Administrative Law - OCJ

A child protection society brought a motion to place four children in the care of their paternal grandparents, subject to society supervision.

The mother opposed the motion and sought return of the children to her custody.

The court found that the mother had proactively addressed the addiction issues that originally prompted the society's intervention, had completed treatment, and was meaningfully engaged in ongoing services.

The court determined that the protection concerns could be adequately mitigated through a supervision order and that returning the children to the mother's care was consistent with Anishinaabe cultural traditions and the remedial purposes of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act.

The court ordered the children placed in the mother's custody subject to supervision and specific conditions.

This is a status review application under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 concerning three sibling children in the care of the Children's Aid Society of Algoma.

The children have been in society care for over five years following apprehension in November 2014 based on allegations of inappropriate discipline.

The court conducted a contested trial to determine whether the children should be returned to their mother, placed with their maternal grandmother, or remain in extended society care.

The judgment addresses complex evidentiary issues regarding hearsay statements of children, the credibility of witnesses, and the application of the best interests test under the CYFSA.

The applicants, who are Indigenous caregivers, sought custody of a child under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The respondent agency sought to strike the application, arguing that the child was subject to an out-of-court customary care agreement under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act and that the applicants were foster parents prohibited from bringing such an action.

The court held that out-of-court customary care agreements operate outside the statutory framework and lack procedural safeguards, that the applicants are customary caregivers rather than foster parents, and that deference cannot be given to the agency's placement decision due to procedural fairness concerns and the application of principles other than the best interests of the child.

The motion to strike was dismissed and the applicants were granted interim custody.

The defendant was charged with two offences under the Regional Municipality of Waterloo By-Law 16-023 (as amended by By-Law 18-023): offering tow truck services within 200 metres of an accident scene and positioning a tow truck within 200 metres of an accident scene.

The defendant challenged the validity of the amended by-law as inconsistent with the Highway Traffic Act.

The court found that the amended by-law conflicted with section 177(3) of the Highway Traffic Act, which provides an exception for towing services in emergencies.

The court determined that an accident constitutes an emergency and that the by-law's complete prohibition on tow truck presence within 200 metres of an accident scene eliminated the provincial emergency exception.

The court found the amended by-law invalid and dismissed both charges.

The Children's Aid Society brought a summary judgment motion seeking a finding that two children were in need of protection on grounds of risk of physical harm and risk of emotional harm, a disposition order of deemed sole custody to the mother, and an order for supervised access to the father.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the Society had not established a genuine issue requiring trial on either ground for finding.

The court noted that while the father exhibited difficult behaviour, there was no credible evidence of a mental health disorder causally connected to risk of physical harm, and no evidence of emotional harm to the children.

The court also expressed concerns about the disposition sought and the practical feasibility of the proposed access arrangement.

The Regional Municipality of York appealed acquittals on six Building Code Act charges arising from Orders to Comply issued in 2013 for unauthorized construction at a marina property.

The trial judge acquitted the respondent on the basis that the 2013 Orders were identical to Orders issued in 1996, and that the respondent had complied with the earlier Orders.

The appellate court found that the trial judge erred by permitting a collateral attack on the 2013 Orders, which had not been appealed to the Superior Court as required by statute.

The court also rejected defences of due diligence, estoppel, laches, and officially induced error.

The acquittals were overturned and convictions were entered on all counts, with fines of $100 per count totalling $600.

The Crown brought applications to quash preliminary inquiry requests made by defendants before new provisions limiting preliminary inquiries came into effect on September 19, 2019.

The new provisions restrict preliminary inquiries to cases where the maximum penalty is at least 14 years imprisonment.

The defendants faced indictable offences with maximum penalties less than 14 years.

The court considered whether the new section 535 of the Criminal Code applied retrospectively to eliminate jurisdiction over previously valid preliminary inquiry requests.

The Crown argued the amendments were purely procedural and applied retrospectively.

The defence argued the court retained jurisdiction over validly requested inquiries.

