OCA 2006

The appellant appealed an order regarding child support payments, arguing that his business expenses were not properly credited and his income had been reassessed downward.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal because the record was insufficient to determine the correct business income.

However, the dismissal was granted with leave for the appellant to move to vary the order based on his tax reassessments and proper evidence of his actual business expenses.

The successful appellants sought costs of $25,000 for the appeal.

The respondent argued for moderation because the appellants did not concede negligence until the appeal hearing, the respondent maintained a portion of the damage award, and due to the unique circumstances of the case.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the respondent and fixed costs at $5,000 inclusive of GST and disbursements, to be shared equally between the appellants.

The appellant driver was sued for negligence following a motor vehicle accident while driving the plaintiff's car.

The plaintiff's insurer, added as a third party, settled the plaintiff's claims without the appellant's consent and obtained a consent judgment against itself, but not against the appellant.

The insurer then successfully moved for summary judgment against the appellant for reimbursement of the settlement monies under section 258 of the Insurance Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal set aside the summary judgment, holding that absent an agreement between the insurer and the insured, the insurer cannot seek reimbursement under section 258(1) without first recovering a judgment against the insured.

The appellants appealed the judgment of the Superior Court of Justice regarding their liability.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's findings of fact were supported by the evidence and that she reached the correct result.

Costs were awarded to the respondent in the amount of $10,000.

The Attorney General of Canada obtained an evidence-gathering order under the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Act to allow a French expert to examine a collection of Rodin plasters held at an art centre.

The collectors appealed, arguing the order amounted to an unauthorized search and seizure.

The application judge made a sending order but attached conditions requiring the Crown to pay storage costs, indemnify the collectors for damage, and pay costs.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the collectors' appeal, finding jurisdiction for the evidence-gathering order.

However, the Court allowed the Crown's appeal, striking out the compensation and costs conditions as inconsistent with the general rule that costs are not awarded in criminal matters absent exceptional circumstances.

The appellant appealed a decision of the summary conviction appeal court dismissing his appeal from conviction.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was alive to the frailties of the identification evidence and that the combination of identification and confirmatory evidence made the verdict reasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was acquitted at trial of impaired driving after the trial judge found that without breath test results, he could not convict for impairment due to alcohol consumption.

The summary conviction appeal court allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in law by requiring breath test results and failing to consider all the evidence, including civilian testimony and the officer's observation of a stale odour of alcohol.

The appellant appealed his convictions for robbery and aggravated assault, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting his videotaped confession.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge failed to properly consider the voluntariness of the statement given the suspect nature of the unrecorded interrogations that preceded it.

Furthermore, the Court held that the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police failed to provide him with access to a telephone after he requested to speak with a lawyer.

The statements were excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the appeal was allowed, and an acquittal was entered.

The appellants appealed a decision declaring their option to purchase a residential parcel of farmland void for contravening section 50 of the Planning Act.

The appellants had sold a 74-acre farm but entered into an option agreement to purchase back the residential portion.

The Court of Appeal held that the option agreement violated section 50(3) because the grantor retained abutting lands not within a registered plan of subdivision.

The Court further found that the agreement lacked an express condition requiring compliance with the Planning Act under section 50(21), and declined to rectify the contract due to a lack of evidence of a prior oral agreement to include such a condition.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants' mother was killed by her son, a psychiatric patient who eloped from the hospital.

The appellants sued the treating psychiatrist, who successfully moved to dismiss the action as statute-barred under the six-month limitation period in s. 78 of the Mental Health Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the constitutionality of s. 78, finding no violation of s. 15(1) of the Charter.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, holding that while claims regarding the patient's care and treatment were statute-barred, it was not plain and obvious that the psychiatrist's alleged common law duty to warn the mother was governed by s. 78.

The action was permitted to proceed solely on the duty to warn claim.

Following a successful appeal and cross-appeal, the appellant sought costs.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario ordered the respondent to pay the appellant's costs fixed in the amount of $20,000, inclusive of GST and disbursements.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of a young person charged with a sexual offence.

The trial judge had found the evidence of non-consensual sex overwhelming, except for the complainant's muted response and her accompanying the respondent behind a building.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by relying on the muted response to raise a reasonable doubt about consent.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a claim for negligent investigation against the respondent, alleging the respondent provided false information to the police leading to the appellant's wrongful arrest.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it plain and obvious that no duty of care existed, as it was not reasonably foreseeable that the police would arrest the appellant without independently determining reasonable and probable grounds.

A cross-appeal regarding a conspiracy claim was allowed, dismissing the claim with leave to amend to plead better particulars.

The Crown appealed the sentence imposed on the respondent following a guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal found that the offence was very serious and would normally attract at least a three-year sentence, particularly given the element of planning.

However, because the respondent had already served nine months in a reformatory and was making progress with his addiction problems, the Court declined to send him to the penitentiary.

The sentence was varied to a maximum reformatory term of two years less a day, followed by three years' probation.

The Director of the Ontario Disability Support Program appealed a Divisional Court decision that set aside a Social Benefits Tribunal ruling denying the respondent disability benefits.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court erred in its interpretation of s. 4(1) of the Ontario Disability Support Program Act by conflating the separate inquiries for 'substantial impairment' and 'substantial restriction' in activities of daily living.

However, the Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's finding that the Tribunal made a palpable and overriding error by misapprehending the respondent's employment history.

The appeal was dismissed and a new hearing was ordered before a different member of the Tribunal.

The appellant sought judicial review of the Minister of Justice's surrender order under the Extradition Act, arguing the Minister failed to give sufficient weight to his rehabilitation and the impact of extradition on his 15-year-old daughter, for whom he is the sole parent in Canada.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding the Minister considered these factors appropriately and made no error of law, concluding the decision was reasonable given the goals of the international extradition regime.

The appellant transported contaminated soil to the respondent's transfer station.

The motion judge concluded that these stand-alone transportation services were not lienable under the Construction Lien Act.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error and relying on established case law.

The appellant appealed a costs decision.

The Court of Appeal varied the order on consent to clarify that no post-judgment interest was payable.

The Court dismissed the remaining grounds, finding that while the motions judge erred in stating costs should be assessed without regard to the settlement amount, the assessment officer erred in law by concluding that costs could not exceed the settlement amount based on proportionality.

The appeal was allowed in part.

The appellant appealed an extradition order, arguing there was insufficient evidence to satisfy the essential elements of the offence set out in the Authority to Proceed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding there was at least a scintilla of reliable evidence, particularly from an undercover officer and a co-conspirator, showing the appellant knew the laundered monies were the proceeds of trafficking in a controlled substance.

The appellant was stopped for a traffic violation and refused to produce his driver's licence, ownership, and insurance.

The police officer arrested him for failing to identify under the Highway Traffic Act, and a scuffle ensued.

The appellant was convicted of assault with intent to resist arrest.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the arrest was unlawful because the officer did not make a separate request for alternative identification as required by section 33(3) of the Highway Traffic Act.

Because the arrest was unlawful, the appellant was entitled to resist, and the convictions were quashed.