Court of Appeal

The Crown applied under s. 679(6) of the Criminal Code to revoke the respondent's bail release order, which had extended his release pending appeal.

The respondent opposed and brought a cross-application for release pending appeal.

The court found reasonable grounds to believe the respondent had committed new indictable offences while on bail, including possession of break-in instruments, stolen mail, ammunition, and potential bomb-making materials.

The court concluded that the enforcement interest outweighed the reviewability interest, particularly given the nature of the new charges and the reduced concern for appeal delay.

Consequently, the respondent's bail release was revoked, and his application for release pending appeal was denied.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario allowed an appeal in a medical negligence action, ordering a new trial.

The plaintiffs alleged delayed diagnosis of hydrocephalus in their child, leading to brain damage.

The trial jury found no breach of standard of care.

The appellate court found that the defendants' expert witness exceeded his role by opining on the credibility and reliability of the parties, thereby breaching his duty of independence.

The trial judge erred by not specifically instructing the jury to disregard these improper opinions and by failing to exclude them.

Despite the appellants' counsel not objecting at trial, the errors constituted a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, tainting the jury's verdict and warranting a new trial.

This appeal was dismissed due to a lack of jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal determined that the proper jurisdiction for an appeal involving a single payment of less than $50,000 is the Divisional Court.

The appellant appealed a judgment of less than $50,000 to the Court of Appeal for Ontario.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal, holding that it was properly brought to the Divisional Court due to the monetary amount.

No costs were awarded.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of "employer" under the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OHSA) following a fatal workplace incident.

The City of Greater Sudbury, which had contracted out road repairs, was acquitted at trial and on first appeal, with courts finding it was neither an "employer" nor "constructor." The Court of Appeal for Ontario reversed, holding that the City was indeed an "employer" under OHSA because its own employees (inspectors) were present and performing tasks at the project site, satisfying the first branch of the "employer" definition.

The case was remitted to the appeal court to consider the City's due diligence defence, which had not been addressed by the appeal judge.

A proposed intervener brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in a family law appeal concerning child custody and the best interests of the children.

The appellant consented, but the respondent opposed the motion.

The court acknowledged the proposed intervener's expertise but dismissed the motion, finding that the late timing of the application would cause significant prejudice to the respondent, who would not have adequate time to respond to the intervener's factum before the scheduled appeal hearing.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of a material change in circumstances for a motion to change under the Family Law Rules.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the issue of material change was properly determined by summary judgment and that the factors (respondent's move, new partner, work schedule change) clearly constituted a material change under the Gordon and Goertz test, relevant to the children's best interests.

The Law Society of Ontario investigated the appellant lawyer for failing to promptly and completely produce documents related to his firm's structure and referral fee practices, breaching Rule 7.1-1 of the Rules of Professional Conduct.

The Law Society Tribunal Hearing Division found professional misconduct, which was upheld by the Appeal Division and the Divisional Court.

The appellant argued that the lower courts erred by applying a purely objective test to "good faith" in the duty to cooperate, effectively creating an absolute liability offence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the test for failure to cooperate is a mixed subjective and objective one, considering all circumstances and good faith efforts, but clarified that ignorance of record-keeping obligations cannot serve as a "good faith explanation" for delay.

The Court of Appeal considered a motion to transfer an appeal and cross-appeal to the Divisional Court due to a jurisdictional issue.

The appellant had been awarded $16,000 in damages by the Superior Court, which falls below the $50,000 threshold for appeals to the Court of Appeal under s. 19(1)(a) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court granted the motion, transferring both the appeal and cross-appeal to the Divisional Court, which has the appropriate jurisdiction.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were deficient, specifically in analyzing evidence, addressing a potential motive to fabricate, and interpreting a text message.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons adequately explained the verdict, sufficiently exposed the reasoning for appellate review, and properly applied the principles of credibility assessment, including the R. v. W.(D.) framework.

The court affirmed that a trial judge is not required to address every argument explicitly if the reasons as a whole are cogent.

The appellants, the Attorney General of Canada and the Ontario Provincial Police, appealed a motion judge's decision that the respondents' claims for malicious prosecution, negligent investigation, misfeasance in public office, and civil conspiracy were not statute-barred.