The court found itself bound by a Superior Court decision granting the Crown's certiorari application in a related case and allowed the Crown's applications, finding the defendants' preliminary inquiry requests to be of no force and effect.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part V of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County brought a protection application regarding two children and subsequently sought leave to withdraw the application without costs.

The respondent father opposed the withdrawal on a without-costs basis, seeking costs of $31,870.41 inclusive, arguing the Society had failed to properly investigate and acted incompetently.

The court dismissed the costs claim, finding the Society had conducted an adequate investigation, acted reasonably and with due diligence throughout the proceedings, and appropriately reassessed its position as circumstances evolved.

The court held that the Society's conduct did not meet the threshold for a costs award against a child protection agency.

Three separate speeding prosecutions were consolidated to address a recurring legal issue regarding sentencing discretion in the early resolution process.

The defendants were charged with speeding offences under section 128 of the Highway Traffic Act.

Following early resolution meetings, the prosecution and defence jointly proposed fines significantly exceeding the applicable set fines and fixed fines.

The court held that it lacked authority to impose fines beyond those prescribed by statute, and that the early resolution process under the Provincial Offences Act limits judicial discretion to either the applicable set fine or the fixed fine specified in section 128(14) of the Highway Traffic Act.

The court rejected the joint submissions as unlawful.

An applicant sought judicial review of a firearms officer's refusal to issue a Possession and Acquisition Licence (PAL) under the Firearms Act.

The officer based the refusal on twelve occurrence reports spanning 2004 to 2015, demonstrating a pattern of violent and unpredictable behaviour, despite only one criminal conviction.

The applicant argued the refusal was unreasonable, but the court found the officer's decision was based on a reasonable assessment of the applicant's propensity for violence and lack of judgment in escalating situations to violence.

The court upheld the refusal, finding it was desirable in the interests of public safety that the applicant not possess firearms.

The defendant brought a motion to recuse the justice of the peace on grounds of reasonable apprehension of bias.

The defendant's agent alleged that the justice had exhibited hostility towards paralegals and agents in prior proceedings, specifically citing an incident involving another paralegal in a different matter and historical treatment of agents in 2004 when they lacked Law Society licensing.

The justice rejected the motion, finding the allegations were unsubstantiated, lacked specificity, and did not meet the threshold for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The justice noted that the paralegal in question was not representing the defendant and that the 2004 practice predated the licensing of paralegals by the Law Society.

An appeal from a conviction for entering inaccurate information in a daily log contrary to Ontario Regulation 555/06 section 27(1) under the Highway Traffic Act.

The appellant was charged with maintaining inaccurate records regarding duty status times in a commercial motor vehicle logbook.

The trial justice found the appellant guilty and imposed a fine of $400 plus costs.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the conviction on three grounds: insufficient evidence of inaccuracies, misinterpretation of the legislation regarding on-duty and off-duty hours, and failure to prove the vehicle was a commercial motor vehicle.

The appellate court dismissed all grounds of appeal and upheld the conviction.

The City of Toronto prosecuted a home comfort equipment retailer and lessor for carrying on the business of a plumbing contractor without a licence, contrary to Chapter 545 of the Toronto Municipal Code.

The defendant hired independent plumbing companies to install and remove a carbon water filter that it leased to a consumer.

The court found that the defendant did not carry on the business of a plumbing contractor within the meaning of the regulatory scheme.

The court distinguished between the business of leasing chattels and the actual performance of plumbing work, which was conducted by licensed independent plumbers.

The court dismissed the charge, finding that a broad interpretation of "plumbing contractor" would lead to absurdity and would require property management companies, building superintendents, and hardware stores to maintain exclusive master plumbers on staff.

This decision addresses a motion by Children's Aid Society of Algoma (Algoma CAS) seeking to substitute Nogdawindamin Family and Community Services (Nogdawindamin CAS) as the applicant in child protection proceedings.

