Melvyn Lloyd Solmon

The appellants, a law firm and lawyer, appealed the dismissal of their motion to strike a defamation claim.

The respondent had sued the appellants for defamation based on a letter and draft statement of claim sent to a town planner the day before the claim was officially issued.

The motion judge held that absolute privilege did not apply because the communication contained gratuitously defamatory material intended to induce false testimony.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, holding that absolute privilege applies to communications made preparatory to and with a view to judicial proceedings, regardless of malice or falsity.

The court found the communication was made on an occasion of absolute privilege and struck the statement of claim.

The plaintiffs appealed an order determining that Ontario lacked jurisdiction or was forum non conveniens for their claims of breach of contract and misrepresentation against their insurance brokers and insurers.

The claims arose from a lapsed umbrella liability policy.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that the central core of the lawsuit concerned contracts and representations made in Quebec, and that the plaintiffs' presence in Ontario was insignificant.

The appellant appealed a judgment granting an oppression remedy to the respondent, a former tenant whose lease was wrongfully terminated.

Before the respondent's damages were quantified, the appellant sold the corporation's sole asset and paid the net proceeds to herself, leaving the corporation judgment-proof.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that a party with a judgment for unquantified damages is a 'creditor' under the OBCA and that the appellant's asset-stripping conduct was oppressive.

The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.

The claim arose from a letter and draft Statement of Claim sent by the defendants to a town planner prior to commencing litigation.

The motions judge had found that absolute privilege might not apply if the communication's objective was to induce false testimony.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as it appeared to confuse the considerations relevant to absolute privilege with those of qualified privilege by factoring in motivation or bad faith.

The appellant commenced an action alleging the respondents conspired to falsely accuse him of fraud, while criminal proceedings against him for that fraud were ongoing.

The motion judge struck the claim, characterizing it as malicious prosecution lacking the essential element of a favourable determination in the criminal proceedings.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding that even if framed as conspiracy to injure, the claim could not proceed in the face of ongoing criminal proceedings.

The appeal was dismissed and the claim struck in its entirety.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his claim for damages against the respondents for breach of contract.

The appellant had an agreement with the deceased respondent granting him an option to purchase a valuable painting upon the deceased's death.

The deceased sold the painting before his death, breaching the contract.

The motion judge dismissed the claim on the basis that the appellant failed to prove he had the financial means to exercise the option.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by assuming the role of a trial judge and that there were genuine issues for trial, including the proper option price and whether the appellant needed to show he had the means to purchase the painting.

The appellant appealed from a judgment dismissing its application and ordering a trial on issues relating to a contractual relationship with the respondent.

The appellant argued the application judge erred in finding a pivotal provision regarding a 90-day cooling-off period for share purchases ambiguous and incomprehensible.

The Court of Appeal found no basis to interfere with the application judge's exercise of discretion, agreeing that the combination of ambiguity and conflict in the record warranted a trial.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant law firm sued the respondent lawyer for damages resulting from the respondent's breach of an undertaking to protect the appellant's account.

The trial judge found that the respondent breached the undertaking but dismissed the claim, finding the breach did not cause the appellant's loss, and awarded costs to the respondent.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the dismissal on the merits, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's causation analysis.

However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, holding that the trial judge erred in principle by awarding costs to a solicitor who breached an undertaking, as such conduct reflects adversely on the administration of justice.

The trial costs order was reversed to no costs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of its application regarding a commercial lease dispute.

The application judge had concluded the matter could not be decided on application and dismissed it without prejudice to the appellant's right to commence an action.

The Court of Appeal agreed that the main issue—whether the landlord's failure to sign and return an amending agreement amounted to a failure to reach a binding agreement—could not be decided on application.

However, the Court revised the procedural remedy, ordering the trial of an issue rather than requiring a new action to be commenced.

The appeal was otherwise dismissed with costs to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a trial judgment regarding a partnership dispute over a Muskoka business.

The trial judge found that while the parties were partners, their relationship was governed by an Acknowledgment document granting the appellant a conditional option to purchase shares, which he failed to exercise.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings that the shares never became partnership property under the Partnership Act and that the arrangement did not constitute a security interest under the PPSA.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The appellant appealed an order striking his Amended Statement of Claim against a law firm without leave to amend.

The appellant, a minority shareholder, alleged that the directors committed oppression by diverting corporate funds to pay the law firm's legal fees, and sought an order for the law firm to refund the fees.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the motion to strike was not barred by issue estoppel and that the amended pleading did not disclose a tenable cause of action against the law firm for knowing receipt of a benefit from oppression.

The appellant husband appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay a $3.3 million equalization payment, retroactive child support, ongoing child support, and costs including a $150,000 premium.

The core issues involved whether a cottage owned by the husband's numbered company constituted a matrimonial home, the valuation of his business, and the appropriateness of the support and costs awards.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision to pierce the corporate veil regarding the cottage and accepted the business valuation and support orders.

However, applying recent Supreme Court jurisprudence, the court allowed the appeal in part to set aside the $150,000 costs premium.

The respondent wife's cross-appeal seeking higher pre-judgment interest was dismissed.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment awarding the respondent landlord damages for the cost of restoring commercial premises at the end of a tenancy.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that a 1999 consolidation lease did not eliminate the tenant's repair obligations from earlier leases.

The court also upheld the assessment of damages for floor, electrical, and HVAC repairs as supported by the evidence.

However, the court allowed the appeal in part, finding that an administration fee for loss of rent was not supported by the wording of the lease.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict finding no negligence on the part of an unidentified customer or the respondent grocery store after an incident in an express aisle.

The appellants also argued the store had a duty to investigate the accident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that it was open to the jury to find no negligence by either party.

The Court further held that the store's duty to keep its premises reasonably safe did not extend to an obligation to investigate the accident.

The appellant appealed a trial judge's decision characterizing a letter of agreement as an absolute and unconditional sale and transfer of shares.

The appellant argued the arrangement created a security interest subject to the Personal Property Security Act.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was entitled to conclude on the record that the transaction was an absolute sale.

The appellants appealed a partial summary judgment finding that they wrongfully terminated a commercial lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motions judge that the respondent was not in arrears of rent but had a credit in its favour, and therefore the appellants were not entitled to terminate the lease.

The court also rejected the appellants' argument that the respondent engaged in wrongful conduct to mislead them.

The appellants appealed a decision refusing to set aside an order dismissing their action.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's application of the usual test for setting aside a dismissal order, nor in the findings that the appellants failed to adequately explain their delay and that the respondents would suffer prejudice.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing its action for specific performance of an alleged oral agreement to purchase land.

The motion judge found no genuine issue for trial because essential terms, specifically the assumption of obligations under a Cost Sharing Agreement, were not agreed upon, and there was no written memorandum to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the appellant's self-serving affidavit evidence, which contradicted its own draft agreement, was insufficient to create a triable issue.

The appellants appealed a judgment enforcing a settlement under Rule 49.09 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Court of Appeal assumed jurisdiction on consent of counsel but dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge had jurisdiction and made no error in exercising his discretion.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondents.

The appellant alleged that the respondents breached a duty of care by failing to properly trace a harassing phone call, which led to his implication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding it unnecessary to decide the duty of care issue because there was no evidence that further investigation by the respondents would have produced exculpatory evidence for the appellant.