The core issue was the application of the "appropriate means" element of the discoverability test under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that it was premature for the respondents to commence their actions until related civil forfeiture proceedings and an appeal of a costs order (which addressed Crown misconduct) were concluded.

The appeals were dismissed, affirming that the limitation period had not expired.

The appellant appealed his convictions related to a firebombing, arguing the trial judge erred in relying on circumstantial evidence.

The prosecution's case relied heavily on electronic messages sent via TextNow, SMS, and Facebook, as well as a blurry surveillance video and a stolen van.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by failing to recognize the inherent fallibility of the electronic messages, improperly relying on worthless video identification evidence, and inadequately addressing the timeline of the stolen van.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

This is an appeal from a detention order issued by the Ontario Review Board.

The original disposition became moot due to a subsequent detention order.

The appellant sought to incorporate the reasons from the new disposition into the current appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as moot, declining to hear it without a full and current record pertaining to the most recent disposition.

The appellant, a judgment creditor, appealed the dismissal of an application seeking a declaration of entitlement to the balance of matrimonial home sale proceeds, which were held in trust as security for the ex-husband's future child and spousal support obligations.

A writ of execution had been registered against the ex-husband's interest prior to the divorce order.

The Court of Appeal found that the application judge erred in interpreting the relevant jurisprudence and in failing to address the court's fundamental duty regarding child support.

The discovery of the writ of execution constituted a material change in circumstances.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the matter was remitted to the trial judge to consider whether a variation of the Divorce Judgment was appropriate in light of the material change.

Bartosz Gajewski was found not criminally responsible (NCR) for assault and forcible confinement and was subject to the Ontario Review Board (ORB) jurisdiction.

The ORB conditionally discharged him.

The Crown appealed this disposition, seeking to add a geographic boundary condition or to remit the matter for a re-hearing, arguing the ORB erred in law and was unreasonable in not imposing the boundary condition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the ORB correctly applied the law by balancing public safety with the accused's liberty interests and that its decision not to impose the boundary condition was reasonable, as existing conditions adequately protected the victim.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of an appeal as frivolous and vexatious.

The appellants failed to respond to the respondents' requests for costs.

The court reviewed the submissions and found the partial indemnity costs sought by The Catholic Children’s Aid Society of Toronto, Mary McConville, Janice Robinson, Rena Knox, and The Hospital for Sick Children to be reasonable.

The appellants were ordered to pay costs to these respondents.

The moving parties (appellants) sought an order setting aside the Registrar’s dismissal of their appeal and an extension of time to perfect the appeal.

The responding party (respondent) requested an adjournment to file responding materials, which was granted.

The motion judge also addressed the arguable jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal over the appeal, noting that the underlying orders had both interlocutory and final elements, and that leave to appeal might not be required given the interrelationship of the issues, citing relevant case law.

The motion was adjourned to a new date to allow the responding party to prepare.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing the trial judge erred by refusing to grant an adjournment to retain new counsel after he discharged his trial lawyer mid-trial, and that the Crown's cross-examination and closing address rendered the trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly exercised her discretion to refuse a lengthy adjournment, as the discharge was an attempt to derail the trial, and the appointment of amicus curiae ensured trial fairness.

The Court also held that while some of the Crown's conduct was improper, the trial judge's corrective instructions neutralized any prejudice.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's order requiring her to "top up" assigned long-term disability benefits to account for income tax deductions, arguing procedural unfairness and misinterpretation of s. 267.8 of the Insurance Act.

The Court of Appeal found the "top up" order procedurally unfair as it was not requested by parties and misinterpreted the statutory trust and assignment provisions.

The court held that the assignment applies to net after-tax payments, and the respondent's insurer, as assignee, must bear the burden of addressing tax implications with the insurer and CRA.

The appeal was allowed, and the "top up" order was set aside.

The Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT), acting as litigation guardian for the appellant, brought a motion to quash the appellant's appeal of a court-approved settlement in two civil proceedings.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario quashed the appeal, holding that once a litigation guardian is appointed, they have sole control over the proceeding, and the litigant lacks the authority to appeal the settlement order.

The court further clarified that any challenge to the appointment of a litigation guardian must be brought before the Divisional Court, with leave, not the Court of Appeal.