown alleged she gave an unknown substance that created a risk the slaughterhouse would refuse the load.

The court found the defendant gave water, not a contaminant, and that her actions did not obstruct, interrupt, or interfere with the lawful use, enjoyment, or operation of property.

The court also found no evidence of willfulness.

The charge was dismissed.

The offender pleaded guilty to break and enter a dwelling house and commit therein the indictable offence of assault with a weapon.

The Crown sought a custodial sentence of 9-12 months with emphasis on denunciation and deterrence.

The defence sought a suspended sentence or intermittent custody of no more than 90 days.

The court imposed a suspended sentence with two years probation, considering the offender's Aboriginal heritage, his status as a first-time offender, genuine remorse, significant rehabilitative efforts, and the relatively modest level of violence despite the serious nature of a home invasion.

The court balanced aggravating factors including planning, use of weapons, and violation of the victim's home against substantial mitigating factors including youth, no criminal record, guilty plea, and demonstrated commitment to rehabilitation.

The defendant was charged with impaired driving and driving with excess alcohol following a traffic stop on December 31, 2015.

The defendant challenged whether the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest him for impaired driving and sought to exclude the breath test results.

The court found that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest based on the totality of circumstances, including slow driving, driving without lights, a wide turn, failure to move to the side of the road when emergency lights were activated, and the smell of alcohol.

However, the court found insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was impaired by alcohol.

The defendant was acquitted of impaired driving but convicted of operating a motor vehicle with excess alcohol (160 mgs per 100 milliliters of blood).

A biological father sought leave to bring a status review application of a Crown ward child who had been in care for over six years.

The child had been placed with the same foster parents for four years, and the Children's Aid Society had identified an adoptive family.

The court applied the five-part test from Catholic Children's Aid Society v. F.(B.A.) to determine whether leave should be granted.

The court found that the father's primary motive was to disrupt the adoption planning, that no unusual circumstances justified the review, and that the father had not established a prima facie case that placement in his care would be in the child's best interests.

The motion was dismissed.

The accused was charged with obstructing police and assaulting a police officer in resisting the arrest of her son.

The Crown alleged the accused physically interfered with an officer's lawful arrest of her son for armed robbery.

The defence argued the arrest was unlawful because the officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds.

The court found that while the officer held a subjective belief in reasonable and probable grounds, the objective review revealed non-inculpatory factors (presence of an accompanying adult, appropriate behaviour of the suspect, unknown duration of association) that were not considered.

The court concluded the arrest was unlawful and therefore the officer was not engaged in lawful execution of duty.

The accused was acquitted of both charges, and the court found her actions constituted lawful defence of her son under section 34 of the Criminal Code.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle with over 80 mg of alcohol in 100 millilitres of blood following a motor vehicle collision in Magnetawan, Ontario on April 25, 2016.

The Crown's evidence established the collision, the accused's impairment, and breath test results of 137 mg and 146 mg respectively.

However, the Crown conceded that the first breath sample was taken outside the two-hour statutory window required by the Criminal Code.

Without expert toxicology evidence to perform retrograde extrapolation, the court found the Crown had not proven all elements of the offence beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

Three accused were tried on charges of robbery with a firearm, disguise with intent, possession of property obtained by crime, and possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine and cannabis.

The Crown withdrew certain charges at trial.

The court found that the Crown failed to prove robbery with a firearm but established theft over $5,000.

Evidence from a recorded three-way phone call and text messages demonstrated that one accused orchestrated the theft with the store employee.

The court acquitted all accused of the drug trafficking charges due to insufficient evidence of knowledge and control, as multiple household members had access to the bedroom where drugs were found.

A costs decision following a seven-day family law trial concerning custody, parenting time, and child support.

The mother was substantially successful on all issues and sought costs on a full recovery basis totaling $60,340.

The father, representing himself, sought costs from the mother in the amount of $157,330, claiming victimization and making serious allegations against the mother's counsel and the Office of the Children's Lawyer.

The court awarded costs to the mother in the amount of $45,000, disallowing the law clerk fees in their entirety and reducing the overall award to account for the father's modest financial circumstances.

The applicant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol level over .08 contrary to section 253(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The applicant brought a motion alleging breaches of her Charter rights under sections 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b).

The court found that the applicant's right to counsel of choice under section 10(b) was breached when the police officer failed to inform the applicant of a third option to contact any lawyer and instead "foisted" duty counsel upon her without providing resources such as a lawyer's directory or internet access.

The court found that the officer's failure to comply with the informational component of the right to counsel of choice deprived the applicant of making a fully informed choice.

Under section 24(2) of the Charter, the court excluded the breath test results, finding that exclusion best served the long-term repute of the administration of justice, and dismissed the charge.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit three accused for trial on charges arising from the death of Dionecio Nelson on July 2, 2015.

Nathaniel Findley and Andrew Mitchell were charged with second degree murder in Nelson's death; Mitchell also faced two assault with a weapon charges.

Rayanne Mehdi was charged with accessory after the fact.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence establishing that Findley and Mitchell were the occupants of a vehicle that stopped after nearly hitting Nelson, leading to a violent altercation in which Nelson was fatally stabbed multiple times.

The preliminary inquiry judge found reasonable inferences available to a jury that Findley and Mitchell acted as co-perpetrators in a joint enterprise to assault Nelson, knowing that death was a probable consequence.

