Neil G. Wilson

The plaintiff brought a motion for partial judgment under Rule 51.06 for $1,038,616, an amount admitted by the defendants to have been misappropriated while acting in a fiduciary capacity as trustees.

The plaintiff also sought a declaration that this debt would survive bankruptcy and substantial indemnity costs.

The court granted partial judgment for the admitted amount, awarded pre-judgment interest, and declared that the debt arose from fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.

However, the court declined to make a pre-emptive declaration that the debt would survive bankruptcy, deeming it hypothetical.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the plaintiff, and directions were given for scheduling the remaining summary judgment motion.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period should be deferred under s. 5(1)(a)(iv) of the Limitations Act, 2002, because it was not legally appropriate to commence a civil claim while criminal charges arising from the defendant's statements to the police were ongoing.

The court applied the Court of Appeal's reasoning in Sosnowski v. MacEwan Petroleum, finding that the civil claim and criminal charges were not 'two sides of the same coin' and that subjective, evaluative concerns do not delay discoverability.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

Jereemy Tan, the moving party, sought an extension of time to file a notice of appeal against a Superior Court decision that authorized a Receiver to disclaim an agreement of purchase and sale for a property.

The moving party's counsel inadvertently missed the 10-day appeal deadline, believing it was 30 days.

The Court of Appeal granted the extension, finding the delay was short and excusable, prejudice to respondents negligible, and the proposed appeal met the low threshold for merit.

The court also determined the appeal was "as of right" under sections 193(b) and (c) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, as the decision could affect other similar cases and involved property exceeding $10,000 in value.

The applicant, a monocular bus driver, challenged the constitutionality of the vision standards in s. 18(3) of the Drivers' Licences Regulations under s. 15 of the Charter.

The regulations imposed a blanket prohibition on monocular individuals holding a Class C commercial driver's licence.

The court found that the regulations substantively discriminated against the applicant based on her physical disability by perpetuating the stereotype that all monocular drivers are unsafe, without allowing for individual assessment.

The court further held that the infringement was not minimally impairing and therefore not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court declared the regulations unconstitutional but suspended the declaration for 12 months to allow the government to amend the legislation, denying the applicant's request for an immediate individual exemption.

The defendant sought to schedule a summary judgment motion in two related actions concerning failed pre-construction home purchases.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing it would not be the most expeditious or efficient process.

The court, exercising its gatekeeping function under Rule 50.13(6), declined to schedule the summary judgment motion, finding that a one-day trial would be more efficient given the limited time savings and the potential for overlapping factual determinations with other pleaded issues (misrepresentation, undue influence, exemplary damages).

The court emphasized that partial summary judgment is only appropriate for discrete, severable issues.

A timetable for documentary production, discoveries, and mandatory mediation was ordered.

This decision addresses costs following a 17-day trial involving two consolidated actions: a construction lien action and a debt recovery action.

The court awarded costs to Kalogon Spar Ltd. and Dino Coliviras, fixing the amount at $190,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable from a standby letter of credit.

The court declined to apply Rule 49 cost consequences due to insufficient evidence from Kalogon regarding costs incurred at the time of settlement offers.

The court considered various factors, including the parties' conduct, the complexity of the proceedings, and the proportionality of the award, noting that both parties displayed inflexibility and Kalogon's principal failed to keep proper records, which significantly increased litigation costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment decision granting specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a Toronto property.

The respondent sought to purchase the property for $4.5 million but the transaction failed to close on the scheduled date.

The central issue was whether the appellant's conduct in providing an altered estoppel certificate and delivering the correct certificate only one hour before the 6:00 p.m. closing deadline precluded it from relying on the time-of-the-essence clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment, finding that the appellant's misconduct prevented it from enforcing the strict closing deadline and that specific performance was an appropriate remedy.

The appellants appealed a decision of the Superior Court regarding the interpretation of a "Net Developable Area" clause in two agreements for the purchase and sale of development lands.

The central issue was whether tableland used for storm water management ponds was included in the definition of Net Developable Area when such lands fell within the Protected Countryside designation of the Greenbelt Plan.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's interpretation, finding that the parenthetical exception did not apply to Greenbelt lands and that the terms "open space lands" and "Greenbelt lands" have distinct meanings subject to different planning controls.

Following the dismissal of the Town of Richmond Hill's motion for an interlocutory injunction regarding alleged zoning bylaw infractions, the successful respondents sought partial indemnity costs of $3,851.04.

The Town argued that costs should be reserved to the trial judge or made payable in the cause, and disputed the quantum.

The court rejected the Town's arguments, finding no compelling reason to depart from the ordinary rule that a successful party on a motion is entitled to costs payable forthwith.

The court fixed costs at the requested amount of $3,851.04.

The appellant purchased a pre-construction condominium detached house unit under an Agreement of Purchase and Sale.

On the closing date, the appellant's solicitor advised that certain common elements (a parkette and entrance/exit gates) had not been constructed, contrary to the disclosure statement, and reserved the right to rescind.

The respondent terminated the agreement and forfeited the deposit.

The appellant subsequently rescinded and sought return of the deposit.

The application judge found the appellant breached the agreement and dismissed the application for return of the deposit.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no material change in circumstances under the Condominium Act and that time was not of the essence for construction of the common elements.

The Plaintiffs, a group of fitness equipment retailers, sued Peter Twist and Twist Conditioning Inc. for defamation based on a letter published by Mr. Twist.

The letter implied that the Plaintiffs, identified as "unauthorized dealers," sold damaged, defective, or stolen BOSU products, and engaged in shady business practices.

