Melvyn Lloyd Solmon

Two consolidated appeals arising from a family law proceeding between parents concerning custody and access to their child.

The respondent appealed an order dismissing a recusal application against a judge, and the appellant appealed an order denying leave to amend pleadings to seek custody.

The court found the case had become a procedural morass characterized by lack of good faith efforts to resolve issues.

Both appeals were dismissed.

The court emphasized that the appellant had pursued indirect procedural tactics rather than direct routes of review, and that the custody issue had been finally determined by a subsequent order that was not appealed.

The respondent Fund and the appellant Manager agreed that the Fund should be liquidated and dissolved but disagreed on the liquidation process.

The motion judge ordered liquidation without appointing a court-supervised liquidator, instead allowing the Fund to proceed with its proposed process using an expert.

The Manager appealed, arguing the motion judge erred in not appointing a liquidator.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that section 217 of the Canada Business Corporations Act grants courts broad discretion to make orders in connection with liquidation and dissolution, and does not mandate the appointment of a liquidator.

The motion judge's reasons were cogent and supported by the record.

The applicants sought a contempt order against the respondents for alleged non-compliance with a Master's order requiring an accounting.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the applicants lacked standing because the underlying action against them had been dismissed, and the Master's order for accounting was not made for their benefit.

Furthermore, the court agreed that the Master's order was not sufficiently clear or unequivocal to form the basis for a contempt finding.

A motion to set aside orders of a chambers judge denying leave to appeal.

The core issue was whether an appeal from a decision denying leave to sue a court-appointed receiver is governed by the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) or the Courts of Justice Act (CJA).

The receiver was appointed under both statutes.

The applicant argued that since the leave to sue provision could be grounded in provincial law under the CJA, the appeal should follow the CJA route, which permits appeals as of right within 30 days.

The respondent argued that the BIA governs because the receivership proceedings are BIA proceedings and the appeal provisions are in operational conflict.

The court held that the BIA governs the appeal route because the leave to sue provision is authorized by the BIA through necessary implication of section 243(1), and federal paramountcy applies to the conflicting appeal provisions.

The plaintiff, 688857 Ontario Limited, sought substantial indemnity costs after successfully recovering $58,761 (plus interest, totaling approximately $66,000) in a fidelity insurance claim against Aviva Insurance Company of Canada.

The court determined it was reasonable for the plaintiff to have pursued the action under ordinary procedure, despite the recovery being below the Simplified Procedure threshold, due to the complexity of employee vs. independent contractor issues and bad faith claims.

The court declined substantial indemnity costs, finding no serious misconduct by the defendant, and awarded partial indemnity costs.

The final award was $196,609.08, significantly less than the plaintiff's claim of $240,563, after adjustments for trial inefficiencies, counsel rates, and proportionality.

Various defendants brought motions to strike the plaintiffs' statement of claim, which alleged civil conspiracy, defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment.

The court struck the claims for defamation, intentional interference with economic relations, and unjust enrichment against all applicants.

The civil conspiracy claim against one individual defendant (Moez Kassam) was struck, but the conspiracy claims against the remaining Anson Corporate Defendants, Adam Spears, Sunny Puri, ClaritySpring Inc., Nathan Anderson, Richard Molyneux, and Darryl Levitt were allowed to proceed.

The court also clarified that 'whistleblower' complaints to the Ontario Securities Commission are subject to absolute privilege and do not constitute the commencement of legal proceedings for the tort of abuse of process.

The respondent in matrimonial litigation moved to have the former case management judge recuse himself due to a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The new case management judge dismissed the motion, finding it premature and pointless as the former judge was not scheduled for future involvement.

The court determined the respondent had an ulterior motive to revisit prior rulings and that the motion constituted an abuse of process, contrary to the Family Law Rules' objectives of saving time and expense.

This decision reconsiders a previous costs award concerning two applications.

The self-represented litigants, William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, sought costs for their time spent on work ordinarily done by a lawyer, in addition to previously awarded partial indemnity for legal services and disbursements.

The court approved a minor increase in disbursements but maintained its ruling that Young and Dinsdale had not sufficiently proven lost opportunities for remuneration for their self-represented time.

The court also noted their role was akin to interveners, who typically do not receive costs.

SusGlobal Energy Belleville Ltd. brought a motion to reopen a prior motion seeking leave to sue the receiver (BDO) for damages, and to introduce fresh evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that SusGlobal failed to meet the test for introducing fresh evidence as the evidence was available at the original hearing and would not have changed the outcome.

The court also found no miscarriage of justice in refusing to relax the reasonable diligence rule.

This decision addresses costs arising from two competing applications concerning land ownership between Aragon (Wellesley) Development (Ontario) Corporation and Piller Investments Limited.

While Aragon and Piller settled their costs, the court determined the costs payable by Piller to William Alexander Young and John David Dinsdale, who were participants in the original dispute.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs for the period Young and Dinsdale were represented by counsel, along with disbursements.

However, claims for costs for their time as self-represented litigants were denied, as they failed to demonstrate a loss of remunerative activity, consistent with established principles for self-represented litigants.

Piller Investments Limited appealed a partial arbitral award concerning a commercial lease and an option to purchase.

