OCA 2006

The appellant appealed an order dismissing his action against the Attorney General United States Department of Justice on the ground of sovereign immunity.

The appellant's claims related to decisions made by US immigration officials regarding his immigration status and alleged loss of employment opportunities.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the claims did not fall within the personal injury or property damage exceptions under section 6 of the State Immunity Act, and that the alleged torts did not occur in Canada.

The appellants appealed an order striking their claims for intentional infliction of mental suffering, negligence, and derivative claims under the Family Law Act.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the claims were properly struck for failing to plead sufficient facts, but found it was not plain and obvious that the pleadings could not be amended.

The appeal was allowed in part to grant the appellants leave to deliver a fresh statement of claim.

The appellant husband appealed an order granting the respondent wife exclusive possession of the matrimonial home and dispensing with his signature to facilitate a prior order.

At the hearing, the appellant sought an adjournment to adduce fresh evidence, which the Court of Appeal refused.

The Court found no error in the motion judge's refusal to stay the prior order or in the exercise of discretion regarding costs.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent.

The appellant appealed a final order regarding child custody.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that Ontario courts lacked jurisdiction under the Children's Law Reform Act because the child was habitually resident in Mexico, where she had lived for four years and where an interim order was outstanding.

The court also found no error in the motion judge's conclusion on the merits.

The appellant appealed an order declaring him a vexatious litigant and setting a timetable and procedure for bringing an application to vary spousal support.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the appellant was attempting to relitigate previously decided issues and was properly declared a vexatious litigant.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed the 10-year length of a prohibition order and sought a variation to permit him to attend proscribed public places in the company of an adult.

The Crown consented to the variation but opposed reducing the length of the order.

The Court of Appeal granted the variation, adding the exception for being accompanied by an adult over 18, but deferred to the sentencing judge's discretion regarding the 10-year duration given the serious nature of the offence.

The sentence appeal was otherwise dismissed.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing his application to set aside a divorce judgment and replace it with an annulment.

The application judge had misunderstood the basis of the application, focusing on the fact that the marriage was entered into for immigration purposes.

However, the undisputed evidence showed that the respondent was already married at the time she married the appellant.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, set aside the divorce judgment, and annulled the marriage due to the respondent's lack of capacity to marry.

The respondent sued the appellant lawyer and law firm for breach of trust, alleging they paid loan funds out of their trust account without her authorization.

The respondent had provided a collateral mortgage on her home as secondary security for a loan to a company owned by her children.

The trial judge found the appellants liable for breach of trust.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal reversed the decision, holding that because the respondent's mortgage was collateral and secondary, the loan funds were advanced to the primary borrower.

The law firm properly held the funds in trust for the primary borrower and paid them out on its instructions.

The appeal was allowed and the action dismissed.

The appellant pleaded guilty to robbery with a firearm and being disguised with intent to commit an indictable offence following a home invasion.

He was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in finding that the sentencing range for home invasions had increased from five to eight years to seven to eleven years.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that sentencing ranges are flexible guidelines that have evolved to reflect the gravity of home invasions.

The eight-year sentence was found to be fit given the terrorizing nature of the offence and the need for denunciation and deterrence.

The appellant union appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding two arbitral awards.

The arbitrators had dismissed grievances alleging that the employer was required to reimburse employees for the new Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreements.

The Court of Appeal held that the Divisional Court correctly applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review to the arbitrators' interpretation of the collective agreements.

The Court further held that the arbitrators' conclusion—that the new premium was an add-on rather than a reversion to the pre-1990 individually paid premium system—was not patently unreasonable.

The appeal was dismissed.

The employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitrator's award that required the employer to reimburse employees for the Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the standard of review for the arbitrator's decision is patent unreasonableness.

The Court found the arbitrator's interpretation that the Ontario Health Premium was reasonably and materially similar to the former OHIP premium was not patently unreasonable, and rejected the argument that arbitral inconsistency warrants judicial intervention.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitral award.

The arbitrator found that the employer was required under the collective agreement to pay the Ontario Health Premium on behalf of its employees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the standard of review was patent unreasonableness and that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement was reasonable.

The court held that the reference to 'cost' in the agreement embraced the Ontario Health Premium, regardless of whether it represented 100 per cent of the cost of medicare.

The employer appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an arbitral award that required the employer to reimburse employees for the Ontario Health Premium under the collective agreement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Divisional Court correctly applied the patent unreasonableness standard of review and that the arbitrator's interpretation of the collective agreement and relevant statutes was not patently unreasonable.

The appellant employer appealed a Divisional Court decision dismissing its application for judicial review of an arbitral award.

The arbitrator had ruled that the employer was obligated under the collective agreement to reimburse employees for the newly enacted Ontario Health Premium.

The Court of Appeal held that the standard of review for the arbitrator's decision was patent unreasonableness, even though the arbitrator interpreted a statute of general application, because the statutory interpretation was secondary to interpreting the collective agreement.

The Court found the arbitrator's award was not patently unreasonable and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed the two-year driving prohibition imposed as part of his sentence for dangerous driving.

The appellant had no prior criminal or driving record and operated a self-employed business that required driving.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence on consent showing the prohibition would force the sale of his business.

Finding the two-year prohibition excessive and a particular hardship, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the driving prohibition to one year.

In a youth criminal appeal involving a historical sexual offence allegation within a blended family, the appellant challenged both conviction and sentence.

The Court of Appeal held that evidence of earlier sexualized conduct between the parties was improperly admitted as similar fact evidence because the prior incidents were materially dissimilar, temporally remote, and did not support the complainant’s delayed disclosure.

The court found the impugned evidence was central to the trial and the curative proviso could not apply.

The conviction and related conditional stay were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay a $3.3 million equalization payment, retroactive child support, ongoing child support, and costs including a $150,000 premium.

The core issues involved whether a cottage owned by the husband's numbered company constituted a matrimonial home, the valuation of his business, and the appropriateness of the support and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil regarding the cottage and accepted the business valuation and support orders.

However, applying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $150,000 costs premium.

The respondent wife's cross-appeal seeking higher pre-judgment interest was dismissed.

The moving party, the first wife of the respondent husband, sought leave to intervene in an appeal regarding a vesting order made in favour of the husband's second wife.

The trial judge had ordered the husband's beneficial interest in certain corporate properties vested in the second wife to satisfy substantial support arrears.

The moving party, who also held foreign judgments for support arrears against the husband, sought to intervene to protect her interests.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the intervention was instigated by the husband to frustrate the second wife's recovery, and that allowing it at this late stage would unduly delay and prejudice the second wife's rights.

The Crown appealed a Superior Court decision granting a young person's application for certiorari and mandamus, which had directed the youth court to order publicly funded legal aid.

The young person, charged with uttering a threat, was refused legal aid and sought a court order for funded counsel at his first appearance while considering extrajudicial sanctions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that under section 25(4) of the Youth Criminal Justice Act, a young person is only entitled to apply for publicly funded counsel at specific stages of proceedings, such as a trial or a hearing related to custody, and not at a first appearance.

The appellant appealed his sentence of 18 months' imprisonment and 18 months' probation for two counts of robbery and related offences, including the use of a firearm.

The appeal was heard years after the sentence had been fully served.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentence was appropriate given the seriousness of the offences, which involved robbing clerks late at night with an imitation firearm and a large knife, balanced against the appellant's youth and rehabilitative prospects.