Michael Carmine Mazzuca

In three related securities class action appeals, the court reconsidered whether a statutory secondary-market misrepresentation claim under s. 138.3 of the Securities Act is time-barred unless leave is obtained within the s. 138.14 limitation period.

The court overruled Timminco and held that, for purposes of s. 28 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the statutory claim is asserted when the representative plaintiff pleads the statutory cause of action, the supporting facts, and an intention to seek leave within a timely commenced class proceeding.

The court also upheld the motion judge's interpretation of the s. 138.8 leave standard as screening out hopeless claims, while holding that the Green certification decision erred in failing to consider certifying common negligent misrepresentation issues other than reliance.

The plaintiffs' appeal in Green was allowed in part and the defendants' appeals in Silver and Celestica were dismissed.

The applicant sought directions regarding a creditor claims and distribution process under the Bulk Sales Act for residual net sales proceeds of $5,458.91.

The motion was unopposed.

The court approved the order but expressed significant discomfort with the applicant's use of the Bulk Sales Act, noting that the statute is designed to protect creditors 'in full', whereas in this case, trade creditors would receive virtually nothing after professional fees and priority claims were paid.

The court suggested that the Bulk Sales Act should be limited to situations where creditors will be paid in full, with insolvency legislation used otherwise.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike portions of the defendants’ statement of defence and counterclaim under Rules 21.01(3) and 25.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively to compel further particulars.

The dispute arose from a joint venture involving educational and consulting seminars and real estate marketing.

The court held that the pleadings disclosed sufficient material facts and did not meet the high threshold required to strike a defence or counterclaim as scandalous, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process.

The court further found that the additional details sought by the plaintiff were evidentiary in nature and more appropriately addressed during examinations for discovery.

The motion was therefore dismissed in its entirety, though the plaintiff was granted additional time to deliver its reply.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination on the basis of disability and reprisal, 11 months after the one-year limitation period expired.

The applicant argued the delay was in good faith because he was unaware of his rights under the Code until advised by counsel.

The Tribunal found the delay was not incurred in good faith, noting the applicant had counsel throughout the delay period and had already commenced a civil proceeding for wrongful dismissal based on the same facts.

The application was dismissed as out of time.

The applicant filed human rights complaints alleging discrimination, harassment, and reprisal based on his disability (multiple chemical sensitivity).

While accommodation issues were previously addressed in a grievance arbitration, the Tribunal heard allegations that the applicant's Superintendent harassed him after the applicant reported the Superintendent for smoking in the workplace, and that the employer and union failed to investigate.

Applying the Faryna v. Chorny test for credibility, the adjudicator found the applicant's evidence to be unreliable and inconsistent with the preponderance of probabilities.

The applications were dismissed due to a lack of credible evidence supporting the allegations of harassment or the reporting of such harassment to management or the union.

Following a decision affirming the Superintendent's Notice of Proposal regarding a partial wind-up report, the interested party sought an award of costs against the company.

The interested party argued that the company was wholly unsuccessful and caused unreasonable delays by advancing frivolous positions.

The Tribunal dismissed the request for costs, finding that the company's arguments were reasonable and necessary for the hearing, and that its conduct was consistent with its fiduciary duty as plan administrator.

The applicant company initiated a voluntary partial wind-up of its pension plan following a plant closure and restructuring.

The company excluded its former President and CEO from the wind-up group, arguing he was terminated for cause following a corporate takeover, not as a result of the plant closure.

The Superintendent of Financial Services issued a Notice of Proposal refusing to approve the wind-up report unless the former executive was included.

The Financial Services Tribunal affirmed the Superintendent's proposal, finding that the executive was terminated during the defined partial wind-up period and the company failed to demonstrate his termination was not a result of the restructuring.

The Tribunal also rejected the company's argument that the Superintendent was functus officio.

The employer requested a hearing regarding a Notice of Proposal by the Superintendent related to a partial wind-up report of its pension plan.

Shortly before the scheduled hearing, the employer withdrew its request.

The union, which had been granted party status, applied for an award of costs against the employer.

The Financial Services Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the employer's conduct was not unreasonable, frivolous, or vexatious, and that the delay caused by the change of position was not unnecessary or unreasonable.

The applicant applied for termination of construction industry bargaining rights.

The respondent union argued the applicant lacked standing because he was not at work on the application date, rendering the application a nullity.

The applicant sought to add two other employees who were at work on the application date as party applicants.

The Board held that although the original applicant lacked standing, the application was not a nullity.

The Board exercised its discretion under Rules 79 and 84 to add the two other petitioners as applicants, allowing the application to proceed.