Administrative Law - OCJ

The Ontario Court of Justice considered three pre-trial motions in a Provincial Offences Act prosecution involving alleged violations of the Building Code Act.

The court granted the prosecution's request to amend the offence dates on the information to a date within the statutory limitation period, rejecting a broader date range that was statute barred.

The court refused to quash the information despite technical irregularities in the jurat signature, holding that substance prevails over form and that the information was properly laid under s.23(1.2) POA.

The court also ruled that the doctrine of discoverability applies to the limitation period under s.36(8) BCA, making the continuing offence argument irrelevant for limitation purposes.

The court granted leave to reapply on amendment and limitation issues based on trial evidence and remains seized of the matter.

This decision addresses whether Notices of Trial sent exclusively by email under the Provincial Offences Act (POA) and its regulations provide sufficient jurisdiction to proceed under section 9.1 of the POA when defendants fail to appear.

The court found that although defendants provided email addresses and signed Notices of Intention to Appear indicating trial options, the POA administration failed to obtain explicit consent that the technical specifications of the electronic documents (PDF format) were acceptable to the defendants as required by O. Reg. 67/12 s. 4(b).

Consequently, service by email only was insufficient to establish jurisdiction, and the court directed that Notices of Trial be issued by mail to regain jurisdiction.

This decision addresses a motion for directions brought by the City of Toronto concerning approximately 250 outstanding appeals under the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) initiated by notices of appeal following guilty pleas entered by paralegal representatives.

The Court identified a troubling pattern where appeals were filed but not actively pursued, often by a non-licensed individual, Kiril Kovuntunko, and a licensed paralegal, Adelin B. Mocanu, operating through Ticket Justice.

The Court ordered that all such appeals be perfected by April 9, 2025, with transcripts filed and service completed, and set a hearing date for May 26-27, 2025.

The judgment highlights procedural safeguards, the statutory framework for Part I POA appeals, and the importance of ensuring appeals are not used to delay justice.

The Catholic Children's Aid Society brought a motion under section 14B of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act to suspend the running of time on a six-month supervision order by three weeks.

The order had been made on March 11, 2020, placing two children with their mother and one child in the temporary care of the society.

A Status Review Application hearing was scheduled for September 29, 2020, which exceeded the six-month supervision period by three weeks.

The court granted the motion, finding that the Emergency Management and Civil Protection Act applied to child protection proceedings and that it was in the best interests of the children that the society not lose jurisdiction due to an apparent administrative error.

The Status Review Application was made effective as of September 29, 2020, and the matter was adjourned to December 2, 2020 for a case conference.

The defendant was convicted of eight regulatory offences under three Ontario professional accounting statutes for unlawfully using foreign professional accounting designations and holding himself out as a member of professional accounting bodies without being a member.

The offences occurred between March 1, 2017 and June 30, 2018.

The court imposed fines totalling $16,000, a two-year probation order with statutory conditions, and ordered the defendant to pay $10,000 in reasonable legal costs to the Chartered Professional Accountants of Ontario.

The court found the defendant had the ability to pay despite his claims of financial hardship, noting his employment income of approximately $90,000 annually and home ownership.

The court also considered the defendant's improper conduct during proceedings, including frivolous adjournment applications and unmeritorious Charter claims, which prolonged the litigation and increased costs.

The defendant was charged with driving a motorized personal mobility device (described as a Segway-type device) on a roadway in contravention of City of Hamilton Bylaw 01-215, which prohibits riding on toy vehicles or similar devices on roadways.

The court found the defendant not guilty, determining that the bylaw does not apply to motorized devices because municipalities lack authority to regulate motor vehicles without express provincial authorization.

The device did not conform to definitions in provincial pilot project regulations for low-speed vehicles or electric kick-scooters, and the bylaw's enumerated devices were all non-motorized, indicating the city's limited jurisdiction over motor vehicles.

