Matthew Geigen-Miller

The Crown brought an ex parte motion for certiorari and mandamus to compel a reviewing justice to consider a search warrant application on its merits.

The reviewing justice had rejected the warrant on its face because it listed a police locker as the place to be searched and electronic devices as the things to be seized, stating a warrant was not required to search a police locker.

The Superior Court held that characterizing an electronic device as an item to be seized and searched, rather than as a place to be searched, does not invalidate the warrant.

The court found the reviewing justice made an error in law and issued the order for certiorari and mandamus.

Following conviction on multiple counts arising from a home invasion of a vulnerable victim in September 2014, and guilty pleas to additional offences committed while in custody, the court imposed a global sentence of 120 months (10 years).

The sentencing considered the principle of parity with a co-accused who received 6.5 years, the absence of a criminal record, the defendant's youth at the time of the offences, and the serious nature of the crimes including robbery, forcible confinement, kidnapping, extortion, and assault causing bodily harm.

Additional consecutive sentences were imposed for attempt to obstruct justice (6 months) and aggravated assault at a detention centre (12 months), with a concurrent sentence for obstructing a peace officer (1 month).

The accused, Nehemiah S. Campbell, was charged on a seven-count indictment arising from a shooting incident in downtown Ottawa.

The Crown alleged the accused was the individual who returned fire with a 9mm handgun after being shot by occupants of a white sedan.

The court found the accused guilty on five counts: reckless discharge of a firearm, possessing a firearm while prohibited, possessing a loaded prohibited firearm without a license, possession of a prohibited firearm, and breach of recognizance.

The court dismissed charges of unlawfully causing bodily harm and using a firearm while committing that offence, finding the innocent bystander was wounded by the initial shooter, not the accused.

The judgment relied heavily on video surveillance, forensic evidence (blood spatter matching the accused), and the recovery of the 9mm handgun with the accused's blood-stained wallet.

The court rejected the defence's theory as speculative, concluding the circumstantial evidence proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter using a firearm after shooting and killing his former girlfriend during a confrontation with her new boyfriend.

The court found the victim's death was an unintended consequence of the accused firing at the new boyfriend.

The court denied additional pre-sentence custody credit for lockdown conditions, finding no evidence of particularly harsh treatment.

The accused was sentenced to 13 years' incarceration, less pre-sentence custody credit, reflecting the high moral culpability of bringing and discharging a loaded handgun at a residence.

The trial judge considered a bail application brought under Criminal Code section 523(2) by an accused who had been in custody for nearly two years awaiting trial.

The judge determined that section 523(2) is a bail review provision, not a bail hearing provision, and that the accused had never had an initial bail hearing.

The judge concluded that he lacked jurisdiction to conduct a de novo bail hearing under section 523(2) because that provision only applies where there is a prior order to vacate.

The judge declined to convert the hearing into a section 515 application, finding that a hearing conducted without jurisdiction is a nullity and cannot be reconstituted by agreement.

The judge directed the accused to pursue a section 515 bail application before another justice.

The accused, Anthony Nathan Constant-Booth, was charged with assault, assault causing bodily harm, and aggravated assault following a parking lot altercation.

The trial focused on the credibility and reliability of eyewitnesses.

The court found the accused guilty of aggravated assault for kicking one victim, Pascal Marion, in the face, but acquitted him of the other two assault charges due to insufficient evidence of common purpose or direct participation in those specific incidents.

The accused brought a motion for a stay of proceedings, arguing his right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter was infringed.

The total delay from the charge to the anticipated end of the trial was 51 months.

After deducting 15.5 months of delay attributable to the defence, the net delay was 35.5 months, exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances or justify the delay based on reasonable reliance on the previous state of the law.

The court found the delay unconstitutional and ordered a stay of proceedings.

The applicant, charged with first-degree murder, applied for leave to cross-examine the affiants who swore Informations to Obtain (ITOs) for a wiretap authorization and a general warrant.

Applying the Garofoli test, the court assessed whether cross-examination would elicit testimony tending to discredit the preconditions for the authorizations.

The court granted leave to cross-examine one detective on specific, limited subjects, including his note-taking regarding attempts to contact the applicant, his characterization of certain witness evidence, and investigative necessity.

The court deferred its decision regarding the second affiant until the completion of the first affiant's evidence.

The accused sought to re-elect trial mode from the Ontario Court of Justice to the Ontario Superior Court of Justice following an adverse severance application decision.

The Crown opposed the re-election, arguing that the trial had already commenced with the severance hearing and therefore re-election required Crown consent.

The court held that once a seized trial judge begins to receive evidence on a severance application, the trial is underway for purposes of Criminal Code section 561(2), and the right to re-elect without consent expires 14 days before that point.

The re-election application was denied.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal for operating a motor vehicle while disqualified.

The trial judge had ruled a certified copy of the prohibition order inadmissible due to a missing signature on the copy attached to the Notice of Intent, deeming it prejudicial and not "reasonable notice" under the Canada Evidence Act.

The Superior Court found the trial judge erred in law by misapplying the standard of reasonable notice, failing to weigh all relevant facts, and effectively requiring an exact copy.

The court held that reasonable notice is a concept, not a document, and the omission of a signature did not cause confusion or prejudice given the other correct information provided.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, a guilty verdict entered, and the matter remitted for sentencing.

