Michael Sims

The applicants sought judicial review of two decisions by the Animal Care Review Board regarding their sled dog business.

The Board had confirmed orders requiring the applicants to improve living conditions for their dogs, including lengthening tethers and remediating doghouses.

When the applicants failed to comply, animal welfare inspectors removed approximately 230 dogs.

The Board subsequently ordered that most of the dogs not be returned until the applicants complied with the orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications for judicial review, finding the Board's interpretation of the tethering requirements reasonable and concluding that the removal and retention of the dogs were justified due to the applicants' ongoing non-compliance with the minimum standards of care.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Koehnen J. dated May 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the respondent in the amount of $4,500.

The moving parties, operators of a dog sledding business, sought a stay of an Animal Care Review Board decision requiring them to pay over $500,000 for the costs of care of over 100 sled dogs removed by animal welfare authorities.

The stay was sought pending the determination of two related applications for judicial review challenging the underlying compliance and removal orders.

Applying the RJR-MacDonald test, the court found a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm due to the potential forfeiture and euthanization of the specially trained dogs, and that the balance of convenience favoured a stay to prevent the judicial reviews from becoming moot.

The court granted the stay on terms, including a requirement for future submissions on financial security for ongoing care costs.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Information and Privacy Commissioner (IPC) upholding the Toronto Police Services Board's refusal to disclose certain records related to her 2007 arrest.

The IPC found the withheld records contained third-party personal information exempt from disclosure under the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding the IPC's decision reasonable.

The court also rejected the applicant's arguments that the IPC failed to properly consider her Charter rights and the public interest override, noting that the Act is not a mechanism for criminal disclosure and the public interest exemption did not apply.

The applicant contractor sought judicial review of two decisions by the City of Toronto: a finding by the Fair Wage Office that it breached the Fair Wage Policy, and a subsequent City Council decision disqualifying it from City contracts for two years.

The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed both decisions, finding that the applicant was denied procedural fairness.

Specifically, the applicant was not provided with notice, disclosure, or the right to be heard before the Fair Wage Office made its breach determination.

The court declined to award damages, noting it lacked jurisdiction to do so on judicial review.

The City of Toronto sought a declaration that Cloverdale Mall Inc. owned and was responsible for the maintenance of a bridge over the East Mall, or alternatively, if the City owned it, that it had the right to demolish it.

The bridge was built by Cloverdale's predecessor after land expropriation for Highway 427, with the province reimbursing construction costs.

The Minutes of Settlement from 1972 were silent on bridge ownership and maintenance.

Applying principles of contractual interpretation, the court found that the parties intended Cloverdale to own and maintain the bridge, as it served Cloverdale's private interests and the City's obligations were extinguished upon payment for construction.

The court also rejected the argument that the bridge was a fixture to City land, as its purpose was to enhance Cloverdale's property, not the City's.

The application was granted in favour of the City, with costs fixed against Cloverdale.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by an Adjudicator with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, which found that the Toronto Police Service had conducted a reasonable search for records responsive to his access request.

The applicant alleged he was the victim of gang stalking and mind control, and argued that the police failed to produce records documenting these activities.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding no error in the Adjudicator's decision, no breach of procedural fairness, and declining to consider Charter arguments raised for the first time on judicial review.

The applicant, a federal inmate serving a six-year sentence, applied for habeas corpus challenging a transfer from minimum to medium security.

He alleged the transfer decision was procedurally unfair under s. 27 of the Corrections and Conditional Release Act because confidential source information was withheld and insufficient particulars were disclosed.

The court held that correctional authorities may withhold information where disclosure would jeopardize safety, security, or investigations, provided a sealed affidavit explaining the withheld material is supplied to the reviewing court.

The court was satisfied that the sealed affidavit justified nondisclosure and that the applicant had received an adequate summary of the information against him.

The court also found the transfer decision reasonable and declined to interfere with institutional placement decisions.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of offences committed prior to the enactment of the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA), appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the retroactive abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

Applying the companion decision in Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's expected incarceration time, constituting an unjustified variation in punishment.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared eligible for the APR regime.

The appellant, a federal inmate convicted of drug offences committed before the Abolition of Early Parole Act (AEPA) came into force but sentenced after, appealed the dismissal of his habeas corpus application.

He argued that the AEPA's abolition of accelerated parole review (APR) violated his s. 11(i) Charter right to the benefit of the lesser punishment.

Relying on the companion case of Canada (Attorney General) v. Lewis, the Court of Appeal held that the abolition of APR appreciably increased the appellant's incarceration time, constituting a variation in punishment that violated s. 11(i) and was not saved by s. 1.

The appeal was allowed, and the appellant was declared entitled to the APR regime.

The respondents committed offences before the Abolition of Early Parole Act came into force, but were convicted and sentenced after.

They successfully applied for a declaration that they were eligible for accelerated parole review under the previous regime, arguing that the retrospective application of the Act violated their rights under s. 11(i) of the Charter.

The Attorney General appealed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the denial of day parole constitutes punishment and that the retrospective application of the Act unjustifiably violated s. 11(i) of the Charter.