The motion arose from the recent designation of Nogdawindamin, a native agency, as a children's aid society effective April 1, 2017.

The court examined the Minister's designation of Nogdawindamin CAS, which imposed conditions restricting its jurisdiction over certain categories of persons.

The court determined that it has authority to adjudicate jurisdictional issues and that transfer motions require more than mere notification to the court.

The court found that the subject child fell within Nogdawindamin CAS's jurisdiction under paragraph 1 of the designation (geographic jurisdiction on First Nation reserves) and ordered the transfer.

The offender was convicted of intimidating a justice participant and breaching a recognizance following his conduct at a preliminary inquiry.

While testifying as a witness in domestic violence charges against the offender, the victim was subjected to a cut-throat gesture and threatening words by the offender.

The court imposed a sentence of eight months custody on the intimidation charge and two months concurrent on the breach charge, followed by 18 months probation with strict conditions including non-association with the victim.

DNA orders and a lifetime firearms prohibition were also imposed.

The court emphasized the seriousness of offences against the administration of justice and the need to protect witnesses and the integrity of the judicial process.

This is a costs decision in a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act.

The mother sought trial costs of $21,919.39 against the Catholic Children's Aid Society.

The court found that while the society's overall conduct did not warrant a full costs award, the society engaged in serious unfair dealing by injecting unsubstantiated risk factors (alcohol and drug abuse, mental illness) into its risk assessment documents regarding the mother.

The court awarded partial costs of $5,000 to the mother, finding that this misrepresentation constituted a "smearing" of the parent that violated principles of fair dealing required under child protection law.

The court emphasized that child protection agencies must maintain proportionate intervention, provide fair disclosure, and avoid manipulating risk calibration through false information.

The Children's Aid Society of the County of Dufferin sought leave to withdraw a protection application concerning a child.

The respondent, a pediatric nurse with 17 years of experience as a foster parent, consented to the withdrawal but sought costs on a full indemnification basis.

The court found that while the Society did not act in bad faith, the decision to apprehend the child was an ill-considered use of the Society's powers that could not be justified.

The court awarded costs to the respondent for the apprehension hearing and the period leading up to the temporary care hearing, but declined to award costs for work undertaken after the Society's settlement offer on May 22, 2013, which was focused on adding the Toronto Children's Aid Society as a party rather than resolving the protection concerns.

This is an evidentiary ruling in a child protection trial concerning the admissibility of a Child and Family Services Review Board decision.

The applicant society sought to exclude a Board decision that upheld the mother's complaints regarding the society's failure to comply with statutory obligations.

The court ruled that the Board's decision was admissible both as a public document and under the principled exception to the hearsay rule based on necessity and reliability.

The decision addresses the relevance of the Board's findings to the court's consideration of whether the society provided appropriate services and gave the parent a reasonable opportunity to parent.

The defendant corporation was charged with three offences under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act for violations discovered at a residential building following a fire on April 3, 2009.

The charges involved: (1) providing devices on required doors that could prevent them from being readily opened from the inside; (2) failing to maintain the fire alarm system in operating condition; and (3) failing to maintain smoke alarms in operating condition.

The prosecution proved the actus reus of all three charges.

The defendant raised a due diligence defence, arguing it had taken reasonable care.

The court found the defendant's fire prevention plan was inadequate, haphazard, and reactive rather than preventive, with poor coordination and no regular monitoring.

The defendant failed to meet its burden of proving due diligence and was convicted on all three charges.

The accused was charged with driving while disqualified contrary to section 259(4)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The accused was operating an electric bicycle (E-bike) while subject to a prohibition order against driving motor vehicles.

The central issue was whether an E-bike constitutes a motor vehicle under the Criminal Code definition.

The court found that the E-bike qualified as a motor vehicle because it was capable of being propelled by an electric motor.

However, the accused successfully raised the defence of officially induced error, having consulted with police officers who advised him that driving an E-bike would not violate his prohibition order.

A judicial stay of proceedings was entered.