Melissa Adams

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction arising from repeated sexual activity with a teenage complainant in the late 1980s, arguing that the complainant's apparent consent was legally effective because the evidence did not establish an exercise of authority under s. 265(3)(d) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that the governing inquiry was whether the relationship gave the appellant coercive power over the complainant and whether that power was used to procure submission.

Applying existing authority, the court found a clear power imbalance, emotional grooming, material inducements, and threats to withdraw benefits, all of which supported the trial judge's conclusion that the complainant's apparent consent was submission produced by coercive authority rather than a free exercise of choice.

The appeal was dismissed and the conviction upheld.

The appellant appealed his conviction for possession of child pornography, arguing the trial judge erred in finding he had knowledge of the nature of the images in a deleted folder on his computer.

The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding it was a logical inference that the appellant knew the criminal nature of the files since he specifically sought them out to delete them before a police visit.

The court also rejected the argument that the conviction for possession was inconsistent with his acquittal for accessing child pornography, as the two verdicts were based on different evidence.

On an application to pass accounts under a power of attorney for property, the court considered whether sale proceeds and related real estate transaction expenses should be included in the attorney's capital receipts and disbursements for compensation purposes.

Applying the percentage approach and cross-checking it against the five-factor trustee compensation framework, the court held the requested compensation based on the house sale was excessive where the attorney did not receive or disburse those funds directly.

The court found the estate modest and the care, responsibility, and time involved relatively limited.

However, the attorney's assistance in facilitating the sale justified a quantum meruit adjustment.

Compensation was fixed at $3,000 and no costs were awarded.

The appellant, an 18-year-old first offender, appealed his 10-year sentence for manslaughter arising from a home invasion robbery where his partner shot the victim.

The Court of Appeal found the trial judge made two errors in principle: failing to properly consider the appellant's rehabilitative potential, and failing to address his level of culpability regarding foresight of the risk that the gun would be used.

The Court found the appellant had objective, but not actual, foresight of the risk, representing a lower level of culpability.

The sentence was reduced to 7 years, resulting in an effective sentence of 3 years and 8 months after pre-trial custody credit.

The appellant appealed a net sentence of two years and seven months imposed following a guilty plea to possession of a prohibited firearm with ammunition.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in drawing unwarranted inferences, imposing an excessive sentence, and failing to give adequate credit for harsh bail conditions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fell within the appropriate range given the appellant's prior record, breach of a weapons prohibition, and the nature of the firearm (a sawed-off shotgun stored with ammunition).

The appellant appealed his conviction for forgery-related offences concerning a forged consent to set aside a vexatious litigant order.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that, after attributing 19 months of the delay to the appellant and finding no actual prejudice, a stay was not warranted.

The Court also found no error in the trial judge's conclusion that the appellant forged and presented the consent document.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the complainant's testimony about the timing of events and whether she blacked out.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge was fully alive to the timing issues and gave thorough reasons for finding the complainant credible.

The sentence appeal was abandoned.

The appellants were convicted of multiple mortgage financing frauds involving the manipulation of recent immigrants to obtain mortgage financing and take title to properties.

They appealed their convictions and sentences of four years' imprisonment, fines in lieu of forfeiture, and a joint restitution order.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding co-conspirators, treatment of evidence, or response to Crown counsel's closing remarks.

The sentence appeals were also dismissed, as the custodial sentences were within the appropriate range for large-scale fraud, and the fines and restitution orders were properly imposed.

The appellant was convicted of defrauding a bank of $375,000 and sentenced to four years' imprisonment, along with a restitution order and a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

On appeal, the appellant challenged the custodial sentence and the terms of the fine.

The Court of Appeal upheld the four-year sentence as fit and within the appropriate range.

The court also upheld the imposition of the fine in lieu of forfeiture but varied the order to allow the appellant two years from his release to pay the fine and reduced the default term of imprisonment from four years to three years.

Homeowners sued a construction manager for breach of contract and negligence arising from defects in the construction of a custom waterfront home.

The court considered whether the builder failed to perform work in a good and workmanlike manner, focusing on water infiltration due to improper siding, masonry, flashing, and air‑barrier installation, as well as drywall and interior trim deficiencies.

