Civil Litigation - Plaintiff - OCA

The Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by Unit Precast (Breslau) Ltd. and a cross-appeal by Click+Clean GmbH.

Unit Precast appealed the striking out of its claims for conspiracy and intentional interference with contractual relations, and claims asserted personally against Lars Bergmann, arguing the motion judge erred in failing to recognize its business as part of RH20 North America Inc.'s.

Click+Clean GmbH cross-appealed the dismissal of its motion to stay the action in favour of arbitration, contending the motion judge erred in finding the arbitration agreement inoperative.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding Unit Precast's claims were not adequately pleaded and that Click+Clean GmbH waived its right to arbitrate by seeking substantive relief (motion to strike) from the court.

The appellant, Nathalie Mouralian, brought a motion before the Court of Appeal for the appointment of a "litigation guardian counsel" to assist with her appeal, citing serious mental health challenges and a brain injury.

The motion was dismissed for two reasons: first, the court lacked authority to appoint a "litigation guardian counsel" as the appellant required counsel, not merely a guardian; and second, the medical evidence provided did not establish mental incapacity as required by Rule 7.04(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and sections 6 or 45 of the Substitute Decisions Act, 1992.

The appellant, a former General Manager and Vice President of the respondent's Construction and Mining Technique division, was convicted of fraud over $5,000 following a jury trial.

The sentencing judge found that the appellant's participation in a fraudulent scheme involving inflated invoices constituted a gross breach of fiduciary duty.

The respondent subsequently moved for summary judgment in its civil action for breach of fiduciary duty, seeking $20 million in damages.

The motion judge granted summary judgment relying solely on the sentencing judge's findings.

The appellant appealed, arguing that the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment based on findings made under s. 724(2)(b) of the Criminal Code that were not express or implied in the jury's verdict.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund appealed a trial judgment in which it successfully sued an automobile insurer for restitution based on unjust enrichment.

The insurer had purported to terminate an automobile insurance policy for non-payment of premiums by sending notice only to the named insured (the vehicle owner's wife) rather than to the actual owner.

The policy remained in force when a catastrophic accident occurred.

The injured passenger obtained a judgment against the vehicle owner and assigned it to the fund, which paid the judgment and then sued the insurer for restitution.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judgment, finding that the notice of termination was ineffective because it was not sent to the actual owner as required by statutory condition 11(1) of Ontario Regulation 777/93, that the fund was not bound by the Insurance Act's limitation period because the Crown enjoyed immunity from the Act's provisions, and that the fund was entitled to bring a claim in unjust enrichment rather than being restricted to the statutory remedy under section 258 of the Insurance Act.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision allowing an appeal of a trial judgment in a civil action involving allegations of excessive force during arrest.

The respondent sought to avoid paying the costs of the appeal on the basis that the matter constituted public interest litigation.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument, finding that the nature of the proceeding did not fall within the recognized categories of public interest litigation.

The appellants were awarded costs of the appeal in the amount of $25,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

The Crown appealed a motion judge's order striking its third party claim.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding it was not plain and obvious that the Crown's third party claim had no reasonable prospect of success.

However, the respondent plaintiff amended his pleading to include language that would render the Crown's third party claim subject to being struck.

As a result, while the appeal was allowed, the practical outcome remained that the Crown's third party claim was struck.

The court awarded costs in accordance with the motion judge's decision, with each party bearing their own costs of the appeal.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his negligence action against a surveying company regarding a boundary dispute.

The motion judge found the claim was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, as the appellant knew of the encroachment and had sufficient information to sue more than two years before commencing the action.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, confirming the action was out of time and rejecting the appellant's procedural arguments regarding the timing of the summary judgment motion.

The appellant commenced a negligence action against the respondent dentists for substandard dental implant procedures.

The respondents successfully moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the appellant argued the motion judge erred in applying the discoverability test.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the claim was discoverable when the appellant's new dentist explained the nature of the problem and advised he would have conducted the procedure differently, which occurred more than two years before the action was commenced.

The appellant purchased 51.5 acres of land from the respondents, with an agreement to use 'best efforts' to obtain a severance of a one-acre parcel containing the respondents' home.