The arbitral panel had granted partial summary judgment on some issues and deferred others to a full hearing.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding the arbitral panel's substantive legal decisions were reasonable and free from errors of law.

The court also held that the panel's decision to defer certain issues was a procedural determination on which there is no right of appeal, and even if appealable, was consistent with summary judgment principles.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision granting a stay of proceedings on forum non conveniens grounds.

The motion judge had characterized the claim as one for oppression under the Canada Business Corporations Act and found that Ontario was forum non conveniens because the core dispute involved shareholders' dissatisfaction with internal management decisions of a Quebec-based company.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred by misconstruing their claim as purely oppression and failing to recognize a common law claim for fraudulent misrepresentation with connections to Ontario.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motion judge's characterization of the claim or his forum non conveniens analysis.

On appeal from a Superior Court decision, the appellant challenged the application judge's interpretation of a management agreement and the restated articles of incorporation concerning Class C shares of an investment fund.

The appellant argued that a payment it made to itself should be characterized as debt rather than an unauthorized performance dividend.

The Court of Appeal upheld the lower court's decision, finding no palpable and overriding error or extricable error in law.

The court affirmed that the payment was an undeclared and unauthorized performance dividend, and that nothing in the fund's articles converted it into debt.

The appellant appealed a civil contempt sentence imposed by the motion judge for multiple failures to comply with court orders.

The motion judge had imposed six consecutive sentences totaling 21 months.

On a motion to vary, the motion judge reduced the global sentence to 14 months after finding the appellant had purged contempt in part and made good faith settlement payments.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reconsidering whether sentences should be concurrent rather than consecutive.

The Court of Appeal found no error in principle but, considering further good faith payments made since the motion judge's decision, reduced the global sentence to 12 months.

The appellant, a personal guarantor of corporate indebtedness, appealed a summary judgment awarding the respondent lender US$3 million plus interest at 21% on his personal guarantee.

The guarantor had negotiated an amended guarantee that excluded facility and forbearance fees totaling US$2.75 million from his liability.

The lender acquired the company's assets through a receivership sale, with the purchase price calculated as total debt less US$3 million.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by failing to consider that the amended guarantee served to reduce the company's obligations that were guaranteed.

The court held that the guarantor's liability should be calculated as the remaining debt after the credit bid (US$3 million) less the excluded fees (US$2.75 million), resulting in liability of only US$250,000.

This case conference endorsement addresses several procedural matters in related actions between Mr. Gerstel and Mr. Berkovits.

The court ordered peremptory examinations for discovery dates and scheduled a future case conference for trial management.

A key issue addressed was Mr. Gerstel's request for particulars regarding Mr. Berkovits's possession of documents sealed in Mr. Gerstel's matrimonial proceedings.

The court declined to order Mr. Berkovits to explain how he obtained the documents, reiterating that a sealing order only prevents public access from the court file and does not imply a confidentiality injunction preventing others from possessing or transmitting them.

The court emphasized that the admissibility of such documents was not currently in issue and there was no free-standing burden on a plaintiff to explain the origin of documents listed in an affidavit of documents.

This is a costs endorsement following an appeal of a partial summary judgment motion.

The appellants sought rescission of an agreement of purchase and sale and damages, with their claims being representative of 20 other similar outstanding actions.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, awarding rescission to one appellant and damages to another (with calculation to be determined by the Superior Court).

The court addressed the costs of the partial summary judgment motions, considering offers to settle that included interest provisions and applied to multiple similar claims.

The court awarded costs to the appellants for the partial summary judgment motions while reducing the amount claimed due to the dismissal of motions against three individual defendants and the ongoing nature of the claims.

This is a costs endorsement following a Court of Appeal decision that allowed an appeal in part.

The appellant sought costs in the court below on a partial indemnity basis up to the date of its offer to settle, and on a substantial indemnity basis thereafter.

The Court of Appeal rejected the appellant's reliance on an offer to settle made in the context of its own application, which had been dismissed.

The court found the result on appeal was mixed and awarded costs to the appellant in the amount of $28,565.99, the same amount originally awarded to the respondent in the court below.

The successful plaintiffs sought recovery of expert witness disbursements following a summary judgment decision in their favour.

The parties agreed on partial indemnity costs of $25,000 plus HST, leaving only the amount recoverable for the plaintiffs’ expert report in dispute.

The court considered the reasonableness of the expert’s hourly rate and time spent, noting that the expert evidence had been largely unnecessary and that costs awards must be fair and reasonable under rule 57.01(1).

Applying principles governing recovery of expert fees similar to those for counsel fees, the court reduced the claimed expert disbursement from $13,000 to $9,000 plus HST.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a solicitor’s negligence claim arising from a commercial real estate transaction involving a building encroaching on a municipal laneway.

The plaintiffs alleged their lawyers failed to warn that the municipality might require payment to convey the laneway and that the title insurance obtained did not cover such a cost.

The court rejected arguments that the claim was statute‑barred and held that expert evidence was unnecessary because the failure to warn of a significant legal risk was apparent on the record.

Applying the “but for” causation test, the court found that had proper advice been given the plaintiffs likely would have sought protection such as a holdback or price abatement.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed and partial summary judgment was granted to the plaintiffs, leaving only the assessment of damages and the claim against the title insurer for trial.