Matthew Geigen-Miller

During a criminal jury trial, the accused brought a motion for a mistrial alleging a reasonable apprehension of judicial bias arising from various rulings and trial management decisions.

The motion relied on the judge’s handling of a juror scheduling issue, evidentiary rulings including a voluntariness voir dire and past recollection recorded, and discussions concerning possible modes of participation following the close of the Crown’s case.

The court applied the test for reasonable apprehension of bias from Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada (National Energy Board) and R. v. R.D.S. The court held that disagreements with rulings or expressions of difficulty understanding counsel’s arguments do not establish bias and that the judge’s conduct reflected ordinary trial management obligations.

The motion for a mistrial was dismissed.

During a criminal jury trial for assault causing bodily harm, the Crown brought an application to admit part of a witness’s prior written statement under the past recollection recorded exception to the hearsay rule.

The witness had prepared a statement within days of the incident but, at trial nearly three years later, lacked present memory of the accused’s detailed participation in the assault.

The court applied the criteria articulated in appellate jurisprudence requiring a reliable record, timeliness, absence of current memory, and the witness’s present confirmation of the statement’s accuracy.

Finding that the witness personally prepared the statement shortly after the event, had been sober, and vouched for its accuracy despite memory loss at trial, the court held the evidentiary requirements were satisfied.

The probative value of the statement was found to outweigh any prejudice, which could be mitigated through jury instructions and cross‑examination.

The Crown sought a ruling that a recorded telephone call made by the accused to the Ottawa Police Reporting Centre reporting vandalism to a vehicle was voluntary and admissible under the common law confessions rule.

The court considered whether there was some evidence that the accused made the call, whether the civilian police call-taker constituted a person in authority, and whether the statement was voluntary under the principles in R. v. Oickle.

The court found sufficient evidence from identifying information provided during the call to allow a jury to infer that the accused made the call.

Even assuming the call-taker could be considered a person in authority, the statement was voluntary because the accused initiated the call, provided information freely, and there were no threats, promises, oppressive circumstances, or police trickery.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography contrary to section 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code and unlawful possession of marijuana contrary to the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act.

The Crown admitted that Detective MacKillop's warrantless search of the accused's computer and thumb drive breached section 8 Charter rights.

The court found multiple Charter breaches including the warrantless search of electronic devices, the search of two additional devices not authorized by warrant, and a section 10(b) breach when the accused was questioned about computer ownership without being informed of the child pornography investigation or his right to counsel.

The court excluded the child pornography evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding that admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the pattern of police carelessness and disregard for Charter rights, notwithstanding the seriousness of the offence.

Following a jury conviction for three bank robberies committed within a short period, the court determined a fit sentence balancing denunciation, deterrence, and rehabilitation.

The offender committed the robberies while addicted to drugs and had made significant rehabilitative progress while residing at a structured addiction recovery program pending trial.

The court credited extensive pre‑sentence custody, including time spent under restrictive conditions at the rehabilitation facility.

Applying the principles of proportionality and totality, the court concluded that a lengthy penitentiary term would undermine the offender’s rehabilitation prospects.

A custodial sentence followed by the maximum probationary period at the recovery program was imposed.

The Crown brought an application seeking admission of similar fact evidence across three robbery counts in a jury trial to establish identity.

The robberies occurred within eleven days at three banks located within one kilometre of each other and involved similar methods, including handwritten notes containing distinctive phrases such as “no ink”, brief interactions with tellers, and similar clothing and demeanour.

The court applied the two‑stage similar fact evidence test, finding a high degree of similarity rendering coincidence objectively improbable.

Evidence linking the accused to the acts included DNA found on clothing recovered after the third robbery and anticipated identification evidence from surveillance video.

The court concluded that the probative value of the evidence substantially outweighed its minimal prejudicial effect and permitted the jury to consider the evidence on each count when determining guilt on the others.