Mary E. Vallee

Purchasers brought a motion for summary judgment seeking specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property after the vendors refused to close.

The vendors argued the agreement was unenforceable because they did not sign it, their spouses did not consent under the Family Law Act, and the purchasers allegedly waived conditions late.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the vendors’ evidence not credible, concluding that they had executed the agreement and that the purchasers’ conditions were waived on time.

The court also held that spousal consent was not required for enforceability of the contract itself and that service of the motion on the spouses was unnecessary.

Finding the property unique due to its large pie-shaped lot, proximity to family, and access to transit, the court granted specific performance.

During an ongoing trial, the plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case to introduce new evidence regarding a recent event.

The plaintiff alleged that a mischaracterized harassment complaint was filed against him and improperly handled by senior management, which was relevant to his damages claim for workplace harassment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the new evidence was relevant and material to the plaintiff's damages, and that admitting it would not cause trial unfairness to the defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion to re-open his case during an ongoing civil trial to introduce evidence of a workplace incident that occurred after the plaintiff had closed his case.

The incident involved a training-session comment that was incorrectly processed within the organization as a harassment complaint and entered into a harassment database.

The court considered the applicable test for reopening a case before the trial had concluded and held that the relevant inquiry was whether the proposed evidence was relevant and material.

The court found the evidence could be material to the plaintiff’s damages claim and that admitting it would not cause unfairness because the defendants had not yet closed their case and could respond.

The motion was granted and the testimony from the motion witnesses was permitted to be read into the plaintiff’s case.

The appellant appealed a conviction for sexual assault arising from an alleged improper search conducted during an arrest.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred by admitting and relying on a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to another officer, by failing to consider inconsistencies in the complainant’s accounts of the searches, and by failing to weigh credibility concerns arising from the complainant’s admitted dishonesty about drug use.

The court held that prior consistent statements are presumptively inadmissible and found that the trial judge improperly admitted and relied upon such a statement to bolster the complainant’s credibility.

The court concluded that the statement was used for the truth of its contents and as a significant foundation for the credibility finding.

As this constituted an error affecting an important piece of evidence, the conviction could not stand.

The applicant, a federal inmate convicted of second degree murder, sought habeas corpus with certiorari in aid requiring his transfer from medium to minimum security.

He argued that maintaining his medium security classification despite favourable psychological reports and recommendations from his case management team constituted an unlawful deprivation of liberty.

The court held that refusal to grant a less restrictive security classification does not amount to a deprivation of residual liberty where the inmate has never previously enjoyed the lower classification.

In any event, the court found the warden’s decision reasonable, given concerns about the inmate’s continued denial of responsibility and its relevance to risk assessment under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering her to repay funds advanced by the respondents for a failed restaurant venture.

The appellant argued the trial judge misinterpreted evidence, gave inadequate reasons, awarded excessive costs, and created an apprehension of bias through comments made to her paralegal.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge made reasonable credibility findings, correctly applied the law of unjust enrichment, properly awarded double costs based on an offer to settle, and that the judge's expressions of frustration did not meet the high threshold for bias.

A subcontractor brought a construction lien action and breach of contract claim against the general contractor arising from delays and termination on a warehouse construction project.

The court found the project experienced substantial delay caused by permitting issues, weather, design problems, owner‑driven restrictions on consultant access, and sequencing failures not attributable to the subcontractor.

The general contractor terminated the subcontractor after it temporarily demobilized while awaiting workable site conditions; the court held the termination was unlawful and did not constitute abandonment or repudiation.

The subcontractor was entitled to unpaid contract funds and compensation for delay‑related labour overruns and overhead costs, while the contractor received limited credits for specific deficiencies including conduit remediation and wire replacement.

The contractor’s counterclaim for completion costs largely failed because the termination prevented the subcontractor from finishing its work.

The estate trustee sought clarification of a prior costs order arising from estate litigation between the trustee and a beneficiary.

The issue was whether the respondent beneficiary was required to pay the ordered costs to the trustee personally or in her representative capacity as estate trustee.

Applying the modern approach to costs in estate litigation, which generally follows ordinary civil costs principles unless public policy considerations apply, the court reaffirmed that the losing party must bear the costs personally.

The court concluded that the respondent beneficiary must pay the awarded costs directly to the applicant in her personal capacity.

Following dismissal of a Rule 21 motion to strike the statement of claim for failure to disclose a reasonable cause of action, the successful plaintiffs sought partial indemnity costs.

The responding party argued the requested amount was excessive given the straightforward nature of the pleadings motion, overlapping work among multiple lawyers and students, and hourly rates exceeding recommended partial indemnity guidelines.

The court accepted that the motion was significant and involved novel legal issues but found the plaintiffs had spent excessive time and improperly included hours related to amending the claim.

Applying principles of fairness and reasonableness in fixing costs, the court reduced the requested amount.

A lump sum costs award was granted to the successful plaintiffs.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of two Small Claims Court actions for unpaid construction funds and holdback.

The trial judge had dismissed the claims as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

On appeal, the Divisional Court found that the trial judge erred in calculating the limitation period for the holdback funds, as the Construction Lien Act dictates when holdback becomes payable.

The claims for holdback were issued within the limitation period.

However, the trial judge correctly concluded that the claims for regular contract funds and lost profits were statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed in part, and the holdback claims were remitted for trial.

