Mellington Godoy

The appellant, R.H., appealed his conviction for sexual assault.

The complainant testified that she consented to the sexual touching, which occurred due to the appellant's drug-induced paranoid hallucinations about her infidelity.

The trial judge, despite the complainant's testimony of consent and the Crown's argument focusing on the complainant's inconsistent police statement, convicted the appellant on the basis that her consent was vitiated by the history of violence in their relationship.

This theory of vitiated consent was not advanced by either counsel during the trial, nor was it raised by the judge with the parties before the decision.

The Court of Appeal found that convicting the appellant on an unargued and uncanvassed theory constituted a fundamental unfairness and denied the appellant his constitutional right to make full answer and defence.

The appeal was allowed, the sexual assault conviction was set aside, and a new trial was ordered on that count.

The Children's Aid Society of Ottawa applied for an order placing a two-year-old Inuit child in extended society care with a view to adoption.

The mother struggled with long-standing addiction and mental health issues, lacked stable housing, and failed to consistently visit the child or engage with support services.

The father resided in Nunavut and was unable to care for the child.

The court found the child in need of protection due to the risk of physical and emotional harm.

Applying the best interests factors under the CYFSA and the federal FNIM Act, the court ordered extended society care with a view to adoption, prioritizing placement with an Inuit family to maintain cultural continuity.

Access was granted to both parents at the Society's discretion.

The applicant society brought a motion for summary judgment regarding the disposition of a child protection matter involving a First Nations child.

While the parties agreed the child should remain in the custody of maternal kin, the respondent mother opposed the father having joint decision-making and unsupervised parenting time, and opposed a formal contact order for the paternal extended family.

The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue for trial.

The court ordered that the child remain with the maternal kin, granted supervised parenting time to the father, and made a specific contact order for the paternal extended family to ensure the child remains connected to his Algonquin heritage, given the father's inconsistent involvement.

The paternal grandmother brought a motion for a temporary order for alternate weekend access and specified holiday time with her four-year-old granddaughter, who was placed in the custody of the maternal grandmother.

The maternal grandmother opposed a formal order, preferring to manage access at her discretion due to concerns about the paternal grandmother's son and grandson.

The court determined that section 104 of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act governed the motion and found that a formal access order was in the child's best interests to manage the tension between the grandmothers.

The court granted alternate weekend access with conditions prohibiting the biological father's presence during visits.

Sarah Lochead was charged with having a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg within two hours of ceasing to operate a conveyance, contrary to section 320.14(1)(b) of the Criminal Code.

The defense admitted the Crown's case but sought to invoke the exception under section 320.14(5), arguing she consumed alcohol only after ceasing to operate her vehicle, had no reasonable expectation of providing a breath sample, and her BAC was below 80 mg while driving.

The court found her testimony lacked credibility and reliability, particularly regarding her cell reception, travel time, and alcohol consumption claims.

The court concluded she failed to prove the statutory prerequisites for the exception on a balance of probabilities and found her guilty.

The children's aid society brought a motion for temporary care and custody of an infant who presented at the hospital with unexplained brain and retinal haemorrhages.

The parents claimed the injuries resulted from a fall off a couch, but medical professionals suspected non-accidental trauma.

The society apprehended the child after the parents failed to maintain a 24-hour supervision safety plan.

The court applied the unexplained injury principle and found reasonable grounds to believe the child was at risk of harm and could not be adequately protected by a supervision order.

The child was ordered to remain in the society's care pending trial, with access granted to the parents.

The defendants, who were patients and cleaners for a family physician, were charged with multiple offences including using forged prescriptions and possessing fentanyl and oxycodone.

The Crown alleged they used their after-hours access to the doctor's office to forge prescriptions and fax them to pharmacies.

The court found both defendants guilty of using forged documents and possessing fentanyl and property obtained by crime, relying on circumstantial evidence including fax transmission times, lack of office stamps, and evidence of cutting and pasting.

The defendants were acquitted of possessing proceeds of crime due to insufficient evidence.

The Children's Aid Society brought a motion under s. 130 of the CYFSA for the production of third-party records relating to the parents and their five children.

The parents opposed the motion, arguing they had previously consented and the motion was premature.

The kin, who were added as parties to seek access to one child, brought a cross-motion seeking disclosure of the Society's entire file and the third-party records.

The court granted the Society's motion, finding the records relevant to the child protection concerns, with minor exceptions for counselling notes.

The court dismissed the kin's cross-motion, holding that their limited participatory rights only entitled them to records relevant to their claim for access to the one child.

The respondent mother, J.L., brought a motion for the presiding judge to recuse herself from hearing pending motions and the upcoming trial, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias due to the judge's prior involvement, evidentiary rulings, and perceived negative language.

The respondent father, A.C., supported the motion.

The Children's Aid Society, counsel for the child B.L., and the added kin parties (T.P. and M.C.) opposed the motion.

The court dismissed the recusal motion, finding no reasonable apprehension of bias, emphasizing judicial continuity in complex family law cases and the high threshold for recusal.

The respondent father brought a motion for increased in-person or virtual access with his child, who was in the temporary care of the maternal grandmother under the supervision of the Children's Aid Society.

The Society and the Office of the Children's Lawyer opposed the motion, citing the father's inappropriate behaviour during virtual visits and the child's stated preference to limit access.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the father's conduct was not conducive to building a positive relationship and that increasing access was not in the child's best interests at this time.

