Michael Miller

The appellant appealed an Inspection Order issued by the Burk's Falls and District Fire Department under the Fire Protection and Prevention Act.

The order required the appellant to comply with the Ontario Fire Code provisions for vehicle and scrap metal salvage yards, including organizing combustible salvage piles, draining gas tanks, and separating tanks and drums.

The appellant argued the property was a public garage and repair shop, not a salvage yard.

The Fire Safety Commission found that the property constituted a salvage yard in terms of fire safety and upheld the Inspection Order, concluding the measures were necessary to protect occupants and emergency responders.

The appellants challenged an order declaring them vexatious litigants, arguing that the responding party improperly proceeded by motion rather than application and that this procedural error required the judgment to be set aside.

The court held that the responding party should have proceeded by application, but found the misdescription caused no prejudice because the appellants had full notice of the case against them.

The court further rejected the argument that the appellants' application to lift an earlier stay had to be heard first.

The appeal was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the respondent.

The applicant, East Durham Wind, Inc., sought judicial review of two municipal by-laws enacted by the Municipality of West Grey that prevented the construction of a provincially approved wind energy project.

The applicant held a Renewable Energy Approval (REA) but required municipal entrance and oversize haulage permits.

The Divisional Court found that the municipal by-laws frustrated the purpose of the REA, which was to facilitate renewable energy projects under the Green Energy Act.

The court declared the by-laws inoperative to the extent of the conflict and ordered the municipality to reconsider the permit applications.

The applicant, a non-Christian resident, alleged discrimination on the basis of creed because the respondent municipality opened its public council meetings with a recitation of a 'Town Prayer'.

The Tribunal found that holding council meetings is a service under the Human Rights Code and that the applicant's feelings of exclusion from the religious observance fell within the protected ground of creed.

The Tribunal concluded that the practice of reciting the prayer imposed a religious observance that adversely affected the applicant, establishing a prima facie case of discrimination.

As the respondent provided no evidence of undue hardship to justify the practice, the Tribunal ordered the respondent to cease reciting the prayer at the opening of public council meetings.

The respondent claimed it was owed $245,000 by the appellants.

The parties signed Minutes of Settlement and a Consent to Judgment in July 2008 with legal advice, but subsequently signed another document in September 2008 without legal advice.

The appellants argued the later document superseded the earlier ones, while the respondent disagreed.

The Court of Appeal held that the serious factual issues between the parties could not be resolved on a paper record and required a trial.

The appeal was allowed and the judgment below was set aside.

The moving party sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from decisions of the Ontario Municipal Board (OMB) refusing to change the designation of the appellants from two individuals to a ratepayers' association.

The moving party argued the OMB erred in its interpretation of its rules regarding minor errors and reviews.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error of law or jurisdiction in the OMB's conclusion that the individuals who signed the appeal forms were the proper parties.

The Court also addressed a potential conflict of interest involving the moving party's counsel and adjourned the issue of costs.

The appellant condominium owner sought access to election proxies and ballots after an unsuccessful bid for the board of directors.

The Small Claims Court initially ordered production of the records, but later varied the order to require redaction of identifying information to protect owner privacy.

The appellant appealed the variation order to the Divisional Court.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding it lacked jurisdiction because the appealed order was procedural and did not involve a monetary amount, and further held that the Small Claims Court judge had jurisdiction to clarify the order.

The applicant brought a motion seeking relief from an earlier court order permitting the municipality to demolish a building if the applicant failed to complete construction by a specified deadline.

The prior order required the building to be ready for final occupancy by August 30, 2012, failing which a stay of demolition would be lifted.

The court found that the applicant had failed to comply with the deadline and had a long history of delays and missed construction timelines despite multiple court-managed extensions.

Applying the doctrines of issue estoppel, collateral attack, and abuse of process, the court held that the prior order should not be revisited.

The motion was dismissed and the earlier demolition-related order was upheld.

The applicants sought enforcement of a prior court order requiring production of condominium corporation financial records and pursued contempt proceedings against a corporate director for non‑compliance.

The director delivered additional banking and financial documents and advised that audited financial statements were being prepared by external auditors.

The court found that the respondent had not yet fully purged the contempt order because the disclosure provided did not include all required financial records.

However, the court accepted that steps toward compliance were underway and relieved the director from further personal attendance requirements.

The contempt motion was adjourned to allow completion of the audit and disclosure of supporting documentation, and costs were awarded to the applicants for the appearance.

A proposed purchaser under a second agreement of purchase and sale sought leave to intervene in litigation between the original purchaser and the vendor concerning the enforceability of an earlier agreement for the sale of condominium units.

