Civil Litigation - Defendant - OCA

The moving party sought a panel review of a motion judge's decision denying a stay of a Divisional Court order that removed a stay of an eviction order.

The moving party had already been evicted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding no error in principle or unreasonable result by the motion judge, and noting that the motion for a stay was moot.

The appellant appealed an order finding that the civil courts had jurisdiction over the respondent's claims of sexual assault by a priest and negligence by the appellant.

The appellant argued the motion judge breached natural justice by relying on an academic article and case law not raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's reference to an academic article criticizing prior case law did not breach natural justice, as it did not involve relying on facts outside the record.

The Court upheld the finding that the dispute was not purely ecclesiastical in nature and subject to canon law.

Furthermore, the Court found no palpable and overriding error in the motion judge's exercise of discretion under the Van Breda framework.

The Estate Trustee of T.O. brought a motion to amend a notice of appeal to add two corporations, The Ridgeway Education Rec Centre Ltd. and 2012023 Ontario Limited, as respondents.

The original appeal, initiated by T.O. before his death, sought repayment of loans from these corporations, but the notice of appeal inadvertently named only D.O. as the respondent.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, applying the five-factor test for amending a notice of appeal after perfection.

The court found that the appellant had the requisite intention to appeal against the corporations, the delay was due to counsel's inadvertence and promptly addressed, there was no relevant prejudice to the respondents (who shared counsel and were aware of the claim), the appeal had arguable merit regarding the Limitations Act, and the justice of the case favored determining the matter on its merits.

This appeal addressed the scope of the "immediate disclosure" rule for litigation-altering agreements, specifically a Pierringer agreement, as established in *Handley Estate*.

The appellant (non-settling defendants) sought to stay the action, arguing the respondent (plaintiff) failed to immediately disclose the agreement's terms.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that the respondent's disclosure of the agreement's existence and essential terms, coupled with an immediate intent to seek court approval, satisfied the disclosure requirement.

The court clarified that not every term needs immediate disclosure, only those affecting the litigation landscape, and that the rationale for an abuse of process finding was not engaged where the court was informed and the disclosure was incremental within the context of seeking approval.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment that dismissed their action against GlaxoSmithKline (GSK), alleging that an H1N1 vaccine manufactured by GSK caused their five-year-old daughter's death.

The appeal raised issues concerning GSK's duty to warn (including the learned intermediary rule), its post-marketing commitments, the inference of negligence from circumstantial evidence, and costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's findings that GSK adequately warned the learned intermediary (the physician), met its post-marketing obligations, and that the appellants failed to prove negligence or causation on a balance of probabilities.

The court also upheld the trial judge's discretionary costs award.

This appeal concerned a medical negligence action where the appellant gynecologist failed to perform an endometrial biopsy on the deceased, Armineh Hacopian-Armen, in 2009, leading to a delayed diagnosis of Stage IV uterine leiomyosarcoma (uLMS) and her subsequent death.

The trial judge found the gynecologist liable for breaching the standard of care and for factual and legal causation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the findings on causation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the trial judge's conclusions that the appellant's negligence caused the harm, emphasizing the deference owed to a trial judge's assessment of expert evidence and the foreseeability of the type of harm.

CUMIS General Insurance Company appealed a trial judgment finding that an unlicensed driver operated the respondent's vehicle without consent, either express or implied.

CUMIS argued the trial judge made palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and failed to establish the tort of negligent entrustment.

The appellate court rejected all of CUMIS's arguments, finding no palpable and overriding errors in the trial judge's credibility assessments and factual conclusions.

The court also held that even if negligent entrustment exists in Ontario, it could not be established given the finding of no implied consent.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a decision allowing her long-term disability (LTD) insurer to deduct the amount of a Non-Earner Benefit (NEB) she received from her auto insurer following a second accident.

The appellant argued that based on the 'apples to apples' principle, the NEB (a non-income benefit) should not be deducted from LTD payments (an income benefit).

