Natasha Calvinho

During a criminal trial, the Crown brought a motion to reconsider a previous Corbett ruling that had excised four of the accused's prior convictions for sexual assault.

The accused had testified extensively that he always pleaded guilty when he had done something wrong, creating a misleading picture for the jury, as he had pleaded not guilty and been convicted after trial for three of the excised sexual assault charges.

The court agreed with the Crown, reversing the Corbett ruling to allow the three convictions to be presented to the jury to correct the distorted view of the accused's credibility, with a clear instruction against propensity reasoning.

The accused, charged with aggravated assault and robbery, brought a pretrial motion to exclude statements he made to police during two interviews.

He argued the first statement was involuntary due to police trickery—specifically, the failure to disclose fingerprint evidence—and that he was psychologically detained, resulting in Charter breaches.

The court applied the Oickle and Grant frameworks, finding the first statement was voluntary and the accused was not detained, as he attended the station willingly and was free to leave.

Consequently, the second statement was not tainted, and all statements were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with sexual assault following an incident at a military marksmanship competition.

The complainant, who had consumed a significant amount of alcohol, awoke with physical signs of sexual intercourse and missing underwear, but no memory of the event.

The accused later bragged to others about having sex with her and displayed her underwear.

The court rejected the accused's testimony that the complainant initiated contact while mistaking him for someone else.

The court found the complainant was so intoxicated as to be incapacitated and incapable of consenting, and that the accused was either aware of this or wilfully blind.

The accused was found guilty.

The defendant was charged with sexual assault on March 8, 2014.

The complainant testified that the defendant sexually assaulted her in four separate locations: in an elevator, on a bus, on stairs, and in a parking lot.

The defendant testified that he was extremely intoxicated and had no memory of the events after 3:00 a.m.

The court found that while the complainant presented as credible, there were significant inconsistencies between her evidence and that of other witnesses, as well as inconsistencies between her trial testimony and her prior statements to police.

The court concluded that these inconsistencies left a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt and acquitted him.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against a 13-year-old complainant whom he met in downtown Ottawa.

The accused argued that the complainant fabricated the events to avoid punishment for skipping school and shoplifting, and alternatively raised the defence of mistaken belief of age.

The court found the complainant's evidence credible and reliable, rejecting the defence's arguments regarding inconsistencies and motive to fabricate.

The court also found the accused failed to take reasonable steps to ascertain the complainant's age.

The accused was found guilty of both charges, with a stay to be entered on one conviction.

The Crown sought a dangerous offender designation for the defendant, A.A.G., who was convicted of multiple sexual assaults and other violent offences against his stepchildren and their mother.

The defence argued for a long-term supervision order.

The court, after considering expert psychiatric opinions and the defendant's extensive criminal history, found that the defendant met the criteria for a dangerous offender designation due to a pattern of repetitive violent and sexual behaviour, high risk of recidivism, and lack of genuine willingness for treatment.

The court declined to impose a long-term offender designation, concluding that there was no reasonable possibility of eventual control of the risk in the community.

The defendant was convicted of trafficking in crack cocaine and related offences following an undercover police operation in Ottawa's market area.

The defendant subsequently brought an application to stay the proceedings on the basis of entrapment.

The court found that while the police did not have a reasonable suspicion that the defendant was engaged in drug trafficking at the initial contact, by the time the officer provided an opportunity to commit the offence, reasonable suspicion had been established through the defendant's conduct and statements.

The court also found that the police were engaged in a bona fide inquiry into drug trafficking in a precisely defined geographic area where criminal activity was concentrated.

The application to stay proceedings was dismissed.

Following a judge-alone trial, the court convicted the accused on eight counts arising from prolonged physical and sexual abuse within a family setting.

The allegations involved repeated sexual assaults and grooming of a child complainant, administration of drugs to facilitate abuse, repeated physical assaults on another child with implements including a belt and stick, and an assault on the children's mother.

Applying the W.(D.) credibility framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as unreliable and found the complainants' evidence credible and sufficiently reliable despite delayed disclosure and some imprecision about frequency.

The court held that the delayed reporting was reasonably explained by threats, shame, fear, and distrust of child protection and police authorities.

The applicants, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application for a change of venue under s. 599 of the Criminal Code.

They argued that a fair trial in Sarnia was impossible due to the small community size, extensive pre-trial publicity regarding their alleged sexual practices, the overwhelming community response to the victim's death, the victim's father's employment at the local courthouse, and inadequate courthouse facilities.

The court granted the application, finding that the cumulative effect of these factors created a reasonable probability of prejudice and impacted the applicants' fair trial rights.

On a Crown application in a criminal trial, the court determined the admissibility of multiple out-of-court statements made by the deceased to family members, friends, and police.

Applying the principled hearsay approach, the court held that necessity was established by the declarant's death and assessed threshold reliability statement by statement.

Statements made under oath in a peace bond application were admitted as sufficiently reliable, as were certain statements to police tendered as circumstantial evidence of the deceased's state of mind.

Other statements were excluded where their meaning was unclear, relevance was lacking, or the surrounding circumstances did not provide sufficient indicia of reliability.

This was a criminal evidentiary ruling on the admissibility of statements made by a deceased declarant.

