OCA 2006

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a commercial tenancy dispute.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the relationship was not a strict tenancy at will and that an accounting was appropriate due to premature termination.

However, the Court found the trial judge erred by affording the respondents double recovery—awarding full compensation for renovations while also granting a rent-free period.

The judgment was varied to require the respondents to pay reasonable rent and utilities for the initial period, reducing the amount payable by the appellants by $8,822.57.

The appeal was allowed in part.

This insurer priority appeal concerned whether an injured 22-year-old qualified as an insured person under his mother's automobile policy because he was principally dependent on her for care while living with her on bail terms.

The Court of Appeal held that dependency for care under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule is not determined by a snapshot at the accident date and that the surety relationship, while relevant, is not determinative.

Applying a reasonableness standard to the arbitrator's mixed fact and law determination, the court found the arbitrator properly assessed the broader relationship and correctly concluded the injured person remained substantially independent.

The appeal was allowed, the arbitrator's decision reinstated, and responsibility for benefits remained with the insurer of the occupied vehicle rather than the mother's insurer.

The respondent brought an ex parte motion in the Superior Court for an order confirming her entitlement to interim and permanent custody of her child based on a Sri Lankan order, and for the return of the child from Oklahoma.

The motion judge granted the order for interim and permanent custody and the return of the child.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal held that the motion judge erred in principle by making an order for permanent custody on an ex parte motion.

The appeal was allowed in part, the permanent custody order was set aside, and the temporary order was stayed pending a motion by the appellant to set it aside in the Superior Court.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in allowing the Crown to introduce evidence of his general propensity for violence.

The appellant's defence was that the victim's boyfriend, who had a history of violence against the victim, was the actual killer.

The trial judge ruled that because the defence's strategy would expose the boyfriend's propensity for violence, the Crown could introduce similar evidence against the appellant to ensure fairness.

The Court of Appeal held that this ruling was erroneous and highly prejudicial, as the defence had specifically undertaken not to explore the boyfriend's general propensity for violence against third parties.

The Court also found that the trial judge erred in admitting opinion evidence from a police officer regarding the exclusion of other suspects.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions on the grounds that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate, the verdicts were unreasonable, and the trial judge reversed the burden of proof.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge's reasons met the Sheppard requirements and that the verdicts were supported by ample circumstantial evidence.

Specifically, it was reasonable to infer that the appellant, who was seen searching the area where a gun and bullet-proof vest were found after a car crash and flight, was the driver who discarded those items.

The court also found no reversal of the burden of proof.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment enforcing a promissory note, arguing the motion judge erred in refusing a longer adjournment and in not granting a stay based on a counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the refusal of the adjournment and agreeing there was no genuine issue for trial.

The court also held that the counterclaim was not sufficiently related to the claim on the promissory note to warrant a stay.

Costs were awarded to the respondents.

The appellant was penalized in disciplinary proceedings by the respondent.

Instead of appealing the decision, the appellant brought a lawsuit claiming the decision was wrong and that the respondent defamed him by publishing the decision on the Internet.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the lawsuit constituted an abuse of process and a collateral attack on the unappealed discipline decision.

The parties reached a settlement and agreed to vary the lower court order on consent in the Superior Court.

The appellant subsequently withdrew the appeal with no costs.

The appellant appealed a trial judgment dismissing his claims for breach of contract regarding the renovation of 118 bathrooms and for slander.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's conclusions that no contract existed and that the appellant failed to prove slander.

The appellant appealed a decision affirming the Minister of Finance's assessment of retail sales tax.

The appellant argued its boats were exempt under the Retail Sales Tax Act as they operated for 'commercial purposes' providing public transportation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the boats operated primarily for tourist purposes, such as glass-bottom shipwreck tours, rather than transportation.

The court also rejected the argument that refitting expenses were exempt capital costs, noting the tax applies to tangible personal property regardless of capital purpose.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, who was found not criminally responsible and detained at a maximum-security psychiatric hospital for 28 years, appealed a disposition of the Ontario Review Board continuing his detention.