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the 'apples to apples' principle applies to statutorily-mandated deductions from tort awards, whereas this deduction was governed by the clear and unambiguous language of the LTD insurance policy, which permitted the deduction of 'any disability benefit'.

The appellant, a physician, sued the respondent lawyers who represented her former patients in medical malpractice actions and complaints to the College of Physicians and Surgeons.

The appellant alleged defamation, malicious prosecution, champerty and maintenance, intentional interference with economic relations, and intentional infliction of mental distress based on statements published on the respondents' website and in the news.

The motion judge struck the statement of claim in its entirety for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the defamation claim was based on statements incapable of defamatory meaning, the other tort claims were premature or improperly pleaded, and the action as a whole constituted an abuse of process designed to collaterally attack the ongoing proceedings against the appellant.

The appellants, former lawyers at a firm where the principal misappropriated trust funds, appealed a motion judge's refusal to set aside or vary a garnishment order against the firm's professional liability insurer.

The respondents, who were owed $3.6 million, sought to exhaust the $1 million policy limits.

The appellants argued they needed the policy for defence costs against threatened claims by the respondents.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, varying the order to require the respondents to release any claims against the appellants relating to the trust funds as a condition of receiving the garnished insurance proceeds, noting the respondents could not articulate any substantive claim against the appellants.

The moving party brought an urgent motion but failed to respond to the respondent's costs submissions.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, noting that costs follow the event and the mortgage terms entitled the mortgagee to reasonable costs.

Costs were fixed at $3,500 all inclusive.

The appellant failed to appear for the hearing of her appeal and sought a fourth adjournment due to alleged dental pain.

The court refused the adjournment, noting the appellant's history of delaying the litigation, the lack of medical evidence regarding her inability to proceed, and the prejudice to the respondent who had been carrying the costs of caring for their elderly mother.

The appeal was dismissed as abandoned, with costs awarded to the respondents.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that the order sought to be appealed was interlocutory and therefore no appeal lay to the Court of Appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $3,000.

The appellant's basement flooded after a municipal culvert became blocked during a major storm.

The appellant sued the city for negligence, alleging inadequate inspection and maintenance.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding the appellant failed to establish causation because the culvert likely became blocked during the storm itself.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions on causation or damages and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant insurer appealed a motion judge's approval of an infant settlement between the plaintiffs and the individual defendants for the limits of the defendants' insurance policy.

The appellant argued the settlement affected its subrogation rights and that there was insufficient evidence regarding the defendants' assets.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the merits, finding the motion judge properly exercised his discretion based on the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal regarding costs, holding that the appellant should only be liable for the additional costs caused by its objections, not the entire costs of the motion to approve the infant settlement.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding him to be a trespasser on lands beneficially owned by the Band and ordering him to vacate the lands, pay damages, and comply with other consequential relief.

The appellant claimed an equitable interest in the lands based on a purported 1993 agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the appellant's evidence was untrue and that the Band was not estopped from asserting its legal rights.

The Court dismissed the substance of the appeal, including the award of punitive damages, but varied the judgment to narrow the scope of orders regarding the removal of chattels and environmental remediation.

Following the release of the court's reasons, counsel for the appellants requested a reconsideration of the costs of the applications, noting that the appellants were not separately represented as stated in the reasons.

The Court of Appeal issued an addendum acknowledging the error but declined to reconsider the costs disposition, finding it remained appropriate because separate applications had been brought.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment finding that work performed by the respondent was referable to an oral agreement to transfer properties to him.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's finding was supported by uncontradicted evidence and there was no basis to interfere.

The appellant appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Court of Appeal found no legal error in the trial judge's reasons, evidentiary rulings, or costs orders, including the Sanderson order.

The appeal was dismissed with costs fixed at $25,000.

The appellant sued the respondent accountant and his firms for negligent misrepresentation, alleging she lost approximately $825,000 invested in a company based on his advice.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding no accountant-client relationship existed when the initial investment was structured, and that the appellant did not rely on the accountant's representations when making further investments despite knowing the company was in financial difficulty.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the action but allowed the appeal on costs on consent, reducing the trial costs awarded to the respondents.