Melanie Anderson

The Attorney General of Canada brought a motion under Rule 21.01(1)(b) to strike two paragraphs from the Statement of Claim which sought wide-ranging non-monetary relief under s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The Attorney General argued that the court lacked jurisdiction to grant such relief as it would intrude on the executive branch's powers.

The plaintiff, Ebrahim Toure, contended the motion was procedurally incorrect and that his claims for Charter relief were not plain and obvious to fail.

The court dismissed the motion to strike, finding that Rule 21.01(1)(b) applies only to "causes of action" and not to "claims for relief" or "remedies." The court also granted the Attorney General an extension of time to file a statement of defence.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that imposed a 12-month pre-writ restricted spending period for third-party political advertising.

The government had previously enacted similar amendments that were struck down under section 2(b) of the Charter, but re-enacted them using the section 33 notwithstanding clause.

The applicants argued the amendments violated the right to vote under section 3 of the Charter, which is not subject to the notwithstanding clause.

The court dismissed the application, finding that the spending limits were carefully tailored to the egalitarian model of elections and did not infringe the right to meaningful participation in the electoral process.

The defendants brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to strike the plaintiff's defamation claim as a strategic lawsuit against public participation (SLAPP).

The plaintiff, Sikhs for Justice, sued the defendants over an article alleging the plaintiff's referendum campaign for an independent Sikh state was driven and controlled by Pakistan.

The court found that the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit and that there were grounds to believe the defendants' defences of responsible communication and fair comment might not succeed.

The court concluded that the harm suffered by the plaintiff was sufficiently serious that the public interest in permitting the proceeding to continue outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendants' expression.

The motion was dismissed.

This was a costs endorsement following a successful constitutional application challenging provisions of election finance legislation under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The court held that partial indemnity remained the appropriate scale because the respondent government's conduct was professional and did not justify substantial or full indemnity costs.

In fixing a fair overall award, the court emphasized that four applicant groups had advanced identical legal challenges in a consolidated proceeding, and that economies of scale had to be reflected in the result.

The court reduced the aggregate request from approximately $690,000 to $500,000 and apportioned that amount among the successful applicants.

No costs were awarded for or against the Chief Electoral Officer or the intervenor.

The applicants challenged the constitutionality of amendments to the Election Finances Act that extended the pre-election restricted spending period for third-party political advertising from six to twelve months.

The court found that the 12-month restriction infringed freedom of expression under section 2(b) of the Charter.

Applying the Oakes test, the court held that while the objective of fostering fair elections was pressing and substantial, the 12-month period failed the minimal impairment test because the government's own experts indicated a six-month period was effective.

The impugned provisions were declared of no force or effect.

The applicant hospital sought judicial review of an arbitrator's decision overturning the transfer of an employee who had previously been disciplined for assaulting a co-worker.

The hospital argued the transfer was an administrative decision to protect the complainant under the Occupational Health & Safety Act.

The arbitrator found the transfer constituted a second penalty for the same offence, violating the principle of double jeopardy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, holding that the arbitrator's decision was reasonable and properly balanced the competing values of workplace safety and protection against double jeopardy.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action against the defendant employer for unpaid overtime, initially claiming $100 million.

The parties reached a pre-certification settlement of $7 million, which included a new time-tracking system.

The court certified the action for settlement purposes and approved the settlement, finding it fair and reasonable given the adjusted actual loss, comparable settlements, and the significant litigation risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the travel industry.

The court also approved a $10,000 honorarium for the representative plaintiff due to retaliatory employment consequences, and approved class counsel's 25% contingency fee.

The court held a case management teleconference to set an expedited schedule for an application for judicial review.

The court established deadlines for the application records and factums, and scheduled the hearing for December 3, 2020.

The court also encouraged the parties to agree on interim terms to avoid the necessity of a stay motion.