The appellant had a long-standing practice of refusing to attend Board hearings, refusing counsel, and refusing all psychiatric treatment.

The Court of Appeal held that the Board erred in law by failing to recognize its inquisitorial role under the Criminal Code.

Given the treatment impasse, the Board had a duty to consider making further inquiries rather than simply recapitulating the static situation.

The appeal was allowed and a new hearing ordered, with the Court noting the Board has jurisdiction to appoint amicus curiae to assist in such cases.

The appellant appealed an order of committal for extradition, arguing an abuse of process based on an alleged agreement with Hong Kong authorities that he would not be prosecuted if he left the country after being released on bail.

The extradition judge found that the appellant failed to establish the existence of such an agreement.

The Court of Appeal upheld the extradition judge's finding of fact, concluding it was fully warranted on the evidence, and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting his nine-year-old stepdaughter and sentenced to three years' imprisonment.

He appealed the conviction, arguing the verdict was unreasonable due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and that the trial judge erred in responding to a jury question by replaying a video interview without reading back contradictory cross-examination.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the jury was entitled to believe the core of the complainant's evidence and that the trial judge's handling of the jury question was appropriate, especially absent a defence request for a readback.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as the three-year term was entirely fit.

The appellants, two black men, appealed the dismissal of their civil actions against the police for alleged misconduct, including racial profiling, assault, and arbitrary detention arising from a traffic stop and subsequent arrest.

They argued the trial judge demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias, acted unfairly, and made palpable and overriding errors in rejecting their racial profiling claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no apprehension of bias, no procedural unfairness, and no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual findings that the police conduct was justified by the appellants' dangerous driving and flight, rather than racial profiling.

The appellant appealed her sentence of three months' jail and three years' probation for assault, break and enter, and other offences.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the appellant's mental health progress and the likelihood of drug use while on a conditional sentence.

Noting the uncontradicted evidence from her psychiatrist that a custodial sentence would be particularly difficult, and her continued progress while on bail, the Court allowed the appeal and reduced the custodial sentence to time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the initial vehicle stop and subsequent search violated his Charter rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the stop was a lawful exercise of authority under s. 216 of the Highway Traffic Act.

The subsequent arrest was based on reasonable grounds of bail breach, and the search of the vehicle was justified as incident to arrest.

The court also rejected a s. 7 Charter argument regarding the reliability of CPIC information due to a lack of evidentiary foundation and notice.

The appellant appealed the sentence imposed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The sentencing judge had departed from the norm of 2 for 1 credit for pre-sentence custody, granting only 1 for 1 credit based on remission and education points.

The Court of Appeal found the sentencing judge's reasons unpersuasive, particularly because the sentence imposed was at the top end of the Crown's proposed range.

The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was varied to include 2 for 1 credit for pre-sentence custody, resulting in a sentence of time served.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the trial judge erred in failing to find that the initial police stop was arbitrary.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings of fact supported the conclusion that the initial detention was not arbitrary, and there was no basis to interfere with those findings.

The appellant sued the respondents for breach of contract under Rule 76.

The appellant failed to serve his affidavit of documents by the deadline due to document contamination and moved to adjourn the trial.

The respondents moved to strike the statement of claim.

The motion judge struck the claim, finding the appellant failed to raise the issue earlier.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge made palpable and overriding errors as the appellant had notified the parties of the contamination well in advance.

The remedy of striking the claim was disproportionate, and the appellant was granted 6 months to serve the affidavit.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against the municipality for a motor vehicle accident on a snow-packed road.

The Court of Appeal found the motion judge erred in granting summary judgment, as the municipality did not put causation in issue and there was conflicting evidence regarding whether it met its standard of care under the Municipal Act.

The appeal was allowed, the summary judgment was set aside, and the matter was directed to trial.