Melvyn Lloyd Solmon

The moving parties requested to schedule a motion to bar a witness from testifying at the upcoming trial, alleging the witness had previously perjured himself and ignored court orders.

The case management judge declined to schedule the motion, finding that admissibility of evidence is a matter for the trial judge.

The judge emphasized that allowing the interlocutory motion would only cause further delay and tactical gamesmanship in an already protracted litigation.

The applicants, 2235209 Ontario Inc. and Guy Salt, brought motions seeking interim orders including holding sale proceeds in trust, an injunction prohibiting dealings with Lot 5, a Certificate of Pending Litigation (CPL) on Lot 5, and a Mareva Order.

The motions were based on allegations of fraud regarding mortgage amounts, which the applicants claimed vitiated prior settlements where they had terminated their agreements of purchase and sale.

The court dismissed the motions, finding that the applicants failed to establish a serious issue to be tried, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favored granting the injunctions.

The court also noted the applicants' lack of clean hands, delay, and insufficient undertakings.

This endorsement addresses the quantum of costs following the Applicants' success in an application to reduce a mortgage from over $5,000,000 to $10,000.

The Applicants sought $139,642.93 on a partial indemnity basis, while the Respondent proposed a maximum of $70,000.

The court considered the high stakes, the urgency of the matter exacerbated by COVID-19, and the Respondent's delaying tactics.

Despite finding the Applicants' bill somewhat high due to senior counsel's involvement, the court awarded costs of $100,000.00 inclusive of disbursements and taxes to the Applicants, emphasizing their full success and the Respondent's conduct.

The applicants sought to quash an order of the Small Claims Court that amended the defendants to include a representative of a trade union.

The applicants argued the Small Claims Court lacked jurisdiction to make a representation order.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Small Claims Court Rules contain a gap regarding representation orders, which the Deputy Judge properly filled by relying on Rule 1.03(2) to apply Rule 12.07 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant held a third mortgage on a property and challenged the sale of the property by the assignee of the first mortgage, arguing the assignee failed to issue a fresh notice of sale.

The applicant moved to convert the application into an action to add allegations of fraud, while the respondents moved to dismiss the application.

The court granted the motion to convert the application into an action, finding the record insufficient to deny the investors the ability to pursue their claims.

However, the court ruled on the legal issue, holding that under the Mortgages Act, an assignee is not required to issue a fresh notice of sale if the interested parties received written notice of the assignment.

Two consolidated appeals arising from a family law proceeding between parents concerning custody and access to their child.

The respondent appealed an order dismissing a recusal application against a judge, and the appellant appealed an order denying leave to amend pleadings to seek custody.

The court found the case had become a procedural morass characterized by lack of good faith efforts to resolve issues.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The court emphasized that the appellant had pursued indirect procedural tactics rather than direct routes of review, and that the custody issue had been finally determined by a subsequent order that was not appealed.

The respondent Fund and the appellant Manager agreed that the Fund should be liquidated and dissolved but disagreed on the liquidation process.

The motion judge ordered liquidation without appointing a court-supervised liquidator, instead allowing the Fund to proceed with its proposed process using an expert.

The Manager appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in not appointing a liquidator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 217 of the Canada Business Corporations Act grants courts broad discretion to make orders in connection with liquidation and dissolution, and does not mandate the appointment of a liquidator.

The motion judge's reasons were cogent and supported by the record.

The applicants sought a contempt order against the respondents for alleged non-compliance with a Master's order requiring an accounting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing because the underlying action against them had been dismissed, and the Master's order for accounting was not made for their benefit.

Furthermore, the court agreed that the Master's order was not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to form the basis for a contempt finding.

A motion to set aside orders of a chambers judge denying leave to appeal.

The core issue was whether an appeal from a decision denying leave to sue a court-appointed receiver is governed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or the Courts of Justice Act (CJA).

The receiver was appointed under both statutes.

The applicant argued that since the leave to sue provision could be grounded in provincial law under the CJA, the appeal should follow the CJA route, which permits appeals as of right within 30 days.

The respondent argued that the BIA governs because the receivership proceedings are BIA proceedings and the appeal provisions are in operational conflict.

The court held that the BIA governs the appeal route because the leave to sue provision is authorized by the BIA through necessary implication of section 243(1), and federal paramountcy applies to the conflicting appeal provisions.

The plaintiff, 688857 Ontario Limited, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully recovering $58,761 (plus interest, totaling approximately $66,000) in a fidelity insurance claim against Aviva Insurance Company of Canada.

