Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

This is an application to re-open an appeal, brought by the applicant after her initial appeal of a habeas corpus dismissal was rejected.

The applicant sought to introduce what she characterized as "fresh evidence" to argue that the trial court lacked jurisdiction for her conviction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding that the proposed "fresh evidence" was merely further legal argument and did not satisfy the test for admission of fresh evidence as established in Palmer v. The Queen.

Furthermore, the court found the arguments irrelevant to the sufficiency of the application judge's original reasons.

This is an appeal from a conviction where the Crown filed an affidavit attesting to the appellant's death.

The court dismissed the appeal as abated due to the appellant's demise.

The appellant, Joshua Nuziato, appealed his sentence for trafficking cocaine, arguing the sentence was inappropriate given his guilty plea, insufficient weight was given to COVID-19 during pre-sentence custody, and the probation term was not legally available.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit and within range, noted the sentencing judge had considered COVID-19 as a mitigating factor, and confirmed that a probation order was legally available as the term of imprisonment did not exceed two years.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario heard two motions arising from two notices of appeal filed by the appellant, Deepan Budlakoti.

The Crown sought to quash a 'Charter Appeal' concerning a pre-trial application dismissal, arguing it was an interlocutory order without a right of appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti sought reconsideration of a decision refusing his application for appointment of counsel for his 'Habeas Appeal' challenging detention conditions.

The court granted the Crown's motion, quashing the Charter Appeal as an interlocutory criminal appeal.

Mr. Budlakoti's motion for counsel was dismissed, as the court agreed there was no arguable ground of appeal for the Habeas Appeal.

The appellant was convicted of forcible confinement by the Ontario Court of Justice.

The Crown alleged that the appellant, his brother, and a third man confined the complainant in a car and drove him around Rexdale to force him to contact his brother about a debt.

The confinement lasted approximately one hour with no physical harm.

The key issue at trial was identity.

The appellant appealed his conviction on grounds of unreasonable verdict, insufficient reasons, and interference with cross-examination.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence of 60 days' intermittent custody followed by 18 months' probation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the conviction appeal and the sentence appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence, arguing that the trial judge erred in refusing to admit fresh evidence after his guilty plea that would allegedly establish he was not the driver of the vehicle involved in the June 15, 2012 accident, and in refusing to permit him to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant failed to provide affidavits from potential alibi witnesses and that his guilty plea was voluntary, unequivocal, and informed based on the trial judge's careful inquiry under section 606 of the Criminal Code.

The Crown appealed an order granting a stay of proceedings on charges of armed robbery due to a breach of the accused's right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

It took 52.5 months to bring the case to trial, with significant delay occurring in the provincial court.

The Crown argued the application judge erred in attributing defence counsel's dilatory conduct to the Crown's failure to be proactive.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the Crown is not responsible for defence counsel's failings, but ultimately dismissed the appeal because the delay was unconscionable and prejudice could be inferred.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault following an altercation at a restaurant where he placed the victim in a headlock, resulting in the victim falling and suffering a severe brain injury.

At trial, the judge refused to leave the defence of consent to the jury, instructing them that consent is not a defence to aggravated assault.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred, as consent is only vitiated if the accused both intended to cause serious bodily harm and actually caused it.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The young person appealed convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, as well as a serious violent offence designation.

In an addendum to a previous endorsement, the Court of Appeal noted the Crown's intention not to proceed on a new trial.

The court allowed the appeal, quashed the convictions for aggravated assault and assault with a weapon, ordered a new trial, and stayed those charges.

Consequently, the court granted leave to appeal the sentence and quashed the serious violent offence designation under the Youth Criminal Justice Act, as the remaining conviction for weapons dangerous could not support it.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The appellant focused on a six-month delay during the preliminary inquiry.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the delay was neutral and that the prejudice experienced by the appellant was not significant.

The appeal was dismissed.

Appeal from an Ontario Review Board disposition order under Part XX.1 of the Criminal Code.

The appellant challenged the reasonableness of a detention order and a 50 km radius restriction requiring proximity to the hospital.

The court held that the disposition was supported by the record and reflected the least restrictive disposition agreed to by the parties before the Board.

Although fresh evidence showed the appellant was doing well, that progress was for the next Board hearing and did not render the earlier disposition unreasonable.

The appellant appealed his sentence for setting fire to a police cruiser during the G20 riots.

The Court of Appeal upheld the custodial sentence, finding that general deterrence and denunciation were paramount and the trial judge adequately considered the appellant's personal circumstances.

However, the Court struck out the restitution order because the trial judge failed to inquire into the appellant's ability to pay, noting his addiction and sporadic employment.

The appellant pleaded guilty to numerous serious offences, including armed robberies and break and enters, after voluntarily confessing to police following a religious conversion.

He was sentenced to 22 years consecutive to a 7-year sentence he was already serving.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found the sentence was crushing and offended the totality principle, failing to give adequate credit for his voluntary confession and guilty pleas.

The appeal was allowed and the sentences were varied to total approximately 15 years.

The appellant appealed the three-year probation term of his sentence, having already served the custodial portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the three-year term was not excessive given the appellant's extensive criminal record and the rehabilitative objectives of probation.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision upholding his conviction for 'over 80'.

He argued the trial judge improperly intervened in eliciting evidence and erred in relying on the presumption of accuracy in a non-certificate case.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the appeal judge properly applied the standard for assessing judicial intervention and that the presumption of accuracy issue did not raise an arguable ground of appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to multiple offences, including a violent home invasion and robbery, and was sentenced to a further six years in custody after receiving credit for pre-trial custody and a four-year discount for acting as a police informant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the sentence violated the 'jump' principle and that the informer discount was insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence appropriate given the significant violence involved and holding that there is no fixed tariff for informer discounts.

The court also declined to order state-funded counsel under s. 684(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a decision of the Summary Conviction Appeal Court refusing an extension of time to appeal his conviction.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court judge dismissed the application because the appellant failed to demonstrate a timely intention to appeal or provide an adequate explanation for the six-month delay.

The Court of Appeal found no error in this decision, noting the appellant's affidavit lacked specific evidence of an intention to appeal within the 30-day period or an adequate explanation for the delay.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was wrongfully convicted of sexual assault and later had his conviction quashed after fresh DNA evidence was admitted, sued his trial lawyer for negligence.

The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the action, finding no 'egregious errors' and no evidence of causation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proper standard of care for a lawyer conducting litigation is reasonableness, not 'egregious error'.

The Court also found that the 'but for' causation analysis raised a genuine issue for trial regarding whether the appellant would have been acquitted had the lawyer obtained the DNA evidence and properly conducted the trial.

The respondent's cross-appeal alleging abuse of process was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of the first-degree murder of a three-and-a-half-year-old child.

On appeal, he argued that the trial judge erred in his instructions to the jury regarding reasonable doubt, the assessment of evidence, and consciousness of guilt based on post-offence statements to the police.

The Court of Appeal found that the reasonable doubt instruction substantially complied with the law, the jury was properly instructed to consider all evidence, and any shortcomings in the consciousness of guilt instruction did not prejudice the appellant given the overwhelming DNA and forensic evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for second degree murder and the 14-year parole ineligibility period.

The court held that an unavailable witness’s prior statement was admissible under the principled hearsay exception because necessity and threshold reliability were established, and any possible concern in the jury charge was cured by repeated limiting instructions.

The court also upheld the admission and treatment of evidence concerning refusal to provide biological samples and subsequent conduct involving destruction of saliva evidence as after-the-fact conduct.

In any event, the court held that any assumed errors would have engaged the proviso because the Crown case was overwhelming.

Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.