Neil G. Wilson

Appellants sued their former solicitors for negligence and lost opportunity damages, claiming the solicitors failed to raise a six-year limitation period in the underlying action against Mitsubishi Motors, which was dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the misrepresentation component of the damages claim, finding the appellants had not appealed the trial judge's obiter finding of no misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an appeal is from a judgment, not from reasons, and that the appellants' appeal of the entire judgment necessarily included misrepresentation claims.

The court also held that partial summary judgment was inappropriate as the misrepresentation claims were intertwined with other claims proceeding to trial.

The party seeking costs was completely successful on motions regarding whether communications at a meeting were subject to settlement privilege.

The opposing party, who had surreptitiously recorded the meeting and publicly filed the transcript, argued for a costs reduction as a public interest litigant.

The court rejected the public interest litigant argument for these specific motions.

The court also declined to award substantial indemnity costs, finding the conduct did not rise to the level of reprehensible.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, adjusting the requested hourly rates downwards, fixing costs at $136,315.

The applicants sought an order recognizing and enforcing an arbitral award of $400,000 made by a religious arbitral tribunal (Beth Din).

The respondents opposed, arguing the award was not yet binding as the tribunal had indicated a willingness to consider additional issues regarding costs and damages.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the arbitration process was not yet complete and the tribunal was not functus officio, applying the competence-competence principle to defer to the tribunal's jurisdiction.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer the action from Barrie to Toronto under Rule 13.1.02.

The plaintiff, who sought an interest in a Toronto property based on renovations he performed, opposed the motion.

The court applied a holistic balancing of the factors under Rule 13.1.02 and found that the interests of justice required the transfer, as the property and the defendants were located in Toronto, and the plaintiff resided a similar distance from both venues.

The motion was granted.

The defendants sought leave to appeal an order compelling them to answer questions refused during an examination in aid of execution.

They also requested an extension of time to file the notice of motion for leave to appeal and a stay of the order pending appeal.

The court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding that neither branch of the test under Rule 62.02(4) was met.

There was no conflicting decision on a matter of principle, and no serious doubt about the correctness of the order, nor did the proposed appeal raise matters of general importance beyond the immediate parties.

Consequently, the requests for an extension of time and a stay were also dismissed.

The applicant, Liliana Di Cienzo, challenged the constitutionality of a provincial regulation under rule 14.05 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing it violated her Charter rights.

The respondent, Attorney General of Ontario, moved to transfer the application to the Divisional Court, asserting that constitutional challenges to regulations fall under judicial review and the Divisional Court's exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court dismissed the motion, holding that it has jurisdiction to hear rule 14.05 applications for declarations challenging the constitutional validity of subordinate legislation, particularly when the challenge is not to the statutory power to make the regulation (ultra vires) but to the regulation itself for Charter non-compliance.

The court emphasized the procedural advantages of the Superior Court for such applications, including the ability to direct a trial of an issue if facts are disputed.

The plaintiffs sued their former lawyers for solicitor's negligence, alleging they missed a limitation period in a prior action against Mitsubishi, thereby losing the opportunity to appeal on the merits of misrepresentation, negligence, and Arthur Wishart Act claims.

The defendant law firm moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the misrepresentation component of the damages claim, arguing that the original motion judge's finding of no misrepresentations was not appealed.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs' Notice of Appeal did not challenge the motion judge's findings on common law or statutory misrepresentation, thus no "lost opportunity" existed for this specific claim.

Costs were deemed a wash due to the defendants' initial broader motion.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing an action arising from a power outage during a wedding reception caused by a severe thunderstorm.

The plaintiffs alleged breach of contract, negligence, and emotional distress, arguing the venue failed to provide backup power and mishandled the event during the outage.

The court held that exclusion clauses in the catering agreement barred liability for damages arising from utility shortages and acts of God.

The court also found the plaintiffs failed to comply with a contractual requirement to provide written notice of any claim within 48 hours and declined to grant relief from forfeiture.

In any event, the plaintiffs failed to establish any breach of contract or negligence.

Following a motion for security for costs, the defendants sought additional costs related to the fees of former counsel and other related issues.

The court declined to increase the amount of security for costs because the defendants provided redacted accounts that failed to show the nature of the work performed, despite the court previously requesting such evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that a prior settlement offer should affect the costs analysis, as the amount ordered was lower than the offer and the conduct of the plaintiff did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

Additional costs requested for undertakings issues were also denied.

