3 total
Reprehensible refusal to provide PPSA disclosure justified substantial indemnity costs.
A secured creditor sought disclosure of financial information under a general security agreement and s. 18 of the Personal Property Security Act after the debtor and another secured party failed to provide requested information.
The proceeding ultimately resolved after undertakings were given during cross‑examination and the disclosure was substantially provided.
On a subsequent costs motion, the court held the respondents had unreasonably resisted disclosure and filed extensive irrelevant evidence to delay the proceeding.
The court found this conduct constituted reprehensible litigation behaviour warranting elevated costs.
Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to the applicant.
Receiver appointed after debtor defaulted on promissory note secured by general security agreement.
A secured creditor applied for judgment on a promissory note and the appointment of a receiver over the debtor company’s assets under a general security agreement.
The debtor alleged it had made advance payments toward the note and counter‑applied for the return of equipment seized by the creditor.
The court found the alleged payments were unrelated to the promissory note and that the debtor had defaulted on the required installment.
Because assets of the purchased company had been transferred contrary to the note’s terms, the entire debt became immediately due.
Judgment for $100,000 was granted, a receiver‑manager was appointed, and the debtor’s claim for return of seized equipment was dismissed.
Leave to appeal granted as motions judge may have erred in applying qualified privilege concepts to absolute privilege.
The defendants sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim.
The claim arose from a letter and draft Statement of Claim sent by the defendants to a town planner prior to commencing litigation.
The motions judge had found that absolute privilege might not apply if the communication's objective was to induce false testimony.
The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding good reason to doubt the correctness of the motions judge's decision, as it appeared to confuse the considerations relevant to absolute privilege with those of qualified privilege by factoring in motivation or bad faith.
