Court of Appeal

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he challenged the admission of opinion evidence from witnesses identifying him as the "kicker" in a video of an assault, and the trial judge's failure to address certain exculpatory evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the witnesses' prior acquaintance with the appellant and their viewing of the video immediately after the assault placed them in a better position than the trial judge to make an identification.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the evidence.

The sentence appeal was dismissed as the appellant had served his custodial term and abandoned the appeal.

The appellant sued its former lawyer for negligence after he failed to appeal a bankruptcy trustee's disallowance of its secured claim.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding the bankrupt had no rights in the disputed funds, meaning the appellant's security interest never attached and it suffered no damages.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred and raised a new 'loss of chance' argument.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings on attachment and refusing to entertain the new loss of chance argument due to unfairness and lack of evidentiary foundation.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his convictions for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample, which had been upheld by a summary conviction appeal judge.

He argued the appeal judge erred in reviewing the trial judge's credibility findings and failed to address whether the breathalyzer machine was working properly.

The Court of Appeal denied leave, finding the trial judge's credibility analysis was adequate and that faking a breath sample constitutes a refusal regardless of whether the device is an approved instrument.

The appellant, a physician, sued the respondent lawyers who represented her former patients in medical malpractice actions and complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The appellant alleged defamation, malicious prosecution, champerty and maintenance, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress based on statements published on the respondents' website and in the news.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim in its entirety for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defamation claim was based on statements incapable of defamatory meaning, the other tort claims were premature or improperly pleaded, and the action as a whole constituted an abuse of process designed to collaterally attack the ongoing proceedings against the appellant.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of her appeal.

The court was advised that she had gone absent without leave from the hospital and was deemed discharged under the Mental Health Act.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order regarding the distribution of funds following the breakdown of a business relationship involving a proposed land development.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the trial judge's factual findings and distribution of funds.

The court also declined to admit fresh evidence regarding a water heater purchase, as it would not have changed the result.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his conviction.

The appellant argued that the unusual fact situation required the court to grant leave regarding the law of entrapment.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, finding the law of entrapment well settled and its application to the facts uncontroversial.

The appellants, who held a first mortgage on a commercial property, appealed the dismissal of their motion to vary a receivership order that granted the receiver-manager super-priority charges over their mortgage.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the appellants failed to move 'forthwith' under Rule 37.14(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the appellants had acquiesced to the manager's appointment and taken the benefit of its work before attempting to vary the order months later.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment finding he failed to pay rent and that the landlord's distraint, which included changing the locks, did not constitute a forfeiture of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record and that changing the locks does not alone render an otherwise lawful distraint a forfeiture.

The appellants, owners of private cottages on leased land in a provincial park, appealed a decision declaring them obligated to pay a portion of the grant in lieu of taxes paid by the Crown to the municipality under the Municipal Tax Assistance Act.

The appellants argued that prior lease agreements and correspondence constituted an agreement exempting them from this obligation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's finding that no such agreement existed and affirming the Crown's right to enforce its statutory rights following a change in taxation policy.

The appellant appealed her convictions and sentence for fraud and uttering a forged document.

She had pled guilty but later moved to strike her pleas, which the trial judge refused.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the pleas were voluntary and informed.

The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding no error in the 22-month conditional sentence imposed for frauds totalling approximately $40,000 and the use of forged documents for a passport application.

The plaintiff appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against a police officer and the police services board for disclosing his criminal record to his employer, which allegedly caused his termination.

The plaintiff argued the limitation period did not begin until the defendants acknowledged the disclosure was wrongful.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the two-year limitation period began when the plaintiff learned of the disclosure and his resulting loss, regardless of whether he knew the defendants were legally liable.

In an ongoing insolvency proceeding, the DeJong appellants appealed a motion judge's order dismissing their cross-motion for a constructive trust and the cancellation of shares, while granting constructive trusts over certain properties to the Bernstein applicants.

The appellants argued the motions judge failed to adjudicate their requested relief, erred in applying tracing principles for constructive trusts, and failed to apply the correct legal test under the Assignments and Preferences Act regarding a proposed settlement agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's tracing analysis, his refusal to grant the requested relief to avoid preferring the appellants over other creditors, or his conclusion that the proposed settlement agreement constituted an unlawful preference.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claim that he was hired by the respondent municipality for a fixed three-year term as CAO.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the appellant was hired only as an 'Acting CAO/Clerk' on a temporary basis, noting that the documentary evidence, the municipality's past practice, and the appellant's own inconsistent positions supported this conclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent municipality.

The appellants appealed a judgment imposing constructive trusts over certain properties, arguing the matter was too complex for a motion and that the motion judge erred in accepting the Inspector's tracing methodology.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge correctly applied the legal principles of constructive trust based on the appellants' fraud and misappropriation of funds, and properly appreciated the extensive evidentiary record.

The appellants sued their former lawyer for fraudulent misrepresentation regarding his fee estimate, and sued his insurer, LPIC, as an accessory after the fact.

The motion judge struck the claim against LPIC for disclosing no reasonable cause of action and dismissed the action against the lawyer as an abuse of process, finding it was brought to provide leverage in a fee assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings that no duty of care exists between an insurer and an adverse party, and that the action against the lawyer was an abuse of process.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible for assault with a weapon and criminal harassment, appealed the Ontario Review Board's refusal to grant him an absolute discharge.

The Board had ordered a continuation of his conditional discharge based on psychiatric evidence that he would likely stop taking his anti-psychotic medication and resume substance abuse if absolutely discharged, thereby increasing the risk of violent relapse.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board correctly applied the significant threat test and that its conclusion was reasonably supported by the evidence.

The Court of Appeal issued supplementary reasons to allocate a previously imposed total sentence of six years among the appellant's various convictions.

The court allocated three years for trafficking in Oxycodone, five years concurrent for trafficking in Fentanyl, and one year consecutive for forgery charges, resulting in a net sentence of seven and a half months on the forgery charges after pre-sentence custody credit.

The appellant appealed her convictions for firearm and drug offences, as well as her sentence.

She argued the trial judge erred in applying step six of the Garofoli procedure by preventing a sub-facial challenge to the redacted information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant, which relied on confidential informers.

The Court of Appeal held that while an accused is entitled to mount a sub-facial challenge at step six, the trial judge's procedure and the judicial summary provided sufficient information to protect the right to make full answer and defence without breaching informer privilege.

The court also upheld the trial judge's dismissal of the appellant's Corbett application and found no error in the consecutive sentence imposed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after strangling the victim.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in jury instructions regarding intent and the partial defence of provocation, and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the cross-examination but held that the trial judge erred by instructing the jury that the appellant's after-the-fact conduct (hiding the body and lying) could be used to infer the requisite intent for murder without proper qualification.

The trial judge also erred in the provocation instruction by attributing the appellant's size and athletic ability to the 'ordinary person' test.

The curative proviso could not be applied, and a new trial was ordered.