Findley was committed to stand trial on second degree murder; Mitchell and Mehdi conceded committal on their respective charges.

The defendant was charged with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act following a two-vehicle collision at the intersection of 16th Avenue and Woodbine Avenue in Markham on May 1, 2016.

Both drivers claimed to have a green traffic light.

The court found the traffic control signals were functioning properly and that both the east/west and north/south lights could not have been green simultaneously.

Based on credibility assessments and the pattern of vehicle damage, the court rejected the defendant's evidence and accepted the complainant's testimony that he had a green light while the defendant proceeded through a red light.

The defendant was convicted of careless driving.

The accused was charged with obstructing a police officer by misidentifying himself.

The Crown's case relied on identification evidence from two officers: PC Perilli, who arrested the accused at a motel and later identified him in a YouTube video, and PC Gorski, who provided recognition evidence based on prior dealings with the accused.

The central issue was whether the Crown proved the accused's identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found significant flaws in the identification procedure, including the absence of a critical cell phone photo used for comparison, inconsistencies between officer accounts, and the poor quality of surveillance video.

The court concluded that while individual officers expressed certainty, the reliability of the identification process was compromised, leaving reasonable doubt as to identity.

The claimant, residing in Michigan with a child born out of wedlock, sought child support from the respondent residing in Ontario under the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act, 2002.

The respondent acknowledged paternity and his obligation to pay support.

The court determined that entitlement to support was governed by Michigan law (the Paternity Act), while the quantum of support was determined under Ontario law.

The court established a retroactive start date for support based on Michigan legislation and calculated monthly support payments using Ontario child support guidelines.

The accused, charged as a youth with four counts of indecent assault alleged to have occurred in 1980, brought a Charter s. 11(b) application seeking to stay proceedings for unreasonable delay.

The charges were laid on July 30, 2015, with trial scheduled for June 14-17, 2017, approximately 22.5 months later.

The court applied the framework established in R. v. Jordan, determining that while the case exceeded the presumptive 18-month ceiling on its face, the delay attributable to a severance decision constituted an exceptional circumstance.

After deducting the delay caused by the severance and defence unavailability, the court calculated the net delay at approximately 14.75 months, below the threshold.

The application was dismissed and the case proceeded to trial.

A youth was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a beach party where the complainant, who was 14 years old, consumed a substantial amount of alcohol and became extremely intoxicated.

The accused admitted to having sexual intercourse with the complainant but claimed she had consented.

The court found that the complainant was incapacitated by alcohol and lacked the minimal cognitive capacity to consent to sexual activity.

The court further found that the accused knew or was reckless or willfully blind to the complainant's incapacity and failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain consent.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault.

The defendant was charged with four counts arising from an altercation with police on August 28, 2016: two counts of assault with intent to resist lawful arrest, one count of resisting arrest, and one count of obstructing a police officer.

The Crown alleged the police lawfully entered the defendant's home in response to a 911 call reporting a domestic dispute and that the defendant assaulted and resisted the officers.

The defendant argued the police exceeded their lawful authority by forcibly entering his home without a warrant and without reasonable grounds to believe anyone's life or safety was in danger.

The court found the police did not have lawful authority to enter the home and acquitted the defendant on all counts.

A voir dire was conducted to determine the admissibility of statements made by the defendant to a police officer during breath testing procedures.

The Crown sought to introduce utterances made by the defendant during the breath room interaction.

The court found that statements made before the first breath sample were voluntary, as the defendant was properly cautioned regarding his right to remain silent and appeared to have freely chosen to speak with the officer.

However, the court found that statements made between the two breath samples were not established to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt, as the defendant may have believed the questions related to the Alcohol Influence Report were part of the compulsory breath testing process and no caution was provided before those questions.

At a preliminary inquiry, the Crown sought to commit two defendants to trial on nine drug-related offences arising from the seizure of cocaine, marijuana, and proceeds of crime from a house at 54 Sharpe Street in Toronto on November 25, 2015.

Bromfield conceded committal only for cocaine and proceeds found on his person.

Smithson conceded committal only for cocaine found in the basement where she resided.

The court applied the test for sufficiency of evidence at committal, focusing on the doctrines of constructive and joint possession.

The court found insufficient evidence to support committal on contested counts, discharging both defendants on most charges while committing Bromfield on two counts and Smithson on one count.

The accused was charged with assaulting a peace officer contrary to section 270(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

Police responded to a 911 call for medical assistance at a residence where a seizure was occurring.

The accused, upset and intoxicated, was asked to leave the kitchen to allow emergency personnel access.

A confrontation ensued between the accused and the officer.

The Crown alleged the accused attempted to head-butt the officer.

The trial judge found that while the accused was agitated and advancing aggressively, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused intentionally attempted to head-butt the officer.

The accused was acquitted.

This is a costs endorsement following a focused trial on child support and a restraining order.

The applicant (mother) sought costs of $15,000, while the respondent (father) proposed $3,000.

The court found the mother was substantially successful on both issues: she obtained the restraining order completely and was more successful on the child support issue.

The court considered the factors under the Family Law Rules, including the failure of both parties to make settlement offers, the reasonableness of behaviour, and the father's modest income.

The court fixed costs at $6,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST, payable at $200 per month starting May 1, 2017.