The court determined it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have pursued the action under ordinary procedure, despite the recovery being below the Simplified Procedure threshold, due to the complexity of employee vs. independent contractor issues and bad faith claims.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs, finding no serious misconduct by the defendant, and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The final award was $196,609.08, significantly less than the plaintiff's claim of $240,563, after adjustments for trial inefficiencies, counsel rates, and proportionality.

Various defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged civil conspiracy, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment.

The court struck the claims for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment against all applicants.

The civil conspiracy claim against one individual defendant (Moez Kassam) was struck, but the conspiracy claims against the remaining Anson Corporate Defendants, Adam Spears, Sunny Puri, ClaritySpring Inc., Nathan Anderson, Richard Molyneux, and Darryl Levitt were allowed to proceed.

The court also clarified that 'whistleblower' complaints to the Ontario Securities Commission are subject to absolute privilege and do not constitute the commencement of legal proceedings for the tort of abuse of process.

The respondent in matrimonial litigation moved to have the former case management judge recuse himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The new case management judge dismissed the motion, finding it premature and pointless as the former judge was not scheduled for future involvement.

The court determined the respondent had an ulterior motive to revisit prior rulings and that the motion constituted an abuse of process, contrary to the Family Law Rules' objectives of saving time and expense.

This decision reconsiders a previous costs award concerning two applications.

The self-represented litigants, William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, sought costs for their time spent on work ordinarily done by a lawyer, in addition to previously awarded partial indemnity for legal services and disbursements.

The court approved a minor increase in disbursements but maintained its ruling that Young and Dinsdale had not sufficiently proven lost opportunities for remuneration for their self-represented time.

The court also noted their role was akin to interveners, who typically do not receive costs.

SusGlobal Energy Belleville Ltd. brought a motion to reopen a prior motion seeking leave to sue the receiver (BDO) for damages, and to introduce fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that SusGlobal failed to meet the test for introducing fresh evidence as the evidence was available at the original hearing and would not have changed the outcome.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice in refusing to relax the reasonable diligence rule.

The appellants appealed a Master's order that varied a previous 'last chance' order requiring the respondent to post security for costs.

The previous order stated that if the respondent failed to post security by a specific deadline, the action would be dismissed.

The respondent failed to comply, but the Master subsequently issued a new order extending the deadline and increasing the security amount.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, finding that the Master was functus officio once the original order was issued, entered, and breached, resulting in the dismissal of the action.

The Master therefore had no jurisdiction to vary the order or grant a stay.

This decision addresses costs arising from two competing applications concerning land ownership between Aragon (Wellesley) Development (Ontario) Corporation and Piller Investments Limited.

While Aragon and Piller settled their costs, the court determined the costs payable by Piller to William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, who were participants in the original dispute.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the period Young and Dinsdale were represented by counsel, along with disbursements.

However, claims for costs for their time as self-represented litigants were denied, as they failed to demonstrate a loss of remunerative activity, consistent with established principles for self-represented litigants.

The plaintiff landlord sued its insurer after the insurer denied a claim under an employee dishonesty policy.

The plaintiff alleged its property manager stole rent money and misused a corporate credit card.

The insurer denied the claim on the basis that the property manager was an independent contractor, not an employee.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the property manager was an employee based on the level of control and the nature of the relationship.

The court awarded the plaintiff $58,761 for the stolen rent but dismissed the credit card claim, finding it was a debtor-creditor arrangement.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims for bad faith and punitive damages, finding the insurer handled the complex claim fairly.

Piller Investments Limited appealed a partial arbitral award concerning a commercial lease and an option to purchase.

The arbitral panel had granted partial summary judgment on some issues and deferred others to a full hearing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitral panel's substantive legal decisions were reasonable and free from errors of law.

The court also held that the panel's decision to defer certain issues was a procedural determination on which there is no right of appeal, and even if appealable, was consistent with summary judgment principles.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

Aragon brought an application for a declaration that Piller and its tenants were obstructing Aragon's right of way over an L-shaped parcel of land.

Piller brought a cross-application claiming it had acquired possessory title to the L-shaped land and a portion of Aragon's land through adverse possession by its tenants, and that Aragon had abandoned its right of way.

The court found that Piller's tenants, as trespassers, did not meet the high threshold for adverse possession, particularly the inconsistent use requirement, as their use was not inconsistent with the servient owner's intended use.

Furthermore, the court found no evidence that Aragon or its predecessors intended to abandon the expressly granted right of way.

Aragon's application was granted, and Piller's cross-application was dismissed.

Piller was ordered to remove the obstructions.