The court admitted several statements on consent, admitted others under the state of mind exception, and excluded certain statements as irrelevant or for failure to meet threshold reliability.

The ruling was interlocutory and addressed itemized statements individually by chart number.

Two accused were jointly tried for multiple offences arising from a home invasion in which one perpetrator posed as a pizza delivery driver to gain entry and threaten the occupants with a handgun while another attempted to duct-tape one victim.

Fingerprint evidence connected both accused to a pizza box used as a decoy, and the court considered whether that evidence, together with eyewitness descriptions, proved identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court held that the cumulative evidence established that one accused was the intruder carrying the pizza box and handgun.

However, the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the handgun was a real firearm within the meaning of the Criminal Code where the weapon was not recovered and eyewitness observations were limited.

The court also addressed the Kienapple principle and found no legal nexus between robbery and attempted unlawful confinement, allowing separate convictions.

Convictions were entered for break and enter, robbery, and attempted unlawful confinement, with several firearm-related counts resulting in acquittals.

The Crown applied under s. 657.3 of the Criminal Code to have a prior Charter ruling from a first trial applied to a second trial after the first proceeding ended in a mistrial.

The mistrial had been declared when the trial judge disclosed a personal relationship with a key investigating officer, giving rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The Crown argued that, pursuant to s. 653.1 of the Criminal Code, evidentiary and Charter rulings made before the merits stage should remain binding in the retrial unless contrary to the interests of justice.

The court held that the integrity of the justice system and the requirement of impartial adjudication outweighed efficiency concerns.

Given the risk that the public might perceive the earlier ruling as tainted by unconscious bias, the Charter application should be reheard.

In a joint prosecution for drug trafficking and firearm possession, the accused brought a motion seeking disclosure of police occurrence reports relating to prior charges against each accused that had been withdrawn, stayed, or resulted in acquittals.

The request was framed as a third‑party records application under the regime established in R. v. O’Connor.

The court considered whether such materials met the first‑stage threshold of “likely relevance” in relation to credibility, character, and propensity issues anticipated at trial where each accused intended to blame the other.

The court held that occurrence reports relating to withdrawn allegations of drug trafficking and possession of stolen property could meet the low threshold of logical relevance for disclosure purposes.

Production to the court of limited police synopsis “front sheets” relating to the withdrawn charges was ordered for judicial review, subject to Crown redactions for privilege and a later balancing of privacy interests against the right to full answer and defence.

The accused applied to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at their residence, alleging the warrant was invalid and the search violated s. 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

They argued the information to obtain relied excessively on confidential informants whose reliability and motivations were insufficiently disclosed, and that the information failed to establish reasonable grounds linking the residence to drug trafficking.

The court reviewed the information to obtain under the Garofoli standard and held that the issuing justice had a sufficient evidentiary basis to authorize the warrant.

Surveillance evidence, corroborated informant information, and covert entries into a related suspect’s residence collectively established reasonable and probable grounds.

The applications to exclude the seized evidence were therefore dismissed.

The accused applied for severance of counts in an indictment alleging historical sexual offences against two complainants: the accused’s sister and niece.

The defence argued the count involving the sister should be severed because the alleged conduct occurred when the accused was a youth and therefore engaged the Youth Criminal Justice Act.

The court rejected that argument but nevertheless considered severance under s. 591 of the Criminal Code.

Applying the factors set out in R. v. Last, the court found weak factual similarity between the allegations, a high risk of moral prejudice to the accused, and the likelihood of antagonistic defences.

The court concluded the interests of justice required separate trials.

The accused, a public servant with Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was convicted of multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust for accepting money to provide preferential treatment to immigration applicants.

The court considered the accused's Aboriginal heritage under Gladue principles but found no causal link to the offences.

Emphasizing denunciation and general deterrence for breach of trust by a public official, the court sentenced the accused to four years' incarceration concurrently on all counts.

The accused, an acting operations supervisor at Citizenship and Immigration Canada, was charged with multiple counts of fraud on the government and breach of trust by a public officer.

She participated in a joint enterprise with an immigration consultant to expedite and favorably process immigration applications in exchange for money and benefits.

The court found that the accused breached the standard of responsibility and conduct demanded of her office by disclosing confidential information, providing preferential treatment, and accepting benefits.

The accused was found guilty on all counts except one count of bribery.

During a trial for immigration fraud, the Crown brought a KGB application to admit the prior inconsistent statements of a hostile witness, specifically his guilty pleas and an Agreed Statement of Facts from his own related trial.

The witness had been uncooperative and claimed memory loss regarding the respondent's involvement.

The court found that the criteria of necessity and threshold reliability were met on a balance of probabilities.

The application was granted, and the statements were admitted to prove the truth of their contents, although the court ultimately assigned them virtually no weight.

During a criminal trial for immigration-related offences, the Crown brought an application under s. 9(1) of the Canada Evidence Act to declare its own witness adverse and hostile.

The witness, a former co-accused who had previously pled guilty, was evasive, repeatedly claimed memory loss, and refused to refresh his memory from his prior Agreed Statement of Facts and preliminary inquiry testimony.

The court found the witness to be both adverse under the Act and hostile at common law, noting his clear motive to protect the accused and his refusal to provide helpful evidence.

The Crown was granted leave to cross-examine the witness at large.