ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE
IN THE MATTER OF an appeal under subsection 135 (1) of the Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33, as amended;
BETWEEN:
AUCKLAND WATSON
Appellant
— AND —
His Majesty the King ex rel. The Corporation of the City of Mississauga
Respondent
Before Justice P.T. O’Marra
Heard on June 19, 2026
Reasons for Judgment on the Appeal released on July 22, 2026
Jason Davie paralegal for the Appellant, Auckland Watson
Maja Karanovic agent for the Respondent
On appeal from a conviction by Justice of the Peace Anand on April 23, 2025 and from the sentence imposed on April 23, 2025.
Introduction
1The appellant appeals from a conviction entered on April 23, 2025, following a guilty plea to a substituted charge under s. 148(5) of the Highway Traffic Act, described on the plea record as failing to turn out to the left to avoid a collision. The substituted charge resolved the original charge of careless driving contrary to s. 130(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. The court imposed a $300.00 fine on a joint submission.
2The appellant submits that the plea was not informed because, when it was entered, he did not know that the conviction could materially prejudice a civil proceeding for damages arising from the same motor vehicle collision. He asks that the plea be struck, the conviction be set aside, and a new trial directed on the original charge.
3For the reasons that follow, I am satisfied that the appeal should be allowed. In the particular circumstances of this case, the appellant has established that he entered the plea without awareness of a legally relevant collateral consequence and that, had he understood that consequence, there is a realistic likelihood that he would not have resolved the matter by guilty plea. Under s. 138(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, it is necessary to direct a new trial to satisfy the ends of justice.
Facts
4On August 6, 2024, the appellant was involved in a motor vehicle collision on Highway 410 near Sandalwood Parkway while attempting to merge from an on-ramp into a travel lane. Following the collision, he was issued a Provincial Offence Notice for careless driving, contrary to s. 130(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.
5The materials filed on appeal indicate that the appellant sustained injuries in the collision and that his vehicle was a total loss. He thereafter retained counsel in relation to a civil claim arising from the same accident.
6The appellant retained Jackie Neskoski of Street Legal Paralegal Professional Corporation to represent him on the provincial offence. Ms. Neskoski swore that her retainer was confined to the provincial offences matter. She further swore that she advised the appellant that she could not provide legal advice regarding his civil or personal injury matter because that was outside her area of practice and expertise.
7On April 23, 2025, the matter came before the Provincial Offences Court. Ms. Neskoski was unable to attend and arranged for another authorized representative to appear on her behalf. Following discussions with the prosecutor, the original careless driving charge was resolved by the appellant’s guilty plea to a substituted charge under s. 148(5) of the Highway Traffic Act. The court accepted the plea and imposed a fine of $300 on a joint submission.
8The appellant swore that he understood generally that, by pleading guilty, he was giving up his right to a trial, admitting the offence, and accepting the ordinary consequences of the plea. He also swore that he did not know that the conviction could affect his civil claim. He says that only after the plea, when he spoke with his personal injury lawyer, did he learn that the conviction could negatively affect that proceeding.
9The appellant further swore that, had he known of that consequence at the time of the plea, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have proceeded to trial.
10The materials also include a letter from the appellant’s civil counsel confirming that counsel was acting for him in relation to claims arising from the August 6, 2024, accident and confirming that he had sustained physical and psychological injuries for which he was receiving ongoing treatment.
11The appellant filed a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by the Provincial Offences Act.
Positions of the Parties
12The appellant submits that the plea was uninformed within the meaning of R. v. Wong, 2018 SCC 25, [2018] 1 S.C.R. 696. He argues that the effect of the conviction on his pending civil action is a legally relevant collateral consequence because it bears directly on a serious legal interest arising from the same collision. He further submits that he was subjectively unaware of that consequence when the plea was entered and that, had he known of it, he would have instructed his representative to proceed to trial. He asks that the conviction be set aside and a new trial be ordered on the original careless driving charge.
13The respondent submits that the plea was voluntary, informed, and reliable and should not be disturbed. The respondent argues that any civil consequence is not the type of consequence contemplated by Wong because it is not automatic and does not arise directly by operation of the provincial offence law. The respondent also submits that the appellant has not demonstrated that he would, in fact, have proceeded differently had he known of the possible civil implications.