A judgment creditor brought a motion to appoint a receiver in aid of execution after the debtor transferred assets to his spouse and related corporation and made an assignment in bankruptcy.

The debtor sought to discharge a certificate of pending litigation registered against the matrimonial home to facilitate refinancing intended to satisfy the judgment.

The court held that the debtor’s conduct, including fraudulent conveyances and repeated attempts to hinder collection, created special circumstances rendering ordinary execution methods ineffective.

The appointment of a receiver was found just and convenient under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The request to discharge the certificate of pending litigation was denied as premature pending agreement or determination of the full amount owed.

The appellant appealed a Small Claims Court decision ordering him to pay the respondent for money lent and renovation work.

The trial judge had enforced promissory notes with a 35% interest rate and accepted the respondent's oral testimony regarding the value of additional work.

On appeal, the Divisional Court upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and the 35% interest rate, finding no palpable and overriding error.

However, the court corrected a minor mathematical error in the interest calculation, reducing the judgment amount by $121.46.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board finding him incapable of consenting to treatment with antipsychotic medications and mood stabilizers.

The appellant argued there was insufficient evidence to uphold the finding and that his procedural fairness rights were infringed when he represented himself at the hearing.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant's own testimony corroborated the treating physician's evidence that he did not believe he had a mental illness, rendering him incapable of consenting to treatment.

The Court also found that the Board properly followed its policy guidelines for unrepresented litigants and safeguarded the appellant's procedural fairness rights.

The appellant appealed a verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder following guilty pleas to uttering threats.

He argued the plea inquiry was inadequate, that his pleas were irregular because he stated he was guilty of the acts but not of intention, and that the trial judge erred in finding guilt without an admission of the mental element.

The court held that the plea inquiry failed to ensure the accused understood the consequences of an NCRMD finding, including the possibility of involuntary detention under the Ontario Review Board.

The court also found the pleas were equivocal and not known to law because they denied the mental element of the offence.

As there was no valid admission of intention, the finding of guilt and resulting NCRMD verdict could not stand.

Following success on a summary judgment motion in a fraudulent conveyance action, the self-represented plaintiff sought costs for the litigation.

The court reviewed principles governing costs awards to self-represented litigants, noting that such parties are not compensated as though they retained counsel but may recover a reasonable allowance for proven loss of opportunity cost.

Evidence demonstrated that the plaintiff’s professional income declined due to time spent conducting the litigation.

Applying fairness and proportionality principles, the court awarded a reduced allowance for the plaintiff’s time plus supported disbursements.

Following an unsuccessful defence motion for summary judgment on a discoverability issue in a motor vehicle accident action, the court addressed the appropriate quantum of costs payable to the plaintiff.

The plaintiff sought over $50,000 in partial indemnity costs.

The court found the requested fees excessive, noting duplication of work among multiple counsel and disproportionate time claimed by senior counsel who did not draft the materials.

Applying s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court emphasized fairness, reasonableness, and the expectations of the parties.

Costs were reduced and fixed at a lump sum of $29,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

Following a motion for security for costs, the defendants sought additional costs related to the fees of former counsel and other related issues.

The court declined to increase the amount of security for costs because the defendants provided redacted accounts that failed to show the nature of the work performed, despite the court previously requesting such evidence.

The court also rejected arguments that a prior settlement offer should affect the costs analysis, as the amount ordered was lower than the offer and the conduct of the plaintiff did not justify substantial indemnity costs.

Additional costs requested for undertakings issues were also denied.

The previously ordered security and costs structure remained unchanged.

The applicants built a house on the respondent's property.

After a falling out, the parties agreed to arbitrate the fair cost of construction using a quantity surveyor.

The arbitrator issued a draft reproduction estimate, but the respondent terminated his counsel and refused to participate further, alleging bias and procedural unfairness.

The applicants sought to enforce the final arbitral award, while the respondent sought a declaration that he was not bound by it.

The court dismissed the respondent's claims of bias and jurisdictional overreach, finding the Arbitration Act applied.

However, because the final award failed to explicitly state its reasons, the court remitted it to the arbitrator to formally attach the reproduction estimate as reasons.

The plaintiff moved to set aside orders compelling answers to undertakings and dismissing the action, arguing that an earlier motion and subsequent appeal had finally resolved those issues and rendered them res judicata.

The court applied the issue estoppel branch of res judicata and held that, although the earlier decision was final and involved the same parties, it did not determine that all undertakings and refusals had been answered.

The later motions concerned outstanding undertakings that remained unresolved, and the plaintiff had failed to respond to the motion before the first motion judge or promptly move to vary that order.

The court held that the later judges had jurisdiction to make their orders and refused to set aside the dismissal.

The defendant Ministry moved to strike a negligence claim arising from the death of a child at an unlicensed private-home daycare after the Ministry had received multiple complaints about excessive numbers of children and had sent a warning letter but allegedly failed to follow up.

The court held that on a motion to strike it was required to accept the pleaded facts as true and determine only whether it was plain and obvious the claim could not succeed.

Applying the duty of care framework and authorities on proximity in claims against public actors, the court found it was arguable that the pleaded facts could establish proximity and foreseeability sufficient to support a private law duty of care.

The claim was novel, but the uncertainties could not be resolved at the pleadings stage and required a full record at trial.