The proposed intervenor also sought a mandatory order compelling completion of the second agreement, declaratory relief, and security for costs.

The court held the proposed intervenor would not assist in resolving the dispute between the original contracting parties and would merely duplicate the vendor’s position.

Any damages arising from failure to complete the second agreement would be compensable and properly pursued against the vendor in a separate proceeding.

The court dismissed the motion for intervenor status and related relief, refused the vendor’s request to withdraw its undertaking not to transfer title, and directed that the dispute proceed by expedited trial on the Commercial List.

The parties sought a determination of custody, access, and child support for their 6-year-old child.

The applicant mother sought to maintain the status quo access schedule, while the respondent father sought a week-about shared parenting arrangement.

The court ordered joint custody with primary residence to the mother, but increased the father's access time, finding that the father's poor conflict management skills and impulsive behaviour made an immediate week-about arrangement inappropriate.

For child support, the court imputed the self-employed father's income at $100,000, ordered $7,140 in arrears, and set ongoing support at $775 per month, reflecting that the new access schedule crossed the 40 percent shared parenting threshold.

The moving party sought an extension of time to file materials in support of a motion for leave to appeal an Ontario Municipal Board decision until 30 days after the Board disposed of the costs issue.

The respondent developer opposed the extension, arguing the leave motion should proceed without delay.

The court ordered the moving party to file its leave materials by March 30, 2012, but deferred setting a date for the leave motion hearing until the Board fixed its dates for the outstanding issues, balancing the need to avoid undue delay with the efficient use of judicial resources.

The appellant appealed a decision declining to quash a municipal by-law.

The municipality had failed to provide proper notification to the appellant that the by-law had been passed.

The application judge found no bad faith on the part of the municipality and no prejudice to the appellant, and thus declined to exercise his discretion under s. 273(1) of the Municipal Act to quash the by-law.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's reasoning and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed a judgment regarding the interpretation of a Quit Claim deed.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Quit Claim deed was clear, unambiguous, and determinative, rejecting the argument that its meaning required reference to other documents.

The appeal was dismissed, and leave to appeal the substantial costs order was denied.

The City of Vaughan appealed a decision dismissing its motion for summary judgment, arguing that s. 20(1)(a) of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act provided complete immunity against the plaintiffs' $151 million claim for malfeasance and negligence.

The plaintiffs alleged the City deliberately delayed their zoning applications, causing them to lose the opportunity to develop their land before retroactive legislative amendments made the development impossible.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the plaintiffs' cause of action and some damages accrued prior to the legislative amendments, meaning statutory immunity did not completely bar the claim.

The court also reduced the motion judge's substantial indemnity costs award from $169,156.30 to $119,156.30.

The moving party municipality sought leave to appeal a motion judge's dismissal of its motions for summary judgment and determination of a question of law.

The underlying action involved claims of misfeasance and negligence related to the closing of zoning applications.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal on the issue of whether the municipality was immune from suit under s. 20(1)(a) of the Oak Ridges Moraine Conservation Act, finding there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's decision and that the issue was of general importance.

Leave to appeal on the limitation period issue was denied.

The appellant filed a petition for drainage works under the Drainage Act.

The Township of Ramara decided not to proceed with the petition, basing its decision on comments from the Lake Simcoe Region Conservation Authority regarding an engineering report rather than the petition itself.

The Tribunal found that the Township considered extraneous and irrelevant factors not permitted under section 4 of the Act.

The Tribunal overturned the Township's decision and directed the drainage petition to proceed, noting that the appellant was denied due process.

Following a successful motion to quash a judicial review application, the moving party sought costs of $15,000 plus disbursements, as well as costs for other respondents.

The responding party opposed the quantum.

The Divisional Court found the motion was straightforward and essentially undefended, making the claimed counsel fee unwarranted.

The court fixed costs at $8,379.38 inclusive of GST and disbursements, and denied the request for costs for the other respondents due to a lack of evidence.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment dismissing their claim against the Town of Parry Sound.

The appellants argued the Town had a duty to build a fence to prevent access to railway tracks.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the trial judge that the Town had no duty to build a fence preventing access from lands owned by the School Board.

Furthermore, the trial judge's finding that the proposed fence would not have prevented access was entitled to deference.

The appeal was dismissed with costs of $12,000 awarded to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their claim.

The motion judge had concluded that a letter found by one of the appellants in February 2003 did not postpone the running of the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge's thorough and careful reasons and dismissed the appeal, awarding costs to the respondents.