OCA 2006

The appellant appealed the dismissal of her action for a declaration of entitlement to statutory accident benefits.

She claimed the motor vehicle accident caused or contributed to her rheumatoid arthritis.

The trial judge found the accident was relatively minor and that the expert evidence did not establish it was more probable than not that the accident caused or triggered the onset of the arthritis.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's approach to causation or assessment of the evidence and dismissed the appeal.

The appellants challenged the constitutionality of the investor-state arbitration mechanism in Chapter 11 of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), arguing it violated s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, judicial independence, the rule of law, and the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that NAFTA tribunals do not exercise powers analogous to those of superior courts at Confederation, nor do they remove core jurisdiction from domestic courts.

The court also held that the tribunals do not violate judicial independence or the rule of law, and that the Charter challenge was premature as it was based on speculative harm rather than a specific tribunal decision.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction involving a child complainant, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not expressly explain the rejection of his denial.

The court held that the adequacy of reasons must be assessed functionally and contextually by asking whether they permit meaningful appellate review.

Reviewing the whole record, including the complainant's evidence, the diary evidence, and the trial judge's express application of the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court found the route to conviction was clear.

The reasons were sufficient to show that the denial did not raise a reasonable doubt when weighed against the accepted evidence.

Appeal dismissed.

The appellant, convicted of drug-related offences, brought a motion for production of records relating to pending criminal and disciplinary charges against the arresting officer.

The appellant sought these records to develop a fresh evidence application on appeal, arguing the officer had an ulterior motive for the arrest and challenging his credibility.

The Court of Appeal held that on a motion for production of third-party records on appeal, the applicant must first satisfy the Trotta relevancy threshold before the O'Connor test for privacy interests is engaged.

The Court found that certain records relating to the officer's alleged drug use and related misconduct met the threshold.

The Court ordered the Provincial Crown to disclose relevant portions of its criminal investigation records, finding they were not employment records subject to a reasonable expectation of privacy, but requested further submissions regarding records held by the Barrie Police Service.

The appellants appealed an order granting an injunction against them for obstructing access to the respondent's work site during a labour dispute.

The appellants argued that a protocol had been agreed upon and successfully applied by the police.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's finding that no such agreement existed and that the union's imposition of a one-hour delay for entering vehicles amounted to unlawful obstruction.

The court upheld the trial judge's application of the R.J.R-MacDonald factors and dismissed the appeal, subject to removing the union as a named party.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's order dismissing his motion to discharge a previous contempt order, finding him in contempt for a third time, and sentencing him to a further 15 months of incarceration.

The underlying class action involved a multi-million dollar fraud.

The appellant had repeatedly failed to produce documents and attend examinations for discovery, resulting in multiple contempt findings.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no basis to interfere with the discretionary orders of contempt given the serious, wilful, and deliberate nature of the appellant's conduct.

The appellants appealed a decision fixing the membership of three charitable corporations and ordering a meeting to elect new directors.

The Court of Appeal found that no proper procedure was taken to change the members in accordance with the Corporations Act, and the proper directors and members remained the original applicants for the letters patent.

The appeal was allowed, and the court ordered meetings of the original members to be held within 30 days.

The applicant witnessed an alleged unprovoked assault by a police officer and filed a public complaint under the Police Services Act.

The Ontario Civilian Commission on Police Services refused to process the complaint, finding the applicant was not 'directly affected' by the conduct.

The Divisional Court overturned this decision, but the Court of Appeal allowed the Commission's appeal, holding that 'directly affected' requires a personal and individual interest, not merely a general interest, and thus a mere witness lacks standing to bring a public complaint.

The appellants appealed a decision denying them defence cost coverage under a Professional Liability Insurance Policy provided by LawPro.

The motion judge found that the appellant acted as an intermediary between the parties in arranging mortgage transactions, triggering the mortgage broker exclusion.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the appellant's actions as a middleman in arranging the mortgages meant the claim fell within the exclusion.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent landlord damages for the cost of restoring commercial premises at the end of a tenancy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a 1999 consolidation lease did not eliminate the tenant's repair obligations from earlier leases.

