Nicholas A. Xynnis

The appellant appealed a two-year sentence imposed following guilty pleas to drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime.

The sentence was based on a joint submission.

The appellant sought a one-day reduction in his sentence to avoid the prohibition under s. 64 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act against appealing a deportation order for permanent residents sentenced to at least two years.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, noting that the immigration consequences were not considered at sentencing and that a one-day reduction would not detract from the fitness of the sentence.

The appellant appealed his 18-month sentence and lifetime driving prohibition for impaired driving and refusing a breath test.

The Court of Appeal found the sentence fit given the egregious circumstances and the appellant's record, noting the trial judge properly considered his guilty plea and gap in alcohol-related convictions.

The court varied the sentence to 17 months to clarify the trial judge's intention to grant one month of pre-trial custody credit, but upheld the lifetime driving prohibition.

The appellant appealed his sentence of imprisonment.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found that the sentencing judge erred in principle by giving insufficient weight to mitigating factors, including the appellant's age, learning disability, lack of criminal record, guilty plea, and efforts to atone.

The appeal was allowed, and the remainder of the sentence was converted into a conditional sentence.

Blair J.A. dissented, finding no error in principle by the sentencing judge.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal which quashed the accused's conviction for sexual offences and ordered a new trial.

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the majority of the Court of Appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting similar fact evidence without the benefit of the Court's reasons in R. v. Handy.

The appellant appealed his convictions for assault and assault carrying a weapon, arguing that the verdicts were inconsistent with his acquittals on related extortion charges and that the trial judge misapprehended a defence witness's evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the verdicts were not violently at odds because there was confirmatory evidence of the assault, while the extortion charges lacked sufficient proof.

The court also found no error in the trial judge's treatment of the defence witness's evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual exploitation, gang sexual assault, and forcible confinement.

He argued the trial judge erred in her jury instructions regarding DNA evidence, in refusing to declare a mistrial after the Crown mentioned the complainant's virginity, and that the Crown's closing address was inflammatory.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's exercise of discretion, noting the relevance of the virginity evidence to the aggravated sexual assault charge, and concluding the Crown's closing address was not inflammatory.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable.

The victim had described his assailant's build, hair, clothing, age, and state of intoxication.

The appellant was found in the area twenty minutes later matching the description, had scratches on his chest, admitted to being in a fight, and was immediately recognized by the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge properly dealt with minor inconsistencies and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant pleaded guilty to possession of stolen property under $5,000 after taking stickers from his employer.

On appeal, he argued his plea was equivocal because his trial counsel submitted during sentencing that he honestly believed he was entitled to take the stickers due to common employee practice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the plea was not equivocal, the facts supported the plea, and the explanation offered in mitigation did not amount to a defence in law.

The appellant appealed his sentence, arguing the sentencing judge erred by referencing a lack of evidence of effective community supervision without following the procedure set out in R. v. Nault.

The Court of Appeal noted the sentencing judge's approach was not in accord with Nault, but dismissed the appeal because the appellant was not a good candidate for a conditional sentence given his serious criminal record.

The sentence was found to be fit.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations involving an eight-year-old complainant.

The principal issue was whether evidence of two prior sexual assaults on young children was admissible as similar fact evidence.

The majority held that the trial judge set the admissibility threshold too low by framing the issue too broadly, relying on generic similarities, failing to account for significant dissimilarities and remoteness in time, and underestimating moral prejudice.

The probative value did not outweigh the prejudicial effect, the conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence.

He argued that the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for arrest because the informant did not reveal the source of their information.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, holding that the trial judge correctly assessed the totality of the circumstances and that the informant's source is only one factor in that analysis.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the imposition of consecutive sentences totaling 14 months was fit and revealed no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and his sentence.

He argued that the search warrant was invalid due to a defect in the copy and omissions in the information provided by confidential informants.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the warrant valid and the conviction supported by physical and expert evidence.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the sentence was appropriate given the appellant's extensive record and a conditional sentence was not warranted.

The appellants, a mother and son, were convicted of assaulting the mother's nine-year-old daughter.

They appealed their convictions and sentences, arguing that the trial judge's conduct and comments during the trial created a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Court of Appeal agreed, finding that the trial judge made improper favourable comments about Crown witnesses and improper negative comments about defence witnesses, including criticizing an accused for using an interpreter.

The appeals were allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed her custodial sentence for cocaine trafficking.

The trial judge had rejected a conditional sentence on the basis that general deterrence and denunciation required a custodial sentence.

Relying on the Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R. v. Proulx, the Court of Appeal held that general deterrence and denunciation can be met by a conditional sentence even in cocaine trafficking cases.

Given the appellant's full rehabilitation over four years on bail, the appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to a 13-month conditional sentence.

The appellant appealed a jury conviction for sexual assault and argued, among other grounds, that the trial judge failed to properly investigate allegations that jurors had communicated with the officer-in-charge during trial.

The Court of Appeal held that both actual fairness and the appearance of fairness required a fuller inquiry into the allegation.

Because the witness was not permitted to explain an inconsistency and the officer should at least have been called to testify, the inquiry was incomplete and inconclusive.

The resulting appearance of unfairness required that the conviction be set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellants challenged an order dismissing their application to quash committals to stand trial arising from a bank robbery prosecution based entirely on circumstantial evidence.

The Court of Appeal applied the strict test governing review of a committal and held there was no scintilla of evidence on the element of identity.

The purported clothing nexus between one appellant and one robber failed because the descriptions contained a material dissimilarity, leaving only resemblance, suspicion, and speculation.

The appeal was allowed and the orders to stand trial were quashed on all charges.

The Crown appealed a decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal that had allowed the accused's appeal and ordered a new trial.

The issue was whether the trial judge erred in excluding cross-examination of the complainant on a collateral matter tendered solely for credibility.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the convictions, holding that the trial judge properly exercised his discretion.

The Court found that the relevance of the proposed evidence was tenuous and its potential for prejudice and misleading the jury was significant.