The Law
14A guilty plea is valid only if it is voluntary, unequivocal, and informed. That principle is fundamental because a guilty plea is the conviction itself. By entering such a plea, a defendant waives the right to require the prosecution to prove the allegation at trial.
15In Wong, the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that a valid guilty plea must be voluntary, unequivocal, and informed. A guilty plea is informed only where the accused understands the nature of the allegations, the effect of the plea, and the legally relevant consequences flowing from it. An accused who seeks to withdraw a plea on the basis that it was uninformed must establish that the missing information related to a legally relevant consequence of the plea and that the lack of that information caused prejudice amounting to a miscarriage of justice: Wong, at paras. 3-4, 11, 13.
16The prejudice inquiry is subjective, but it is assessed in light of the objective record. The appellant must establish a reasonable possibility that, had he known of the legally relevant consequence, he would have acted differently, either by pleading not guilty and proceeding to trial or by resolving the matter on different terms: Wong, at paras. 6, 19. The inquiry does not require the appellant to show that a trial would likely have produced a better result. It asks whether the missing information realistically mattered to the plea decision.
17Not every adverse consequence of a conviction will render a plea uninformed. The consequence must be legally relevant and sufficiently serious in the circumstances. The significance of the consequence is assessed contextually, having regard to the nature of the consequence, the appellant’s circumstances, the benefit obtained by the plea, and whether the missing information could realistically have affected the appellant’s decision: Wong, at paras. 13, 19.
18In R. v. Quick, 2016 ONCA 95, 129 O.R. (3d) 334, the Court of Appeal held that a non-criminal collateral consequence may, in an appropriate case, be significant enough to render a guilty plea uninformed. The Court set aside the plea because the appellant was unaware that his conviction would result in an indefinite licence suspension under the Highway Traffic Act, a consequence of particular significance because he was a truck driver: Quick, at paras. 1, 3-4. Quick supports a fact-specific approach to whether the collateral consequence was sufficiently significant to the accused’s decision to plead guilty.
19In Ontario, the possible use of a conviction in later civil proceedings is not a merely abstract concern. Section 22.1 of the Evidence Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.23, provides that proof that a person has been convicted or discharged anywhere in Canada of a crime is proof, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the crime was committed by that person, once appeal rights have expired or been exhausted. Although s. 22.1 does not make a conviction conclusive in every later proceeding, it gives the conviction real evidentiary significance. In Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., Local 79, 2003 SCC 63, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 77, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine of abuse of process may prevent a party from relitigating facts determined in a prior criminal proceeding where relitigation would undermine the integrity of the adjudicative process: Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., at paras. 37-38. In Caci v. MacArthur, 2008 ONCA 750, 93 O.R. (3d) 701, the Ontario Court of Appeal applied that principle in a motor vehicle civil action and upheld a ruling that the conviction and facts essential to it were conclusive in the civil proceeding. In Intact Insurance Company v. Federated Insurance Company of Canada, 2017 ONCA 73, 134 O.R. (3d) 241, the Court of Appeal confirmed that s. 22.1 remains subject to “evidence to the contrary” and that the abuse of process analysis is contextual: Intact Insurance, at para. 51.
20This appeal is brought under Part I of the Provincial Offences Act. Section 138(1) provides that the appeal court may affirm, reverse, or vary the decision appealed from or, where in its opinion it is necessary to do so to satisfy the ends of justice, direct a new trial.
21In Toronto (City) v. Al-Bawi, 2022 ONCJ 411, at paras. 4-5, the court recognized that in a Part I provincial offences appeal the operative remedial question is whether a new trial is necessary to satisfy the ends of justice under s. 138(1). That inquiry requires attention to fairness to the appellant, fairness to the prosecution, the integrity of the plea process, and the importance of finality.
22In my view, the proper approach in a case such as this is to apply the substantive principles governing informed pleas, as set out in Wong, Quick, and related authorities, to determine whether the plea was entered with knowledge of its legally relevant consequences. If the plea was materially uninformed, the court must then determine, under s. 138(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, whether directing a new trial is necessary to satisfy the ends of justice.
Analysis
23I accept the appellant’s evidence that he did not know, when he entered the plea, that the resulting conviction could materially prejudice a civil action arising from the same accident. His affidavit states that plainly. Ms. Neskoski’s affidavit confirms that she did not advise him on the civil dimension because it lay outside her retainer and expertise. There is nothing in the record that contradicts the appellant’s sworn assertion of unawareness.
