G. Hall

The moving defendants sought leave to amend their statement of defence on the eve of trial, three and a half years after the action was commenced, to plead that the plaintiff's claims arose from the use and operation of an automobile and were subject to the Insurance Act.

The plaintiffs opposed the motion, arguing that the amendment would cause non-compensable prejudice as the case had been prosecuted on the basis that it was not a motor vehicle accident case.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the presumption of prejudice from the delay had not been rebutted and that the plaintiffs would suffer actual prejudice if the amendment were permitted.

Investors who were customers of a bank alleged negligence after advancing funds to entities engaged in a cheque‑kiting scheme whose accounts had been frozen by the bank.

They claimed the bank knew of the fraudulent activity and failed to disclose material information during communications with them, while applying the advanced funds to reduce the fraudster’s indebtedness to the bank.

The bank moved under Rule 21.01(1)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure to strike the negligence claim for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.

Applying the Anns/Cooper framework and the test on motions to strike, the court held it was not plain and obvious that the claims had no reasonable prospect of success.

Given the pleaded bank‑customer relationship and alleged communications between the bank and its customers, the negligence claim was at least analogous to recognized categories of proximity.

The estate of a former CEO brought an oppression action under s. 248 of the Ontario Business Corporations Act seeking recovery of a $750,000 loan advanced to finance a corporate break fee.

The loan was structured through a related entity and contained provisions stating that proceeds from certain Irish transactions could be used, at the lender’s discretion, to repay the loan.

After the corporation received nearly $1 million from three of the four transactions, the directors and CFO used the funds for payroll, operating expenses, tax arrears, and to repay their own loans rather than repaying the lender.

The court held the lender had a reasonable expectation that proceeds from the Irish deals would be applied to the loan principal.

While some expenditures were made in good faith to keep the company operating, the repayment of insiders and a later lender constituted conduct that unfairly disregarded the lender’s interests.

Personal monetary orders were made against certain directors and the CFO.

In a commercial dispute concerning a promissory note and alleged oppression by corporate directors and officers, the court addressed the structuring of an upcoming commercial trial.

The plaintiff alleged that a term of the promissory note required the company to apply proceeds from certain related companies to repay the note and that the company failed to comply.

The defendants denied liability and the corporate defendant advanced a counterclaim alleging breach of a separation agreement and diversion of business opportunities.

At a case conference, the parties proposed a hybrid trial procedure combining affidavit evidence with viva voce testimony.

The court approved a structured plan governing settlement discussions, service of affidavit evidence, expert reports, joint expert meetings, electronic document delivery, and time-limited oral openings, emphasizing the flexibility of modern civil trial procedures.