Applicants challenged environmental charges under the Ontario Environmental Protection Act, arguing that provincial environmental legislation should not apply to stevedoring activities on federal Crown property at the St. Lawrence Seaway.

The applicants invoked doctrines of interjurisdictional immunity and federal paramountcy, contending that the provincial provisions impaired federal jurisdiction over navigation and shipping and frustrated the purposes of the Canada Marine Act and Seaway Property Regulations.

The court dismissed the application, finding that neither doctrine applied.

The court held that stevedoring is integral to shipping but that environmental protection requirements do not impair the core federal power.

The court also found that provincial and federal environmental regimes can operate harmoniously without conflict.

The Children's Aid Society of Algoma brought a motion to transfer carriage of a child protection status review proceeding to Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services, a newly designated native children's aid society.

The motion involved determining whether Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction under its ministerial designation to act as the applicant society.

The court examined the complex jurisdictional issues arising from the designation, including territorial jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction based on aboriginal status, and the conditions imposed on the designation.

The court granted the motion, finding that Nogdawindamin CAS had jurisdiction to carry out its mandate as a children's aid society in this case involving an Indian child identified as a member of one of the seven listed First Nations.

The appellant appealed his convictions for speeding, failing to surrender his motor vehicle permit, and failing to surrender his insurance card.

The court allowed the appeal regarding the permit and insurance card convictions, finding that the appellant had surrendered the documents within a reasonable time and had exercised due diligence.

The court classified these offences as strict liability offences and found that the appellant's conduct met the due diligence defence, particularly considering his concerns about personal safety during the police interaction.

The appeal regarding the speeding conviction was dismissed as the evidence supported the conviction.

A status review application brought by the Children's Aid Society concerning an 11-year-old child placed in the care of the maternal aunt under an order dated January 20, 2016.

The Society failed to comply with statutory and procedural requirements for service of the status review application.

The application was issued before the order's expiry but served significantly late, and the maternal aunt was not served prior to the first return date despite being entitled to service.

The court dismissed the application for non-compliance with Section 64(2)(b) of the Child and Family Services Act and Rule 33(6.1) of the Family Law Rules, finding that jurisdiction for status review had been lost.

The defendant was charged with speeding (120 km/h in a 100 km/h zone) contrary to section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Following an early resolution meeting with a prosecutor, the defendant entered a guilty plea to the amended charge of Disobey Sign contrary to section 182(2) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The parties jointly submitted that the set fine of $85.00 was appropriate.

The court rejected the joint submission and imposed a fine of $100 plus court costs and victim surcharge, finding that set fines are statutorily reserved for cases that do not proceed to trial and that imposing a set fine after trial would be contrary to the public interest and legislative intent.

The Crown charged the defendant with knowingly giving a false statement to a conservation officer contrary to section 96(a) of the Fish and Wildlife Conservation Act.

The defendant was alleged to have falsely stated that no second bull moose was shot by members of the hunting party during opening weekend, when in fact Kevin Cain had shot a second bull moose unlawfully.

The trial turned on the credibility of the officer's account of the interview conducted at the defendant's home versus the defendant's account.

The court found reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant was asked about Kevin Cain or Rick Cain, and whether the defendant's responses were as alleged by the Crown.

The defendant was acquitted.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought trial costs of $21,919.39 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society.

The court found that while the society's overall conduct did not warrant a full costs award, the society engaged in serious unfair dealing by injecting unsubstantiated risk factors (alcohol and drug abuse, mental illness) into its risk assessment documents regarding the mother.

The court awarded partial costs of $5,000 to the mother, finding that this misrepresentation constituted a "smearing" of the parent that violated principles of fair dealing required under child protection law.

The court emphasized that child protection agencies must maintain proportionate intervention, provide fair disclosure, and avoid manipulating risk calibration through false information.

The Children's Aid Society of the County of Dufferin sought leave to withdraw a protection application concerning a child.

