Criminal and Quasi-Criminal Law - OCA

The appellant, Rapinder Bains, appealed convictions for drug-related offences, arguing that the trial judge erred by applying a less onerous standard for entrapment.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge’s approach, holding that it was open to the trial judge to infer from the Agreed Statement of Facts that the officer had the requisite subjective belief to proceed.

The appeal and the sentence appeal were both dismissed.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice that had dismissed an application for certiorari.

The appellant sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision to commit him to trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict on the charge.

The appellant, J.H., appealed his conviction for two counts of sexual assault.

The appeal raised five grounds: failure to declare a mistrial due to erroneous reception of uncharged disreputable conduct evidence, improper questioning of the complainant, failure to instruct the jury on prior consistent statements and hearsay, failure to instruct on the distinction between lack of evidence of motive to fabricate and proven absence of motive to fabricate, and failure to provide corrective instructions regarding the Crown's closing address.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the conviction.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing death, dangerous driving causing bodily harm, impaired driving causing death, impaired driving causing bodily harm, blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in death, and blood alcohol over legal limit causing accident resulting in bodily harm.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and failed to consider relevant evidence.

The primary defence theory was that the Crown failed to prove the appellant was driving the van, suggesting the appellant and a passenger could have switched positions.

The appellate court found no misapprehension of evidence and no failure to consider relevant evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed convictions for two counts of sexual assault, two counts of touching a person under 14 for a sexual purpose, and two counts of invitation of a person under 14 to sexual touching, arising from alleged offences committed in 1995 and 1996 when the appellant was a 21-year-old student living with the complainant's family.

The trial judge convicted on six of eight counts.

The appellant raised three grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in dismissing character evidence regarding the appellant's years as a youth hockey coach; (2) the trial judge failed to properly consider evidence of innocent collusion between the complainant and his younger sister; and (3) the trial judge applied a stricter standard of scrutiny to defence evidence than to Crown evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal.

The appellant, a former employee of the Ministry of Community and Social Services, appealed an order from the Superior Court that restricted her ability to commence legal proceedings.

The order prohibited her from initiating or continuing any civil or criminal proceedings without prior authorization from a Superior Court judge.

The appellant had engaged in extensive litigation across multiple forums, filing numerous civil actions, private informations, and peace bond applications, all of which were dismissed or withdrawn.

The Court of Appeal upheld the restriction on civil proceedings under section 140 of the Courts of Justice Act but struck down the restriction on criminal proceedings, finding that the Superior Court lacked the inherent jurisdiction to prevent access to justices of the peace for private informations and peace bond applications.

The appellant was convicted of a large-scale, complex fraud and sentenced to five years' imprisonment with a $100,000 restitution order.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's reasoning, noting that denunciation and deterrence are dominant for such offences.

However, based on sealed material regarding post-sentence events, the parties consented to a sentence reduction.

The Court allowed the appeal and reduced the sentence to three years.

The appellants, two commercial truck drivers, were convicted of importing $3.5 million of cocaine after the drugs were found hidden in their trailer at the border.

They appealed their convictions, arguing they were 'blind couriers' and the trial judge erred in his credibility assessments, particularly regarding their knowledge of English and a purported alibi.

The Court of Appeal (majority) dismissed the conviction appeals, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the sentence appeals, reducing the sentences from 16 and 14 years to 12 and 10 years, as the original sentences were outside the range for first-time couriers.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his summary conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited blood alcohol level.

He argued that the trial judge erred in finding the roadside breath demand was made 'forthwith' under s. 254(2)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The Court of Appeal refused leave, holding that the proposed ground of appeal involved well-established legal principles and a fact-specific inquiry that did not raise a question of law alone of general importance.

The appellants were convicted in absentia of Highway Traffic Act offences after failing to appear for trial.

The certificates of offence contained discrepancies between the short-form description of the offence and the section number.

The appeal judge upheld the convictions, finding the certificates complete and regular on their face.

On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Crown conceded that the certificates were not regular on their face as required by ss. 9(2) and 9.1(2) of the Provincial Offences Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed, allowed the appeals, and quashed the certificates of offence.

The appellant was convicted of several counts related to a home invasion and sentenced to 10 years in custody.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in rejecting his alibi and in accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness to establish identity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's factual findings or consideration of confirmatory evidence, including fingerprints and the timing of the arrest.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the 10-year sentence reflected the seriousness of the offence and the appellant's criminal record.

The appellant appealed his convictions for two counts of dangerous driving causing death arising from a motor vehicle collision where his vehicle crossed the centre line and struck an oncoming car.

He argued the trial judge erred in applying the fault component, reversed the burden of proof, and rendered an unreasonable verdict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law and concluding that the evidence reasonably permitted the inference that the appellant was driving too fast to negotiate the curve on his own side of the road.

The appellant appealed a 25-month sentence.

The Court of Appeal reduced the sentence to two years less a day, less pre-trial custody, taking into account immigration ramifications that were not before the trial judge.

The appellant appealed from a conviction entered by the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as abandoned.

The appellants were convicted of offences relating to the theft and sale of firearms.

They appealed their convictions, arguing that the trial judge erred in applying the W. (D.) framework to the accused's testimony, improperly treated a lack of memory as an undisclosed alibi, and failed to exercise sufficient caution when accepting the evidence of an unsavoury witness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding that the trial judge properly applied the burden of proof, appropriately cautioned himself regarding the unsavoury witness, and provided adequate reasons in accordance with R. v. R.E.M.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent, arguing it was wholly inadequate.

At the sentencing hearing, there were critical factual disputes regarding the respondent's intoxication and whether she acted in self-defence, but neither counsel requested a Gardiner hearing to resolve them.

The trial judge accepted the respondent's version of events, including that her capacity was seriously compromised and she acted in self-defence using excessive force.

The Court of Appeal held that in these highly unusual circumstances, the sentence, while at the extreme low end of the range, was not wholly inadequate and did not reflect an error in principle.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a finding that she breached a condition of her conditional sentence by failing to report to a drug rehabilitation program.

She argued the appeal was moot, the hearing did not commence within the 30-day statutory limit under s. 742.6(3) of the Criminal Code, and the judge erred in finding a breach.

The Court of Appeal held the appeal was not moot, the hearing commenced within the required time when the judge took jurisdiction, and the obligation to attend the program was continuous.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, a youth, was convicted of sexual interference and breach of probation involving a 5-year-old complainant.

The trial judge framed the central issue as a credibility contest between the complainant and the appellant, ultimately rejecting the appellant's testimony on the basis that he had a motive to lie to avoid conviction.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, finding that the trial judge erred by failing to apply the W.(D.) test for assessing credibility and reasonable doubt, and by erroneously assuming the appellant's testimony was inherently suspect, which violated the presumption of innocence.

The appellant appealed from a decision of the summary conviction appeal court judge dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The appellant argued that the trial judge's conclusion was unreasonable.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the summary conviction appeal court judge's finding that the trial judge's conclusion was supported by the evidence.

Leave to appeal was granted, but the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal judgment that set aside a stay of proceedings based on alleged unreasonable delay.

The court held that the delay between December 15 and May 5 was attributable to the defence, and that the trial judge improperly placed significant weight on systemic scheduling concerns unrelated to the actual causes of delay in the case.

Agreeing with the summary conviction appeal judge, the court concluded that a fair balancing of the relevant s. 11(b) factors did not justify a stay.

The application for leave to appeal was dismissed.