OCJ 2016

The Crown sought to establish a peace bond under section 810 of the Criminal Code against the defendant following a separation dispute.

The complainant alleged threats and concerning behaviour during property division proceedings.

The defence brought a motion for non-suit or directed verdict at the close of the Crown's case, arguing insufficient evidence of reasonable grounds for fear.

The court found that while the complainant harboured fear at the time the information was sworn, the evidence did not establish reasonable grounds for such fear at the time of hearing, approximately ten months later.

The court granted the defence motion, finding that the passage of time, absence of contact between parties, and lack of acrimony in subsequent interactions undermined the reasonableness of the fear.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident on September 7, 2014.

The complainant and accused were friends of approximately 12 years with a purely platonic relationship.

While watching television at the complainant's newly purchased home, the complainant fell asleep on a loveseat while the accused was massaging her feet and legs.

The complainant awoke to find the accused's fingers inserted into her vagina without her consent.

The accused immediately told him to leave.

The court found that the accused sexually assaulted the complainant by inserting his fingers into her vagina while she was asleep and therefore incapable of consenting.

The accused's own admissions in his text message, statements to police upon arrest, and video-recorded police statement were determinative of guilt.

The applicant mother sought parental support under section 32 of the Family Law Act from her adult daughter, claiming a need for $3,000 per month.

The applicant alleged she had provided care and support to the respondent from birth until age 16, when the respondent chose to live with her father.

The respondent opposed the claim and sought a restraining order, alleging a history of physical and emotional abuse, alienation from her father, exposure to domestic violence, and ongoing harassment including criminal charges and civil litigation.

The court found the applicant had not established entitlement to parental support on the basis of need, had not provided adequate care or support given the emotional and psychological abuse inflicted on the respondent, and that the applicant's unconscionable conduct constituted an obvious gross repudiation of the mother-daughter relationship.

The court dismissed the parental support claim and granted a restraining order.

The defendant was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over the permissible limit.

The trial focused primarily on whether the defendant's Charter rights were violated and whether the breath test results should be excluded from evidence.

The defendant challenged the lawfulness of the approved screening device demand, alleging lack of reasonable suspicion, and argued that he was not properly informed of his right to counsel at various stages of the investigation.

The court found that the officer had reasonable suspicion to demand the screening device, that the defendant was properly informed of his rights to counsel, and that the breath samples were obtained as soon as practicable.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with care or control of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol.

The Crown conceded that the defendant's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired.

The sole issue was whether the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was in care or control of the vehicle.

The court found that the statutory presumption under s. 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code was not engaged because the Crown failed to prove the defendant actually occupied the driver's seat.

However, applying the risk analysis from R. v. Boudreault, the court found a realistic risk that the defendant would drive while impaired, based on her intoxication, proximity to her vehicle, possession of keys, and lack of a concrete and reliable alternative plan.

The defendant was found guilty.

A default hearing concerning child support arrears.

The Director sought a default order requiring the respondent father to pay $2,224 per month in ongoing support plus $776 per month toward arrears, with a 3-day jail term for each default.

The father, acting in person, sought a $600 per month payment order without a committal clause.

The court found the father had only partially rebutted the presumption of ability to pay, noting his poor payment history, lack of credibility, and inconsistent financial disclosure.

The court ordered a graduated payment schedule starting at $600 per month and increasing to $1,800 per month by April 2017, with a 3-day jail term for each default up to a maximum of 180 days.

The defendant, Tyrell Mingo, was convicted of possessing a loaded, prohibited firearm contrary to Criminal Code s. 95(1).

At age eighteen, he was found in possession of a .357 calibre revolver with six rounds of ammunition during a police response to a reported home invasion.

The Crown sought four years' imprisonment, while the defence sought eighteen months.

The court imposed a structured sentence of two years less a day in custody followed by three years' probation with conditions including community service, counselling, and completion of high school education.

The court considered the defendant's youth, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, and sixteen months of house arrest bail, while emphasizing the serious nature of firearm offences and the need for deterrence and denunciation.

This is a child protection matter under Part III of the Child and Family Services Act involving an apprehension of three children with developmental delays.

The father challenged the apprehension and sought dismissal of the protection application as an abuse of process, or alternatively, sought placement of the children in his care without supervision.

The court found that the father's inability to manage his emotions while disciplining the children, combined with his refusal to cooperate with services and his inappropriate responses to allegations of sexual abuse, established a real risk of emotional and physical harm.

The court rejected the father's abuse of process arguments and allegations of bias against the child welfare agency.

The children were placed with the mother subject to supervision, and the father was granted supervised access with specific conditions and recommendations for behavioral modification.

The court heard two motions brought by respondent parents in a child protection proceeding.

The respondent mother sought a declaration that she and three youngest children are Native and/or eligible for status as Indians under the Child and Family Services Act, and requested that the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte be served and permitted to participate in proceedings.

The respondent father D.M.'s motion was dismissed as he did not appear.

The court adjourned the mother's motion to May 6, 2016, and made orders regarding service on the Band, participation at hearings, and case management to address delays caused by the parties' conduct and the voluminous materials filed.

The accused was charged with two counts of criminal harassment under section 264 of the Criminal Code for repeatedly communicating with two women, Stephanie Guthrie and Heather Reilly, via Twitter between August 1 and November 20, 2012.

The Crown alleged that the accused's tweets caused both complainants to reasonably fear for their safety.