The respondent, a pediatric nurse with 17 years of experience as a foster parent, consented to the withdrawal but sought costs on a full indemnification basis.

The court found that while the Society did not act in bad faith, the decision to apprehend the child was an ill-considered use of the Society's powers that could not be justified.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the apprehension hearing and the period leading up to the temporary care hearing, but declined to award costs for work undertaken after the Society's settlement offer on May 22, 2013, which was focused on adding the Toronto Children's Aid Society as a party rather than resolving the protection concerns.

A courier company appealed a conviction for parking a vehicle in a designated accessible parking space without displaying a valid permit.

The appellant argued that the vehicle was "standing" rather than "parked" and that the common law exception for loading and unloading merchandise applied.

The court upheld the conviction, finding that the by-law clearly prohibited parking, standing, or leaving unauthorized vehicles in accessible spaces, and that the appellant's vehicle was left unattended for an unreasonable period while the driver completed a delivery to an upper floor of a building.

The court rejected arguments based on common law exceptions and statutory interpretation, emphasizing the remedial purpose of accessibility legislation.

The defendant was charged with wilfully failing to inform the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board of a material change in circumstances in connection with her entitlement to benefits within 10 days after the change occurred, contrary to section 149(2) of the Workplace Safety and Insurance Act, 1997.

The defendant had been receiving benefits for work-related back injuries and depression since 2007.

The prosecution presented surveillance evidence showing the defendant engaging in numerous independent activities (driving, shopping, attending events) during June 1-6, 2011, which contradicted her reported condition of severe pain and limited mobility.

The court found that the prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt both the actus reus and mens rea of the offence, rejecting the defendant's arguments regarding language barriers and medication effects.

The defendant was convicted.

The Halton Region Conservation Authority appealed the sentencing decision imposed on the respondents for contravening the Conservation Authorities Act by undertaking unauthorized development in a designated erosion hazard zone.

The respondents had applied for permission to construct a lakeside addition to their property in Burlington, which was denied.

Despite the denial and subsequent stop work orders, they proceeded with construction and completed the addition.

The trial judge imposed fines of $5,000 each and a probation order requiring seawall reconstruction, but did not order removal of the unauthorized structure.

The appellate court found the sentence demonstrably unfit and allowed the appeal, setting aside the fines and imposing an order for removal of the lakeside addition at the respondents' expense.

An elector appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee declining to order a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The elector alleged that the candidate had made false, misleading, and untrue statements in her Form 4 Financial Statement, specifically regarding unreported contributions and underreported campaign expenses.

The court conducted a de novo hearing and applied the "reasonable grounds" test, requiring an objective belief based on compelling and credible information raising reasonable probability of a breach.

The court found that the elector's allegations were based on conjecture, speculation, and circumstantial evidence insufficient to meet the threshold.

The appeal was dismissed and no compliance audit was ordered.

A police officer charged the defendant with careless driving under section 130 of the Highway Traffic Act by filing a Certificate of Offence.

However, the officer had deliberately struck out the title "Certificate of Offence / Proces-verbal d'infraction" and other portions of the prescribed form, intending to convert it into a Summons.

The court examined whether these alterations invalidated the document under section 84 of the Legislation Act.

While the striking out of the Fine Boxes and modifications to the Certification Box were found not to invalidate the document, the deliberate removal of the title was found to fundamentally alter the substance of the prescribed form and render it no longer a valid Certificate of Offence.

An applicant appealed a decision by the Halton District School Board Compliance Audit Committee that rejected her application for a compliance audit of a school trustee candidate's election campaign finances.

The applicant alleged the candidate had filed false and misleading financial statements.

The court found that the Compliance Audit Committee failed to establish adequate administrative procedures as mandated by statute, failed to provide fair notice to the applicant regarding the hearing process, and failed to create a transparent and complete record of its proceedings.

The court determined that procedural fairness had been compromised and ordered a de novo hearing on appeal, allowing the applicant to present additional evidence that was not before the original committee.