The defamation arose after the Plaintiffs refused to adhere to the Defendants' Minimum Advertised Price (MAP) Policy, which they believed violated the Competition Act.

The Defendants were noted in default and did not participate in the trial.

The court found the statements defamatory by false innuendo, given Mr. Twist's reputation and the widespread distribution of the letter.

The plaintiff, Fortress Carlyle Peter St. Inc., sought costs following its successful summary judgment motion for specific performance.

The defendant, Ricki’s Construction and Painting Inc., challenged the plaintiff's requested all-inclusive sum of $100,000 as excessive and unreasonable, proposing $50,000, and argued for divided success.

The court found the underlying motion was not simple, the plaintiff's costs claim reasonable with a $10,000 reduction, and rejected the argument for divided success.

The court awarded the plaintiff $90,000 in all-inclusive costs.

The applicant municipality brought a motion for an interim order prohibiting the respondents from using two semi-detached buildings as multi-unit apartments, contrary to the local zoning bylaw.

The municipality argued that the respondents had previously breached the bylaw and could easily do so again.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that while a municipality need not show irreparable harm to obtain an injunction against ongoing bylaw breaches, it must demonstrate that the bylaw is currently being flouted.

The evidence indicated the respondents were making some attempt to comply with the bylaw, and the threat of statutory penalties remained an adequate sanction pending the final hearing.

The plaintiff, Fortress Carlyle Peter St. Inc., brought a summary judgment motion for specific performance of an Agreement of Purchase and Sale for a property in Toronto, or alternatively, relief from forfeiture of a $1 million deposit.

The defendant, Ricki’s Construction and Painting Inc., brought a cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

The court granted specific performance to the plaintiff, finding that the defendant's conduct, including delayed delivery and deceitful alteration of an estoppel certificate, disentitled it from insisting on "time of the essence" for the closing.

The property's uniqueness was also a factor supporting specific performance.

The plaintiff landlord sought double damages under sections 48 and 50 of the Commercial Tenancies Act against the tenant corporation and its principals for allegedly fraudulently or clandestinely removing goods to prevent distress for rent arrears.

The court found that the bulk of the goods were removed before rent arrears accrued and that the removal was not clandestine or fraudulent.

The claims against the individual defendants and the claim for double damages against the corporate tenant were dismissed.

The corporate tenant was found liable for damages for breach of lease due to unpaid rent.

The applicant purchaser sought a refund of her deposit after failing to close a condominium purchase, arguing she validly rescinded the agreement due to the vendor's failure to complete common elements (parkette and gates) and a material change in the disclosure statement.

The respondent vendor counter-applied for a declaration of breach, forfeiture of deposit, and further damages.

The court dismissed the purchaser's application, finding that the failure to complete common elements was not a fundamental breach or a material change under the Condominium Act, and that a right to rescind cannot be exercised after the agreement has been validly terminated by the vendor.

The vendor's application was allowed regarding the breach and deposit forfeiture, but the claim for damages beyond the deposit was ordered to proceed to trial due to disputed material facts regarding mitigation.

This case involved two applications arising from a failed condominium purchase and sale.

The purchaser sought a refund of her deposit, arguing she validly rescinded the agreement due to the vendor's failure to complete common elements (parkette and gates), which she claimed constituted a material change.

The vendor contended the purchaser breached the agreement by failing to close, leading to termination, and that rescission was not possible after termination.

The court found that the purchaser had no right to refuse closing based on uncompleted common elements, as the agreement explicitly stated this would not deem the unit incomplete.

Furthermore, a change in the construction schedule for amenities was not a "material change" under the Condominium Act, 1998.

The court affirmed the common law principle that an agreement cannot be rescinded once it has been validly terminated.

Consequently, the purchaser's application for a deposit refund was dismissed, and the vendor's application was allowed, confirming the purchaser's breach, the vendor's right to terminate and retain the deposit, and the right to sue for further damages.

A trial of an issue was ordered to determine the quantum of damages exceeding the forfeited deposit.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to dismiss the plaintiff's claims of defamation and libel.

The defendant argued that the statements were true, protected by qualified privilege or fair comment, and that the libel claim was barred due to lack of proper notice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that there were genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly concerning the truth of the allegations and the presence of malice, which necessitated credibility assessments.

The court also determined that the lack of specific notice for the libel claim was not an absolute bar given the circumstances where the defendant's identity was initially unknown and the publisher promptly retracted the advertisement.

An appeal concerning when an international commercial arbitration award becomes "binding" on the parties for purposes of judicial recognition and enforcement under the UNCITRAL Model Law.

The appellants obtained an arbitration award from a rabbinical court in New York for significantly less than sought.

After unsuccessfully applying to set aside the award, they sought recognition and enforcement.

The respondents opposed on the ground that the award had not yet become binding because they intended to pursue further issues before the arbitral tribunal.

The application judge dismissed the recognition application.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the award was binding and should be recognized and enforced.

The court clarified that the potential jurisdiction of the arbitrator to entertain new issues about post-award events does not affect the binding nature of the award.

The plaintiffs, as judgment creditors, previously obtained a civil contempt order against the defendant judgment debtor for concealing income and moving assets to defeat his creditors.

The penalty phase was adjourned to allow the defendant to purge his contempt by paying $112,623.

The defendant paid the amount in full, albeit past the deadline.

The court determined the appropriate sentence for the contempt, weighing mitigating factors (purging the contempt, no prior record, apology) against aggravating factors (intentional and long-running misconduct).

The court ordered the defendant to complete 75 hours of volunteer community service over six months.