The accused, Albert Tremblay and Amanda Ruddy, applied for directed verdicts of not guilty on multiple counts, arguing the prosecution failed to establish a prima facie case.

The court granted directed verdicts for counts related to possession of stolen property (chainsaws) due to lack of recent possession evidence, and for fraud counts due to absence of economic deprivation to the pharmacies.

However, the court denied directed verdicts for a count of possession of property obtained by crime (cash), and for counts of illegal possession of narcotics (fentanyl and oxycodone), finding sufficient circumstantial evidence to proceed to a jury.

The Children's Aid Society sought an order to place one child, B.L., in the temporary care of kin pending trial.

The parents brought a cross-motion to return all five children to their temporary care under a supervision order.

The court found a material change in circumstances due to the kin placement approval for B.L. and the parents' recent housing and service engagement for the other children.

The court granted the Society's motion for B.L., placing him with kin, finding it in his best interests and that he could not be returned to parents.

The parents' cross-motion for the four youngest children was adjourned to allow them more time to demonstrate sustained progress in addressing mental health, addiction, and parenting concerns.

The accused applied for a stay of proceedings or, alternatively, for an order excluding evidence due to alleged Charter violations.

The application concerned two main issues: lost police photographs from a search and unlawfully obtained/undisclosed medical prescription records.

The court found that the loss of photographs did not constitute unacceptable negligence or prejudice the defence, thus denying their exclusion.

However, the court determined that two specific prescription documents (Exhibits #26 and #27) were unlawfully seized without a production order, infringing the accused's privacy rights under sections 7 and 8 of the Charter, and were not disclosed in a timely fashion.

Applying the Grant factors, these two exhibits were deemed inadmissible.

A stay of proceedings was not warranted as the Charter-infringing conduct did not amount to an abuse of process.

The Respondent Mother, J.K., sought an order for costs against the Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa for alleged delays in returning her child, X.K., to her temporary care and custody.

The Society opposed this request and brought its own motion for costs.

The court dismissed the Mother's motion for costs, finding that the evidentiary record did not support the conclusion that the Society acted in a patently unfair and indefensible manner, despite some initial delays in worker assignment.

The court emphasized the special considerations for First Nations, Inuit, and Métis children under the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017, but concluded that the Mother had not demonstrated sufficient stability for an earlier return of the child.

The Society's motion for costs was adjourned.

The court ruled on the admissibility of two purported prescriptions during a criminal trial.

The documents, introduced by defence counsel during cross-examination of a doctor's secretary, were questioned for authenticity by co-accused's counsel.

The court found that the witness's testimony, which appeared to accept the documents' representation, coupled with the difficulty of assessing her evidence without the documents, warranted their admission as numbered exhibits for a limited purpose, rejecting defence arguments for non-admission or identification-only marking.

This is a voir dire ruling on the admissibility of pharmacy records as business records under section 30 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The documents in question included fax copies of prescriptions and computer-generated "prescription hard copies" some with handwritten notes.

The court found that these documents met the five prerequisite conditions for admissibility as business records: they were original entries, made contemporaneously, in the course of normal business routine, by persons under a duty to record, and without a motive to misrepresent.

The court also addressed the notice requirement under subsection 30(7), finding that sufficient notice was given or, alternatively, dispensing with the formal notice requirement.

The records were admitted into evidence.

The appellant appealed his convictions for theft of a pickup truck, dangerous driving, failing to stop for police, and mischief.

The central issue was who was driving the stolen truck during a high-speed chase on Highway 401.

The appellant claimed his companion, Mr. Gilbert, was driving, while Mr. Gilbert testified the appellant was the driver.

The trial judge accepted Mr. Gilbert's evidence as reliable and rejected the appellant's testimony as inconsistent and tailored.

The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions, finding no misapprehension of evidence or uneven scrutiny by the trial judge, and that the conclusions were reasonably drawn from the evidence.

The Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a final order to place the child, J.Q., in the Extended Care of the Society, with discretionary access for the mother and maternal grandmother.

The mother opposed the motion but failed to file responding material.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, concluding that the child remained in need of protection due to the mother's ongoing substance abuse issues and inconsistent engagement with support services.

The father and paternal grandmother were in default.

The motion was granted, placing the child in the Society's extended care to provide stability and certainty.

This is a preliminary inquiry decision concerning the first-degree murder of Dady Junior Jean on November 4, 2015.

Four defendants were charged: Dominique P. Chrétien, Johnnie-Dean Locey-Derochie, Candy L. Locey, and Todd S. Turner.

The Crown sought committal of all four on first-degree murder.

The court examined whether there was sufficient evidence to commit each defendant to trial on first-degree murder, considering the elements of planning and deliberation.

The court found that the cumulative circumstantial evidence, including motive, opportunity, communications, procurement of a firearm, and coordinated actions, supported reasonable inferences that all four defendants knew of and participated in a planned and deliberate murder.

All four defendants were committed to trial on first-degree murder.

The Crown brought an application under section 540(7) of the Criminal Code to admit a videotaped police interview with a witness who subsequently died.

The witness had been interviewed regarding his role as a taxi driver transporting individuals allegedly involved in a first-degree murder.

The court declined to admit the statement, finding it did not meet the threshold of being credible or trustworthy, and exercising its discretion to refuse admission given that the declarant would be unavailable for cross-examination at trial and the evidence would therefore be inadmissible at trial unless it met the principled hearsay exception standard.