Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence but died prior to the release of the decision.

The Court of Appeal considered whether to exercise its discretion to hear the appeal despite the general rule of abatement upon death.

Finding no issue of general importance or special circumstances, the court held that the appeal abated and dismissed it.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference involving historic intrafamilial abuse, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate and that the credibility analysis failed to address contradictions and frailties in the complainant's evidence.

The court held that the trial judge was alive to the complainant's psychiatric history, substance abuse, delayed disclosure, and conflicts with other witnesses, and properly differentiated between allegations that lacked confirmation and those that had some independent support.

The court further held that a partial admission to the complainant's mother was capable of providing confirmatory support, while other corroborative details were given only slight weight.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a designated long-term offender, was convicted of breaching his long-term supervision order (LTSO) and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

The sentencing judge intended to grant 1.5 days of credit for each day of pre-sentence custody but made a calculation error, resulting in 228 fewer days of credit.

The appellant appealed, seeking to have the 228 days applied to reduce the length of his LTSO.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that despite the calculation error, the sentence actually imposed was fit.

The court noted that an LTSO continues to run during pre-sentence custody for breaches of the order, making enhanced credit less appropriate.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal decision that upheld his convictions and sentences for impaired driving and failing to remain at the scene of an accident.

The appellant argued the verdicts were unreasonable, the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his alcohol consumption, and the fines were excessive.

The Court of Appeal found no error of law by the trial judge or the summary conviction appeal judge, noting there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the appellant's alcohol consumption and its effects were greater than he claimed.

The application for leave to appeal conviction and sentence was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of paying for sexual services from a person under 18 years of age.

He appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding his defence of mistake of age.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge gave conflicting and confusing instructions on the burden of proof concerning whether the appellant took all reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The conviction was quashed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions, arguing the trial judge erred in assessing phone records evidence and the credibility of a complainant regarding an assault.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's conclusions on the unreliability of the phone records and the credibility of the complainant were open to her and warranted no interference.

The appellant appealed his sentence of twelve years' imprisonment for two counts of sexual interference involving two young children.

He argued the trial judge failed to assist him as an unrepresented accused and that the sentence was manifestly unfit.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the first ground, finding the trial judge continually urged the appellant to retain counsel.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on the second ground, finding the twelve-year sentence was beyond the range for offences involving no violence or intercourse.

The sentence was reduced to nine years total, and the parole eligibility restriction was removed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing he was arbitrarily detained when an off-duty police officer asked to see the bottom of his boot, which linked him to a series of break and enters.

The trial judge found that the officer calmly approached the appellant and asked to see the tread pattern, and the appellant voluntarily complied without any physical or psychological restraint.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings, concluding there was no violation of the appellant's rights under sections 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, suffering from a severe delusional disorder, was convicted of aggravated assault and assault with a weapon after representing himself at trial and refusing to raise a mental disorder defence.

On appeal, the Crown sought to introduce fresh psychiatric evidence establishing that the appellant was not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD).

The Court of Appeal admitted the fresh evidence, finding it met the Palmer test and was necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction.

The Court rejected the argument that entering an NCRMD verdict after ten years of proceedings constituted an abuse of process, emphasizing the public interest in protecting society and ensuring mentally ill individuals are not improperly labelled as criminals.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a verdict of NCRMD substituted.

The young person pleaded guilty to aggravated assault following a swarming incident where the victim was repeatedly stabbed with a box cutter.

The youth court judge imposed a sentence of two years' probation.

The Crown appealed the sentence.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the probation sentence demonstrably unfit given the seriousness of the violent offence, the young person's role as the ringleader, and the devastating impact on the victim.

The sentence was varied to a nine-month custody and supervision order followed by six months' probation.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after beating the victim to death.

At trial, the appellant's core defence was that he was not present when the victim was killed, but he also relied on the defence of provocation based on an alleged unwanted sexual advance by the victim.

The trial judge left provocation to the jury.

On appeal, the appellant argued the jury charge on provocation was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality on both the objective and subjective elements, and therefore should not have been left to the jury.

As the jury had to find the appellant committed murder before considering provocation, the error occasioned no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary because it was entered as a result of death threats against him and his wife.

The appellant filed fresh evidence, including an email containing a death threat.

The Court of Appeal found that the record raised a serious issue about the voluntariness of the plea and that the appellant had satisfied the burden of proving the plea was involuntary on a balance of probabilities.

The appeal was allowed, the guilty pleas struck out, the convictions quashed, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a total sentence of nine years imposed after being found guilty of 26 charges, including possession for the purpose of trafficking cocaine, possession of counterfeit money, and firearms offences while subject to a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence was fit and not outside the range for the serious offences committed.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the trial judge.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in applying the principles of parity, jump, gap, and totality, resulting in an unduly harsh sentence.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to time served (equivalent to 18 months) plus 12 months of probation with conditions related to alcohol consumption and treatment.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing that the sentencing judge erred by imposing a concurrent rather than a consecutive sentence for a second set of offences committed two months after the first.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, citing the Supreme Court's decision in McDonnell, which establishes that a sentencing judge has considerable discretion in determining whether sentences should be concurrent or consecutive, and that appellate courts will generally defer to that discretion.

The Crown appealed the acquittals of the young person respondent on charges related to a series of car jackings.

The trial judge had excluded evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding that the police lacked objective reasonable grounds to arrest the respondent, rendering the arrest and subsequent searches unlawful.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the totality of the circumstances, which objectively provided reasonable grounds for the arrest.

Consequently, the arrest and incidental searches were lawful, and the evidence should not have been excluded.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellants appealed convictions for manslaughter, conspiracy to commit robbery, possession of a weapon, and wearing a disguise arising from a fatal botched robbery.

The court held that the trial judge erred in three respects: by giving an improper deadlock exhortation that suggested the majority view was correct, by failing to give a limiting instruction on bad character evidence led by one co-accused against the other, and by failing to provide a Vetrovec warning regarding a central accomplice witness whose credibility was seriously in issue.

The court declined to apply the curative proviso under s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant challenged his conviction on the basis that a saliva sample was obtained without informed consent and without permitting access to counsel after request.

The court held that the trial judge erred by placing the onus on the appellant to prove lack of consent under s. 8 of the Charter and failed to give reasons on the s. 10(b) issue.

Applying the framework for conscriptive evidence and discoverability under s. 24(2), the court was not satisfied that the saliva sample would be admissible.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was directed.

The appellant challenged his convictions on the basis that the trial judge improperly dismissed a Charter application seeking exclusion of a saliva sample.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred by placing the burden on the appellant to prove lack of consent under s. 8, failed to make adequate credibility findings, and gave no reasons on the alleged s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the conscriptive evidence analysis from Stillman, the court concluded the trial judge's s. 24(2) analysis was of little assistance and rejected the Crown's discoverability argument for lack of evidentiary foundation.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions and sentence arising from trafficking in large amounts of cocaine.

He argued primarily that the judge hearing the Garofoli application unfairly limited cross-examination of the police officer who swore the affidavits supporting wiretap authorizations.

The court held that leave to cross-examine on such affidavits is not automatic, informer privilege remained protected absent the innocence-at-stake exception, and the application judge properly exercised his discretion in restricting questions that risked revealing protected information.

The court also rejected a sentence disparity argument, finding the appellant played a more significant role than others in the trafficking operation.

Both conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.