The trial judge found the appellant breached this obligation and ordered specific performance.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in assessing the evidence and erred in awarding specific performance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's factual conclusions were supported by the record and the award of specific performance was reasonable given the unique nature of the property.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a motion to certify a class action on behalf of CIBC customer service employees for unpaid overtime.

The motion judge and Divisional Court had found it plain and obvious that CIBC's policy requiring pre-approval for overtime complied with the Canada Labour Code, and that individual issues predominated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that it was arguable the pre-approval requirement violated the Code's mandate to pay for overtime 'required or permitted' by the employer.

The Court also found some basis in fact that CIBC's systemic practices breached employment contracts, satisfying the common issues requirement for certification.

Following an appeal where the appellant achieved partial success against multiple respondents, the Court of Appeal determined the appropriate costs awards.

Recognizing the divided success at both the motions and appellate levels, the court ordered the appellant to pay costs for the motions below, while ordering certain respondents to pay costs for the appeal.

The court accounted for the multiplicity of counsel and the novelty of the appellant's arguments in fixing the amounts.

The appellant, a lesbian, challenged the constitutionality of federal regulations governing semen donation for assisted conception, arguing they discriminated against women using known donors who were not spouses or sexual partners.

Before the application was heard, the appellant successfully self-inseminated and the government amended the regulations, leading the application judge to dismiss the case as moot.

The Court of Appeal upheld the mootness finding and declined to hear the Charter issues as a court of first instance.

However, the Court granted a motion to add another woman in the same situation as a party and remitted her application to the Superior Court for an expedited hearing on the constitutional issues.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their motion to set aside a noting in default and a subsequent default judgment.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge was not given a full picture of the merits.

The Court noted several factors favouring setting aside the default: the haste of noting in default, the short period of delay, the absence of prejudice to the respondent, and the availability of a defence.

The default judgment and noting in default were set aside, and the time for delivering a statement of defence was extended.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing its claim for breach of fiduciary duty arising from commercial negotiations.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in applying the law of fiduciary obligations to parties negotiating towards an agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusion that none of the indicia of a fiduciary duty were present, as the appellant did not repose trust of a confidential nature and was not vulnerable.

The appellants appealed an order confirming a deputy registrar's findings regarding the accounting of clinic funds, including OHIP billings and bank loans.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the deputy registrar's conclusions were supported by the evidence and authorized by the clarification order.

The parties are neighbours who share a mutual easement for repair over a four-foot strip between their houses.

The appellants built a fence entirely on their own property, which restricted access to the easement from the front to about 26 inches.

The respondents successfully applied for an injunction to remove the fence, arguing it obstructed their use of the easement for equipment like a wheelbarrow.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the easement did not include an ancillary right to cross the appellants' unencumbered property.

Because the fence was built entirely on the appellants' own property and not on the easement itself, it could not constitute an obstruction in law.

The appellant insurance company appealed a motions judge's decision that the plaintiff was not an 'occupant' of a motorcycle when she was struck by an uninsured motorist while standing near the parked vehicle.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, applying the 'objective observer' test to find that the plaintiff was a passenger and therefore an occupant under s. 224(1) of the Insurance Act.

As a result, the respondent insurer was solely liable for the plaintiff's claim.

The appellant's claim was dismissed at trial.

She appealed but failed to pay the deposit for trial transcripts.

After multiple extensions of time to perfect the appeal and obtain legal aid, her appeal was dismissed for delay by Laskin J.A. The appellant moved for an extension of time to review Laskin J.A.'s order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, noting there was still no evidence she could pay for transcripts or proceed with the appeal, and almost a year had passed since the initial extension.

The appellant appealed from a trial judge's dismissal of a motion to adduce fresh evidence.

The appellant had previously sought to adduce the same evidence before the Court of Appeal, which dismissed the appeal and refused to reconsider its decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the current appeal, finding that the admissibility of the evidence had already been determined and that the proposed evidence did not meet the requirements for admission, as it could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result at trial.

The appellant appealed an order dismissing an application on the basis that disputed facts required a trial.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the matter could not proceed by way of application, but held that the motion judge should have converted the proceeding into an action under the Rules of Civil Procedure rather than dismissing it without prejudice.

The appeal was allowed, the dismissal order was set aside, and directions were given for pleadings and discovery in the converted action.

No costs were awarded on the appeal.