J. Davie

The appellant appealed a conviction for a Highway Traffic Act offence entered following a guilty plea, arguing the plea was uninformed because he was unaware it could prejudice his pending civil action arising from the same motor vehicle collision.

The Ontario Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding that the potential use of the conviction in the civil proceeding was a legally relevant collateral consequence.

Because the appellant established a realistic likelihood that he would not have pleaded guilty had he known of this consequence, the plea was struck and a new trial ordered on the original careless driving charge.

The appellant was convicted in absentia of careless driving and operating a motor vehicle with a handheld device after his retained paralegal firm failed to take any steps to dispute the tickets.

The appellant's representative repeatedly misled him about the status of his matters, falsely claiming the charges were being reopened and that his licence was not suspended.

The Ontario Court of Justice found that the appellant was convicted through no fault of his own and that the representative's deceptive conduct foreclosed the appellant's ability to protect his rights.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Baron Alloway, appealed two Highway Traffic Act tickets after being deemed not to dispute them due to non-attendance at a rescheduled trial.

He claimed he never received the Revised Notice of Trial.

The court considered Section 87(2) of the Provincial Offences Act, which establishes a rebuttable presumption of mail delivery.

The appellant provided an affidavit and testified unequivocally that he did not receive the notice, and this evidence remained uncontradicted.

The court found the presumption rebutted and allowed the appeal, ordering a new trial.

This appeal concerned a Part I Provincial Offences Act conviction where the appellant sought a new trial due to a paralegal agent's error leading to a conviction without trial.

The court emphasized the "ends of justice" test under s. 138(1) of the POA, requiring sufficient evidence, typically through affidavits from both the appellant and the paralegal, detailing the error, its discovery, client notification, and any resulting prejudice.

The court criticized the "culture of complacency" among some paralegal agents in provincial offences courts and dismissed the appeal due to the appellant's failure to provide any evidence (e.g., an affidavit) to support their claim, despite the paralegal's error.

The appellant, Wing Cheung, appealed his conviction for driving while holding or using a hand-held device, seeking to strike his guilty plea.

He argued that the prosecutor failed to provide advice and the court did not conduct a plea inquiry, particularly regarding potential insurance consequences.

The court found that prosecutors are not obligated to provide legal advice or inform about private collateral consequences like insurance.

The plea was voluntary and unequivocal, and the failure to conduct a s. 45 Provincial Offences Act inquiry does not invalidate the plea.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was charged with failing to stop for a red light.

A trial date was set for May 24, 2016, then adjourned to September 12, 2016.

On September 12, 2016, the appellant attended court but the ticket was not before the court and the matter was not addressed.

A revised notice of trial was issued on September 21, 2016 for November 24, 2016, but the appellant did not receive this notice.

The appellant failed to attend the November 24, 2016 trial and was convicted in absentia.

On appeal, the appellant argued the court lost jurisdiction and sought either an acquittal or a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, finding that while jurisdiction over the person was lost on September 12, 2016, it was regained by the issuance of the revised notice of trial.

However, because the appellant did not receive the notice and had always intended to dispute the charge, a new trial was ordered.

The defendant was charged with driving a motor vehicle while holding or using a hand-held wireless communication device contrary to section 78.1(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The prosecution alleged the defendant was texting while stopped at a red light.

The defendant testified he was using his cell phone through a Bluetooth hands-free device while keeping both hands on the steering wheel.

The court found the prosecution had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was holding or using the device in a manner prohibited by the statute.

The court determined the defendant was using the device in hands-free mode, which is permitted under section 78.1(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, and acquitted the defendant.