The court also upheld the assessment of damages for floor, electrical, and HVAC repairs as supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that an administration fee for loss of rent was not supported by the wording of the lease.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a certiorari application to quash his committal for trial.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample evidence that the appellant and his co-accused were engaged in a joint venture to cultivate and traffic in marijuana and to possess firearms in furtherance of that enterprise, justifying the committal for trial.

The appellant appealed her five-year sentence, arguing that the sentencing judge failed to apply the principle of parity with her co-accused.

The Court of Appeal denied the Crown's adjournment request, noting the appeal would become moot if delayed.

The Court dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge struck an appropriate balance and correctly concluded that the appellant's late willingness to cooperate put her in a different position from her co-accused.

The Crown appealed a decision of a Summary Conviction Appeal Judge who had ordered a new trial for the accused.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction.

The Court found that the trial judge's section 16 competence inquiry of the child complainant was adequate, as it established her ability to observe, recollect, communicate, and understand the difference between truth and a lie.

Furthermore, the Court held that the trial judge properly understood the complainant's evidence regarding penetration and that there was no inconsistency with the medical evidence.

Finally, the Court concluded that the trial judge provided adequate reasons for accepting the complainant's evidence and rejecting the accused's testimony.

The appellant appealed his sentence following convictions for a brutal, unprovoked assault on his common-law partner, as well as assaults on another individual and the police.

The Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge should have given the appellant pre-trial credit for months seven and eight on a one-for-one basis.

However, the Court concluded that the overall sentence of five years, after crediting one year for pre-trial custody, was entirely fit given the seriousness of the offences.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed their convictions for robbery, arguing that the trial judge erred in rejecting their defences of duress and that the verdicts were inconsistent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's conclusion that there was no air of reality to St. Louis's duress claim and that the Crown had rebutted Taillefer's duress claim.

The court also found sufficient differences in the evidence to explain the different verdicts, rejecting the inconsistent verdict argument.

The sentence appeals were dismissed as abandoned.

The plaintiffs, a special needs child and his mother, brought a proposed class action against Ontario for negligence and misfeasance in public office, alleging the government unlawfully terminated special needs agreements under section 30 of the Child and Family Services Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a cause of action.

The court found that the statutory discretion to enter into voluntary agreements did not create a private law duty of care, and the plaintiffs failed to plead specific facts demonstrating intentional wrongdoing by a public officer required for misfeasance in public office.

The appeal was allowed and the certification order was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault causing bodily harm and sexual assault.

During deliberations, the jury asked a question about how to weigh reasonable doubt against the credibility of the complainant and the accused.

The trial judge instructed the jury to first decide what they believed, then find the facts, and finally apply the reasonable doubt standard to those facts.

The Court of Appeal held that this instruction misstated the law as set out in R. v. W.(D.), because it failed to explain that the jury must acquit if they are unable to decide whom to believe, and that reasonable doubt applies to the totality of the evidence.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a trial decision dismissing its action and allowing the respondents' counterclaim for rescission of an agreement for the removal of sand and gravel from the respondents' property.

The trial judge rescinded the agreement on the basis of unconscionability, noting the unequal bargaining power, lack of independent legal advice, and the fact that the unilingual francophone respondents were presented with an English agreement containing overreaching terms.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's credibility findings, his rejection of the laches defence, or his award of $4,000 for unjust enrichment.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for robbery, arguing the trial judge failed to exercise sufficient caution when assessing the evidence of an unsavoury co-accused.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly cautioned himself and reasonably relied on numerous pieces of confirmatory evidence, including DNA and witness testimony, to find the co-accused credible.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action for malicious prosecution, conspiracy to injure, intentional infliction of mental suffering, and inducing breach of contract against the Ontario Association of Architects and others.

The action arose from his convictions for professional misconduct and the subsequent suspension of his licence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that there was no genuine issue for trial, noting that the Architects Act requires notice of termination, which supersedes the association's by-laws.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.