Mark L. Edwards

Following a successful summary judgment motion concerning a debt dispute and alleged settlement, the plaintiff sought substantial costs for the motion and the broader action.

The court held that the defendants had unnecessarily complicated what was a relatively straightforward settlement issue through procedural steps and a counterclaim.

However, the court emphasized proportionality and the principle that the losing party should not reasonably expect to pay for two senior counsel on a relatively simple motion.

Applying Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the principles in Boucher v. Public Accountants for the Province of Ontario, the court reduced the claimed costs and fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion.

The court deferred determination of the remaining action costs pending resolution of issues relating to the counterclaim.

Following the granting of summary judgment dismissing a wrongful death action arising from a drowning incident, the court addressed costs.

The plaintiffs argued that no costs should be awarded due to the tragic circumstances and potential financial hardship.

The court held that while tragic circumstances and the losing party’s ability to pay may be relevant considerations, the evidence demonstrated the estate held assets exceeding approximately $1 million and the plaintiffs could reasonably anticipate a costs award.

The court therefore exercised its discretion to award partial indemnity costs for both the summary judgment motion and the action, taking into account the reasonable expectations of the parties and the principles articulated by the Court of Appeal regarding proportional and predictable costs awards.

Self-represented plaintiffs sought leave to amend their statement of claim alleging negligent investigation, Charter breaches, abuse of authority, and related torts arising from police searches of two residential properties.

The defendants brought a motion to strike the pleading as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and being deficient in particulars.

The court applied Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and considered whether the proposed amendments disclosed viable causes of action and whether certain claims were statute-barred.

Most claims were struck for failure to plead essential elements, being statute-barred, or disclosing no cause of action.

Limited claims relating to negligent investigation and misfeasance in public office concerning a March 22, 2012 search were permitted to proceed with further amendments, while additional particulars were required for certain Charter s. 8 claims.

A municipal councillor brought a defamation action against the mayor and several councillors arising from a public council statement and related legal opinion criticizing the councillor’s blog posts about senior municipal staff.

The court held the statements were not defamatory and were substantially true in substance, as the plaintiff’s blogs contained disparaging criticism of staff contrary to the municipal code of conduct.

Even if defamatory, the publications were protected by qualified privilege because they were a measured response to the plaintiff’s public letter to the editor and were made to correct the public record.

The court found no evidence of malice and noted the defendants relied in good faith on legal advice before publishing the statement.

The action was dismissed.

A municipality brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of a negligence claim arising from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by a curb stone that had moved from a grassy boulevard onto a roadway.

The dispute centered on which municipality had jurisdiction over the portion of the boulevard from which the curb stone originated.

Evidence including a survey established that the relevant land fell within the jurisdiction of another municipality that was responsible for roadway maintenance under the Municipal Act.

The court held that the moving municipality had no legal responsibility for the hazard and therefore owed no duty in respect of the curb stone.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action against the moving municipality.

The accused brought a motion to exclude evidence obtained during the execution of a search warrant at his residence in a cocaine trafficking investigation.

The defence argued the Information to Obtain contained misleading information and failed to establish a sufficient nexus between the alleged drug trafficking activities and the residence searched.

The court found that surveillance, intercepted communications, and investigative observations provided a reasonable basis to believe evidence of drug trafficking would be located at the residence.

The court further held that even if a Charter breach had occurred, the evidence would have been admitted under the s. 24(2) analysis.

The motion to exclude evidence was dismissed.

The accused was charged with robbery and wearing a disguise with intent to commit an indictable offence following a driveway robbery in which a victim was assaulted and property stolen.

The Crown’s case relied primarily on circumstantial evidence, including a palm print found on the victim’s vehicle that matched the accused.

Expert evidence confirmed the print match but could not determine when the print was placed on the vehicle.

The court held that fingerprint or palm print evidence alone is insufficient to establish guilt unless the surrounding evidence proves the print was made during the commission of the offence.

Because the evidence left open a reasonable possibility that the print was placed on the vehicle at another time, the Crown failed to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court issued supplementary reasons to clarify when the two-year limitation period begins to run for claims arising from unpaid Highway 407 toll invoices.

The dispute concerned whether the limitation period commenced when the debtor’s vehicle permit expired during licence plate denial or when the debtor was first placed into licence plate denial under the Highway 407 Act.

The court held that the limitation period begins when the Registrar places the debtor’s licence plate into licence plate denial.

