OCA 2003

The Crown appealed an order quashing an indictment for historical sexual offences.

The original information spanned a time frame when the respondent was between 12 and 20 years old.

The application judge quashed the indictment, holding that proceedings should have commenced in youth court.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the indictment was not a nullity and could be amended under the Criminal Code to cover only the period after the respondent turned 16, as there was no prejudice to the respondent.

The plaintiff brought a civil action against the Crown and police for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, conspiracy to injure, and intentional infliction of harm after his sexual assault conviction was overturned based on new DNA evidence.

The Crown successfully moved to strike the claims for abuse of process, conspiracy, and intentional infliction of harm on the basis that malicious prosecution is the only tort available against a prosecutor.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the jurisprudence is not fully settled on whether the four elements of malicious prosecution must always be proven in every civil action against a prosecutor, and therefore it was inappropriate to strike the claims at this early stage.

The appellants appealed the trial judge's assessment of damages and costs award following a finding that they breached a three-year fixed-term employment contract with the respondent.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge properly quantified damages based on the contract rather than tort principles, and correctly accounted for the respondent's mitigation efforts.

The Court also upheld the trial judge's Sanderson order, which directed the unsuccessful corporate defendant to pay costs directly to the successful individual defendant.

The Canadian Human Rights Commission brought a motion for leave to intervene as a friend of the court in appeals concerning the entitlement of same-sex couples to marry.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal granted the motion, finding that the Commission had the experience and expertise to provide a unique perspective and useful contribution to the resolution of the constitutional and societal issues raised, without causing injustice to the immediate parties.

The Crown appealed an order requiring the Attorney General to pay $25,000 in costs to the respondents, who had successfully argued on appeal that the prosecution against them was abusive due to a loss of Crown independence.

The respondents cross-appealed, seeking a stay of proceedings.

The respondents alleged that the outside counsel retained to prosecute them under the Liquor Licence Act was compromised because his fees were paid by the Liquor Control Board and he was supervised by a Board employee.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and dismissed the cross-appeal, finding no evidentiary foundation that the retained counsel failed to comply with his obligations as Crown counsel.

The appellants, minority shareholders of a Manitoba broadcasting corporation, brought an action in Ontario seeking an oppression remedy under the Canada Business Corporations Act against the majority shareholder and its affiliates.

The motions judge stayed the action, finding Ontario lacked jurisdiction and that Manitoba was the convenient forum.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the motions judge erred in applying the real and substantial connection test to defendants present in Ontario, and found that Ontario did have jurisdiction over all defendants, including the extra-provincial defendant.

However, the Court upheld the stay on the basis that Manitoba was clearly the more convenient forum, as the dispute primarily concerned the internal management of a Manitoba corporation.

The appellant, a police officer, was charged with possession of a prohibited weapon and obstruction of justice after a knife was found in his son's desk at school.

The preliminary inquiry judge discharged the appellant on both counts, finding no evidence that the knife's handle was made of metal, an essential element of the prohibited weapon charge.

The Crown successfully applied to the Superior Court to set aside the discharge.

The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the discharge, holding that the preliminary inquiry judge did not commit a jurisdictional error by failing to consider circumstantial evidence or by improperly weighing the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing that the trial judge held the complainant's evidence to a different standard and misapprehended the evidence.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly considered the reliability of the appellant's evidence, addressed the frailties in the complainant's version of events, and did not misapprehend the evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The applicant was committed for extradition to Trinidad on charges of murder and accessory after the fact to murder, where he faced a mandatory death penalty.

He applied for bail pending his appeal of the committal order and pending the Minister of Justice's surrender decision.

The Court of Appeal granted bail pending the surrender decision, finding that the mandatory death penalty raised a non-frivolous issue for the Minister, the applicant established he would surrender despite the flight risk, and public interest favoured his release given the 14-month delay.

The application for bail pending appeal was adjourned until after the Minister's decision.

The appellant vendor agreed to sell commercial land to the respondent purchaser, conditional on obtaining severance approval under the Planning Act.

The Committee of Adjustment granted severance but required the vendor to construct and dedicate a road extension.

The vendor attempted to terminate the agreement, arguing the condition was unreasonable and frustrated the contract.