24The first part of the inquiry is, therefore, established.
25I am also satisfied that the collateral consequence at issue was legally relevant in the circumstances of this case. This was not a generalized concern about insurance rates, demerit points, or some remote civil effect. At the time of the plea, the appellant had an existing civil claim arising from the same collision. The conviction related to that very event and could bear upon the allocation of fault in the civil proceeding.
26The legal interest at stake was serious. The record indicates that the appellant alleges significant physical and psychological injuries and seeks damages arising from them. The possible use of the conviction in the civil proceeding was therefore not merely theoretical. Section 22.1 of the [Ontario ]Evidence Act gives a conviction evidentiary significance in later proceedings, subject to evidence to the contrary. In addition, Toronto (City) v. C.U.P.E., at paras. 37-38, and Caci, recognize that, in an appropriate case, the doctrine of abuse of process may prevent a party from relitigating the conviction or facts essential to it.
27I accept that the possible civil consequence was not automatic in the sense that the conviction would necessarily determine liability or damages. That is not the test. Section 22.1 creates a rebuttable evidentiary effect, and the abuse of process doctrine remains contextual: Intact Insurance, at para. 51. The question is whether the appellant was unaware of a legally significant consequence that bore on a serious legal interest and that realistically could have affected his decision to plead guilty. Here, the connection between the plea and the civil interest was close and concrete. The civil claim already existed, it arose from the same collision, and the possible adverse use of the conviction was grounded in law rather than speculation.
28In these circumstances, I conclude that the possible civil use of the conviction crossed the threshold of legal relevance. The point is not that the conviction inevitably prejudiced the appellant’s civil claim. It is that the conviction created a real legal risk in an existing proceeding involving the same facts and a serious claim for damages.
29I am further satisfied that the appellant has established prejudice. He says that, had he known of the civil consequence, he would have proceeded to trial rather than plead guilty. That assertion is supported by the objective record. The penal consequence of the plea was modest. By contrast, the potential effect upon a pending action for damages arising from significant alleged injuries could be substantial. The contrast between those stakes makes it entirely plausible that the appellant would have made a different choice had he been properly informed: Wong, at para. 19; Quick, at paras. 3-4.
30His prompt filing of the appeal after learning of the consequence reinforces the credibility of his account.
31I do not decide whether the appellant would ultimately have been acquitted at trial. That is not the issue before me. Nor is it necessary for him to demonstrate that a trial would likely have produced a better substantive result. What matters is whether there is a realistic likelihood that, had he known of the collateral consequence, he would have chosen not to plead guilty: Wong, at para. 19; Quick, at paras. 3-4. On this record, I am satisfied that he would have.
32The decision whether to plead guilty was the appellant’s. Because that decision was made without knowledge of a serious collateral consequence affecting his existing civil legal interests, the plea cannot stand.
The Ends of Justice Under Section 138(1)
33I turn then to remedy. Section 138(1) of the Provincial Offences Act requires me to determine whether a new trial is necessary to satisfy the ends of justice.
34Finality in guilty pleas is important. Proceedings under the Provincial Offences Act depend heavily upon the integrity and reliability of resolutions reached by plea. Courts should not lightly disturb them. However, finality cannot outweigh fairness where the plea was entered without an understanding of a serious legally relevant consequence: Wong, at paras. 3, 13.
35To hold the appellant to this plea would diminish confidence in the plea process rather than enhance it. The integrity of that process depends upon the court’s ability to conclude that a plea represents a genuine and informed waiver of the right to trial. That conclusion cannot be reached here.
36In my view, the ends of justice therefore require that the conviction be set aside and the matter returned to its pre-resolution posture.
37Once the plea to the substituted charge is struck, the appropriate disposition is a new trial on the original charge of careless driving contrary to s. 130(1) of the Highway Traffic Act. That result is fair to both parties. It restores to the appellant the trial right he surrendered on an uninformed basis, while preserving the respondent’s right to prosecute the original allegation.
Disposition
38The appeal is allowed.
39The guilty plea entered on April 23, 2025 to the substituted charge under s. 148(5) of the Highway Traffic Act is struck, and the conviction entered on that plea is set aside.
40Pursuant to s. 138(1) of the Provincial Offences Act, a new trial is directed on the original charge of careless driving contrary to s. 130(1) of the Highway Traffic Act.
Released: July 22, 2026
Signed: Justice P.T. O’Marra