The accused applied for severance of counts relating to two separate criminal incidents—one in Ottawa involving the alleged robbery, assault, and unlawful confinement of Justin Huynh, and another in Richmond Hill involving similar offences against Linton Campbell.

The accused sought to sever the counts to avoid prejudice and to preserve her tactical choice whether to testify.

The court denied the severance application, finding significant factual overlap between the incidents, viable similar fact evidence connecting them, and no objective foundation for the accused's stated intention to testify on one set of charges but not the other.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug (marijuana) on June 25, 2014, in Ottawa.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's ability to operate a motor vehicle was impaired by marijuana.

The evidence included observations of marijuana smoke emanating from the vehicle, the accused's admission to smoking, and performance on drug influence evaluation tests administered approximately one to one and a half hours after the stop.

The court found that divided attention tests, particularly the modified Romberg balance test, heel-to-toe walk, and one-leg stand test, demonstrated significant impairment of the accused's ability to perform tasks requiring divided attention, which is essential to safe driving.

The accused was convicted on both the impaired driving charge and the marijuana possession charge.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and forcible confinement following an interaction with the complainant after a church service.

The complainant alleged the accused attacked her, choked her, and sexually assaulted her outside the church.

The accused testified that the interaction was consensual and related to faith healing, denying any sexual contact.

The court applied the W.(D.) test for credibility and found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, including contradictions with video surveillance and prior testimony.

The court was left with a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused on both charges.

The accused was charged with operation of a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mgs per 100 mls of blood.

The trial proceeded as a blended voir-dire with Charter application arguments.

The court found that the accused was arbitrarily detained in violation of section 9 of the Charter and was not advised of the reason for detention or his rights to counsel in violation of sections 10(a) and 10(b).

The officer detained the accused without reasonable grounds to suspect he was the driver, handcuffed him, searched him, and obtained inculpatory statements without proper caution or rights advisement.

The court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of these breaches under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute by admission of the evidence.

An acquittal was entered on both counts.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by alcohol and operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood.

The Crown relied on observations of the accused's driving, physical signs of impairment, and breath test results showing readings of 110 and 100 milligrams.

The defence challenged both the impairment charge and the admissibility of the breath test results on the basis that the Crown failed to prove the samples were taken as soon as practicable.

The court found reasonable doubt on both counts due to inadequate police notes, vague timing evidence, and unexplained delays between arrest and breath testing.

The accused was acquitted on both charges.

The accused was stopped for erratic driving and subsequently subjected to an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for suspected impaired driving.

The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches: failure to inform the accused of the reason for detention (s. 10(a)), failure to provide the ASD demand "forthwith" (s. 254(2)(b)), resulting in failure to advise of the right to counsel without delay (s. 10(b) informational breach), unlawful detention and search (s. 8 and 9), and failure to facilitate a realistic opportunity to consult counsel before the ASD test (s. 10(b) implementational breach).

The trial judge excluded the breath sample evidence and acquitted the accused.

The accused was sentenced following jury convictions for assault causing bodily harm and two counts of forcible confinement, along with a guilty plea to assault.

The offences arose from a vigilante-style attack in which the accused and several associates forcibly removed two individuals from a nightclub and violently assaulted them in an alley after suspecting them of vandalizing a vehicle.

The assault resulted in severe and permanent injuries, including a traumatic brain injury and significant psychological disorders.

The court emphasized denunciation and general deterrence given the planned, group-based nature of the revenge attack and the profound harm to the victim.

After weighing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed a global custodial sentence of three and a half years.

Sentencing following a jury conviction for fraud over $5,000, perjury by affidavit in a land transfer tax affidavit, and breach of recognizance.

The offences arose from the accused’s attempt to fraudulently transfer his elderly mother’s condominium parking space using a forged deed and false affidavit while she was suffering from dementia and residing in long‑term care.

The court found significant aggravating factors including breach of trust against a vulnerable family member, financial abuse, planning and sophistication, and the accused’s lack of remorse and refusal to accept responsibility.

A conditional sentence was rejected because denunciation and deterrence were paramount and the accused demonstrated poor prospects for community supervision.

The accused was sentenced to 18 months’ incarceration followed by two years’ probation with strict no‑contact conditions with siblings.

Following a jury verdict finding the accused guilty of assault causing bodily harm and forcible seizure, and a guilty plea to a further assault charge, the Crown applied under s. 523(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Code to revoke the accused’s bail pending sentencing.

The court considered the seriousness of the violent offences, the significant and permanent injuries suffered by the victim, and the prospect of a substantial custodial sentence.

The court also reviewed the accused’s prior criminal record, outstanding charges for a similar group assault while on recognizance, and concerns about the adequacy of a proposed surety.

While primary grounds for detention were minimal, the court held that secondary and particularly tertiary grounds justified detention to protect the public and maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

During a criminal jury trial, the court addressed whether defence counsel could use visual aids such as cartoons, stick-figure diagrams, and graphical illustrations during closing submissions.

The trial judge ruled that visual depictions created by counsel that were not admitted through witness testimony risked misleading the jury and effectively amounted to counsel giving evidence.

The court also rejected a proposed visual continuum illustrating the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, relying on Supreme Court of Canada authority cautioning against analogies or illustrative scales for that standard.

The judge held that such materials could distort the fact‑finding process and improperly represent the evidence.

Defence counsel was therefore prohibited from using the proposed visual aids during closing address.