Expert evidence established multiple violations of the Ontario Building Code and improper installation practices that compromised the rain‑screen system and voided the siding manufacturer’s warranty.

Claims relating to the deck and fascia were not proven, but the court accepted evidence that exterior wall systems, drywall, and portions of interior trim were defective.

Damages were awarded based largely on the plaintiff’s engineering expert’s remediation estimate, and the court rejected the defendant’s argument that damages should be reduced for betterment due to the plaintiffs’ years of use of the home.

In an addendum to a previous appeal decision, the Court of Appeal accepted a joint submission regarding the time to pay a $10,700 fine imposed in lieu of forfeiture.

The offender was granted two years to pay the fine following her latest date of release from custody in relation to her current and pending sentences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for attempted murder and related offences arising from a stabbing incident.

At trial, the appellant relied on self-defence, calling a witness who testified the victim attacked the appellant with a baseball bat.

The trial judge rejected this evidence and convicted the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge applied unequal scrutiny to the witnesses and misapprehended evidence.

The Court of Appeal found no palpable or overriding error in the trial judge's credibility assessments or factual findings, concluding the evidence overwhelmingly weighed against self-defence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of fraud over $5,000 and using forged documents after obtaining a fraudulent mortgage using her half-sister's identity.

She appealed her convictions, arguing they violated the Kienapple rule, and her 3.5-year sentence.

The Crown appealed the trial judge's refusal to order a fine in lieu of forfeiture.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no legal nexus between the offences.

While the trial judge erred in principle during sentencing, the 3.5-year sentence was upheld as fit given the breach of trust and the appellant's history.

The Crown's appeal was allowed in part, with a $10,700 fine in lieu of forfeiture ordered based on the limited evidence of the appellant's control over the unrecovered funds.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and choking to assist in the commission of an indictable offence.

He argued the trial judge applied differing levels of scrutiny to the evidence and erred in drawing an adverse inference regarding the late disclosure of an extortion letter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge carefully analyzed the evidence, sufficiently explained her credibility findings, and had already concluded the appellant was not believable before addressing the extortion letter.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking over $83,000 related to a failed restaurant venture, or alternatively $30,000 based on a promissory note signed by the defendants.

The court found that while the broader monetary claims and allegations of fraudulent conveyance involved contentious factual issues requiring a trial, there was no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the promissory note.

The defendants failed to establish duress or ambiguity in the note.

The court granted partial summary judgment for $28,800 under the promissory note and dismissed the requests for an injunction and declaration of fraudulent conveyance.

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge improperly relied on the complainant's prior consistent statements to bolster her credibility.

The summary conviction appeal judge found an error but applied the curative proviso on his own initiative to dismiss the appeal.

The Court of Appeal held that while the appeal judge erred in applying the proviso without submissions, there was no underlying error by the trial judge, who properly used the statements as narrative and to explain inconsistencies.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual assault with a weapon against his estranged spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred in relying on the complainant's post-offence demeanour, improperly rejected his evidence, and sought to introduce fresh expert evidence that a mark on his finger was not a bite mark.

The majority of the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge properly assessed credibility and that the fresh evidence, even if believed, could not reasonably be expected to have affected the result given the strength of the other evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a Summary Conviction Appeal Court decision dismissing his appeal.

The appellant raised a question of law regarding a section 715.1 statement and challenged the trial judge's credibility assessments.

The Court of Appeal refused leave to appeal, finding the legal question had no merit and the credibility issues did not raise questions of law with significance beyond the facts of the case.

The appellant sought leave to appeal a summary conviction appeal court decision that set aside a stay of proceedings.

The trial judge had stayed the proceedings due to a 15-month delay, attributing it entirely to a systemic problem with the production of 911 tapes.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred by failing to assess the causes of delay at each stage, noting that part of the delay was attributable to defence counsel's failure to respond to Crown requests for clarification.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the summary conviction appeal judge and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and sexual exploitation, arguing the Crown improperly split its case by cross-examining him on a segment of his police statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, noting that defence counsel at trial did not object to the cross-examination, did not object to the jury instructions, and specifically declined the trial judge's offer of a mistrial.

The court found no basis to conclude the trial was unfair.