The accused was also charged with violating a peace bond.

The court found that while the accused engaged in repeated communication and the complainants were harassed, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused knew the complainants were harassed or that the complainants' fear for their safety was reasonable in all the circumstances.

All charges were dismissed.

The accused brought an application under section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms alleging unreasonable delay in bringing the matter to trial.

The accused was charged with attempted murder and numerous firearms-related offences arising from a drive-by shooting on July 23, 2014.

The trial was scheduled for July 11-22, 2016, representing a delay of approximately 23.5 months from the laying of charges.

The court dismissed the application, finding that while the Crown was responsible for approximately one month of delay in disclosing a sealed Information to Obtain a search warrant, the overall delay was reasonable when considering the complexity of the case, the inherent time requirements, the accused's implicit waiver through his actions and tactical choices, and the significant societal interest in trying serious offences on the merits.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug (marijuana) on June 25, 2014, in Ottawa.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by marijuana.

The evidence included observations of marijuana smoke emanating from the vehicle, the accused's admission to smoking, and performance on drug influence evaluation tests administered approximately one to one and a half hours after the stop.

The court found that divided attention tests, particularly the modified Romberg balance test, heel-to-toe walk, and one-leg stand test, demonstrated significant impairment of the accused's ability to perform tasks requiring divided attention, which is essential to safe driving.

The accused was convicted on both the impaired driving charge and the marijuana possession charge.

This is a disposition hearing in a child protection application following a bifurcated hearing.

The Children's Aid Society of Oxford County sought Crown wardship without access for a child born in 2008.

The biological mother sought placement without supervision, while the maternal grandparents sought placement as an alternative.

The court found the child to be in need of protection based on exposure to domestic violence, parental substance abuse, mental health issues, and failure to follow protective advice.

The court ordered Crown wardship for the purpose of adoption, finding that the child had formed a secure attachment to the foster family and that returning the child to the mother or grandparents would cause significant harm.

The court dismissed the mother's and grandparents' placement plans and denied access to the biological family.

The respondent father brought a motion to set aside a default order made by Justice Nevins on January 26, 2015, granting the applicant mother sole custody of their child, a restraining order, and child support.

The father was not properly served with the original application, as the process server filed a false affidavit of service.

The court found that the father was entitled to have the order set aside because he was never properly served and had no notice of the proceeding.

The court set aside the default order and made temporary orders granting the mother custody pending a new application in British Columbia, where the child now resides, and granting the father Skype access to the child.

The Crown sought preliminary orders in a sexual assault and sexual interference case involving a 13-year-old complainant.

The court granted orders banning publication of the complainant's name, permitting testimony outside the presence of the accused, and allowing a support worker to be present.

The central issue was whether defence counsel should be permitted to be in the adjacent room during cross-examination.

The court ruled that defence counsel must remain in the courtroom and conduct cross-examination remotely via video link, rather than being present in the adjacent room with the witness.

An application to extend a youth's committal to a secure treatment program at Syl Apps Youth Centre for an additional three months was dismissed.

The applicant sought to extend the committal based on five statutory criteria under the Child and Family Services Act.

While the youth conceded that he had a mental disorder and was receiving appropriate treatment, the court found that the applicant failed to establish that it was likely the youth would cause or attempt to cause serious bodily harm to himself or others.

The court distinguished between minor assaults and the serious bodily harm required to justify continued detention under the extraordinary measures provision of the Act.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol content exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood and dangerous driving.

The Crown did not proceed with an impaired driving charge.

The accused admitted to driving with a blood alcohol level of 130 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood but raised the defence of necessity, claiming he was forced to drive to escape an imminent threat of physical harm in a parking lot confrontation.

The court found the defence of necessity did not apply and convicted the accused of the over 80 charge while acquitting on the dangerous driving charge.

The Crown appealed a not guilty verdict in a Highway Traffic Act charge of driving while handling a handheld device.

The trial Justice of the Peace acquitted the defendant on the basis that the Crown failed to prove that the vehicle was a "motor vehicle" and the road was a "highway" as defined by the Highway Traffic Act, because the Crown's witness did not use the specific phrase "as defined by the Highway Traffic Act." The appellate court allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the Crown's evidence was sufficient and that witnesses need not recite statutory definitions verbatim.

The court applied principles of judicial notice and the ordinary meaning of terms.

The accused was charged with impaired operation of a motor vehicle and operation with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding the legal limit.

The accused was found in the driver's seat of her truck in a ditch with the engine running and her hands on the steering wheel.

The accused claimed she entered the vehicle only to charge her cell phone after waiting approximately six hours for a friend to help extract the vehicle from the ditch.

The court found the accused's account lacked credibility and determined that she failed to rebut the statutory presumption of care and control under section 258(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The court also found that even if the presumption had been rebutted, the Crown proved actual care and control beyond a reasonable doubt based on the realistic risk of danger.

A youth was convicted of multiple offences arising from events in 2013 involving the recruitment and exploitation of a 14-year-old girl for sexual services in Toronto.

The offences included attempt to procure, exercise control, living off avails of a person under 18, perjury, intimidation, obstruction of a peace officer, and failure to comply with orders.

The court imposed an adult sentence of four years imprisonment, with 306 days remaining after credit for pre-sentence custody calculated at 1.5:1.

The court also imposed three years of probation with conditions including counseling, education/employment requirements, no contact with the victim, and a 10-year weapons prohibition.