The previously ordered security and costs structure remained unchanged.

Following an order granting the plaintiff leave to discontinue the action, the court addressed the quantum of costs payable to the defendants.

The defendants sought over $25,000 in partial indemnity costs for the relevant period.

The court reviewed the bill of costs and disallowed several amounts, including a double-counted HST charge, time spent after the service of the notice of discontinuance, work related to unsuccessful security for costs proceedings, and excessive communication charges.

Applying the principles under the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court fixed costs at a fair and reasonable amount significantly lower than claimed.

After accounting for a set-off from costs previously awarded to the plaintiff on appeal, the net amount owing was reduced accordingly.

The plaintiff dentist alleged that the defendants supplied defective dental equipment causing business losses, property damage from leaking equipment, and delays in opening a second clinic.

On competing motions relating to documentary production and discovery procedures, the court applied the relevance standard under Rule 30.02 and the proportionality principle under Rule 29.2.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court ordered various categories of document production from both sides, including financial records, repair invoices, equipment images, and documents relevant to alleged lost profits and misrepresentation.

The court also permitted the plaintiff to examine an individual defendant personally at discovery due to allegations that he was the directing mind of the corporate defendant and personally involved in the representations at issue.

A discovery plan was ordered to move the litigation forward.

Following a partially argued motion involving consolidation with a Small Claims Court action, a stay of the Small Claims proceeding, or alternatively striking portions of a counterclaim, the parties settled the motion except for the issue of costs.

The court considered written submissions and the discretionary authority over costs under s. 131(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

Given that the motion resolved by settlement and considering the settlement terms, the court held that it was in the interests of justice for each party to bear its own costs.

No costs were awarded.

Investors sought the appointment of an investigative receiver over the defendant’s assets after transferring $3 million for foreign currency trading and alleging misappropriation and fraud when funds were not returned.

The defendant opposed the request and moved to set aside a default judgment previously granted against him.

The court held that although the defendant had not fully explained what happened to all funds during examinations and productions, the extraordinary remedy of appointing an investigative receiver before trial was not justified.

Existing discovery mechanisms and potential procedural sanctions were sufficient to address any non‑compliance.

The default judgment was set aside on consent, and the court directed the action to proceed to an expedited hybrid trial to determine liability and the disposition of the invested funds.

In a CCAA proceeding, the applicants challenged the reasonableness of legal fees charged by counsel to their secured lender after the applicants were required to pay those fees as part of the secured debt under an initial order.

The issue on this motion was whether the dispute over the reasonableness of the fees should be determined by an assessment officer through a solicitor-client assessment or by a judge of the Commercial List.

The court held that because the initial order made the fees part of the costs of the CCAA proceeding, jurisdiction properly lay with the Commercial List court absent exceptional circumstances.

The court emphasized the Commercial List’s expertise in supervising professional fees in insolvency matters and concerns about proportionality and efficiency if the matter proceeded through a lengthy assessment process.

The court ordered that the issue of the reasonableness of the fees be determined by a judge of the Commercial List following a case conference process to narrow the issues.

The defendant, Steven Blondin, pleaded guilty to 112 charges of failing to comply with Orders to Pay issued by an Employment Standards Officer under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

Blondin was the sole director of six Ontario corporations that failed to pay wages totalling approximately $142,000 to 61 employees between March 2007 and October 2009.

The court imposed a fine of $40,000 against Blondin personally and $240,000 against his six corporations collectively, along with a custodial sentence of three months to be served concurrently.

Restitution orders were issued separately.

The defendant's request for house arrest as an alternative to imprisonment was denied as the Provincial Offences Act does not provide for conditional sentences.

A not‑for‑profit corporate governance dispute led to court‑ordered elections for officers and directors of an association.

On a motion for directions, the court clarified the powers of court‑appointed election supervisors, determined the positions to be filled, and resolved several disputes about membership eligibility, voting procedures, and governance rules.

The court held that previous confirmations of the president and vice‑presidents were procedurally invalid due to lack of quorum and improper notice.

Suspensions or terminations of certain members were set aside due to lack of procedural fairness.

The court issued detailed directions governing the conduct of the upcoming elections, including supervision authority, quorum rules, and control over the association’s website during the election process.