The purchaser sued for specific performance.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision granting specific performance, finding that the contract clearly obligated the vendor to obtain necessary consents at its expense, the doctrine of frustration did not apply as the condition was foreseeable, and the property was unique.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on the ground that the trial judge erred in refusing to permit it to lead similar act evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle or unreasonable exercise of discretion in the trial judge's ruling.

The trial judge applied the proper standard, considered the similar acts cumulatively, and reasonably concluded that the prejudicial effect of the proposed evidence outweighed its probative value.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after shooting his wife.

At trial, he raised the defence of not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16 of the Criminal Code.

The defence called three psychiatrists who testified that the appellant suffered from a mental disorder, while the Crown called no psychiatric evidence.

The appellant appealed the conviction, arguing the jury's guilty verdict was unreasonable as it conflicted with the uncontradicted expert evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the jury was entitled to reject the factual underpinnings of the experts' opinions, which were based largely on the appellant's own statements, and to rely on other evidence surrounding the shooting to conclude the NCR defence was not established.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of the respondent on a charge of discharging a contaminant under the Environmental Protection Act following a gasoline spill from a pipe failure.

The trial judge convicted the respondent, holding that the due diligence defence was unavailable because the precise cause of the pipe failure was unknown.

The appeal judge overturned the conviction, finding the defence was made out unless it was patently obvious that reasonable care was not met.

The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that while a defendant need not prove the precise cause of an event to raise a due diligence defence, the appeal judge erred in law by shifting the onus of disproving due diligence to the Crown.

The landlord appealed the dismissal of its application for a declaration that a commercial lease was terminated because the tenant sublet the premises without consent.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the landlord's prior consents to subleases did not authorize the new sublease.

The Court held that section 20(7) of the Commercial Tenancies Act does not preclude resort to the court's equitable jurisdiction to grant relief from forfeiture under section 98 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The issue of whether the tenant was entitled to relief from forfeiture was referred for trial.

The appellant appealed his convictions for kidnapping, extortion, assault, and uttering a death threat.

The charges arose from an incident where the appellant and co-accused kidnapped the victim, forced him into a car, and assaulted him.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in admitting a 911 call under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, in his jury instructions regarding conceded facts and identity, and in allowing prior consistent statements to enhance a witness's credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions, and noting the overwhelming strength of the Crown's case.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder after the victim was found killed in his garage.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence, eyewitness identification of a man driving the victim's car, and expert evidence matching the appellant's barefoot impressions to blood-spattered boots found at the scene.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his instructions on eyewitness identification and in admitting the barefoot impression evidence.

The Court of Appeal held the eyewitness instructions were proper but found the trial judge erred in admitting the novel expert evidence regarding barefoot impressions, as its slight probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant sought the extradition of the respondent, who had been convicted in California of criminal harassment.

The extradition judge discharged the respondent on the harassment charge, finding that the appellant failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conduct underlying the California conviction corresponded to the Canadian offence of criminal harassment, as the victim's testimony did not establish she reasonably feared for her safety.

The appellant appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that section 29(1)(b) of the Extradition Act imposes a balance of probabilities standard, the victim's transcript was properly admitted, and the extradition judge's conclusion was reasonable.

The appellant appealed his total sentence of 11 years (plus two years credit for 17 months pre-trial custody) for severe and prolonged domestic abuse of his common-law spouse.

The abuse included daily terrorization, throwing the victim from a balcony, placing her in a freezer, and sadistic sexual abuse.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle and held the sentence was not demonstrably unfit, noting the appellant's terrible criminal record, lack of mitigating factors, and history of domestic abuse.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the trial judge's dismissal of his wrongful dismissal action, arguing the judge erred in finding just cause for termination.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's contextual approach, agreeing that the appellant's unauthorized store closure, false reports of staff resignations, and prolonged insubordination justified dismissal without notice.

The respondent's cross-appeal regarding the quantum of trial costs was also dismissed, as the trial judge appropriately exercised his discretion under Rule 57.01.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued the trial judge gave inadequate instructions on in-dock identification and the W.D. framework regarding defence evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the instructions sufficient given the context of the trial and the evidence presented.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was deemed fit given the seriousness of the crime and the appellant's record.