This interpretation avoids allowing the toll operator to control when the limitation period begins and is consistent with the statutory collection scheme and the principles underlying limitation periods.

The court therefore confirmed that the limitation period in the case began on the date the licence plate was placed into denial.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking to enforce an alleged settlement agreement arising from a dispute over unpaid invoices for agricultural produce.

The defendants argued that no binding settlement existed because the parties never reached agreement on a fundamental term, namely the schedule of repayment.

The court held that the parties had reached a binding settlement on the principal compromise amount through email exchanges and subsequent conduct, including the issuance and negotiation of cheques consistent with the proposed settlement.

Silence in response to a counter‑proposal combined with partial performance supported an inference that the repayment terms were accepted.

Summary judgment was granted enforcing the settlement against certain corporate defendants but not against the individual defendants.

The plaintiff municipality brought a motion seeking a declaration that the defendant was in civil contempt of court for failing to comply with an earlier order requiring removal of a berm constructed on his property that allegedly caused flooding in a municipal drainage ditch.

The court reviewed the three-part test for civil contempt requiring a clear order, deliberate and wilful disobedience, and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.

While the evidence indicated that the berm had not been fully removed and flooding continued, the court was not satisfied that the breach was deliberate or wilful.

Instead of a contempt finding, the court ordered the defendant to provide access to the property for surveying to determine the remaining berm and to facilitate compliance with the prior order.

The defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing a negligence action arising from a drowning at Lake Simcoe during a social visit to their cottage.

The plaintiffs alleged the defendants negligently misrepresented that the lake was safe and failed to warn a non‑swimmer of risks or provide safety equipment.

The court held that no special relationship existed giving rise to a duty of care and that the alleged statements about the lake’s safety did not constitute negligent misrepresentation.

The deceased was an adult who voluntarily entered the water using his own flotation device, and the lake was not part of the defendants’ property.

Applying Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The plaintiff mortgagee brought a motion seeking payment out of court of funds deposited by the defendant after redeeming a replacement vendor take‑back mortgage in foreclosure proceedings.

The defendants asserted an equitable set‑off defence alleging negligent fill operations, excess fill, and contamination affecting the property.

The court found the allegations unsupported by evidence and noted the mortgage required payment without deduction or abatement.

The defendants failed to particularize or substantiate the set‑off claim and did not demonstrate prejudice warranting a stay of payment.

The court ordered the funds paid out to the plaintiff while leaving the equitable set‑off issue to be determined separately.

Following a jury trial in a motor vehicle accident action, the jury awarded damages including general damages, future housekeeping costs, and future care.

The defendant brought a threshold motion under s. 267.5 of the Insurance Act seeking dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim for general damages and certain future care expenses on the basis that the plaintiff had not proven a permanent serious impairment of an important bodily function as required by Ontario Regulation 381/03.

The court held that the trial judge determines the threshold issue independently of the jury’s verdict and is not bound by the jury’s factual findings.

The plaintiff’s expert evidence was rejected as lacking objectivity and failing to comply with the evidentiary requirements of the Regulation.

The court concluded the plaintiff failed to meet the statutory threshold and dismissed the claims for general damages and future medical rehabilitation expenses.

A commercial property owner sought reimbursement from a real estate brokerage for marketing and advertising expenses incurred after retaining a third-party marketing firm during a listing agreement.

The owner argued the agreement required the brokerage to bear marketing and promotional costs.

The court interpreted the agreement in light of the factual matrix and commercial reasonableness, emphasizing that external marketing costs were subject to mutual agreement and that the brokerage was engaged primarily to sell or lease real estate, not to underwrite independent marketing initiatives.

The court also considered the owner's subsequent conduct, including retaining a marketing firm without consultation and raising the reimbursement claim only after receiving a demand for signage costs.

The court concluded that the agreement did not obligate the brokerage to reimburse the owner for the claimed expenses.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action for specific performance of an agreement of purchase and sale of residential property.

The purchaser failed to provide funds to his solicitor by the contractual closing deadline, despite the agreement specifying that time was of the essence and requiring tender by certified funds from a lawyer’s trust account.

The court found the purchaser was not in funds on the closing date and that the vendor reasonably refused a requested extension.

The purchaser’s evidentiary record was deficient, as he failed to file affidavits from his solicitor or mortgage broker to support his claims regarding financing issues.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the claim, and the vendor was awarded damages and litigation costs set off against the purchaser’s deposit.

The plaintiff brought an ex parte motion seeking a Mareva injunction and a certificate of pending litigation against the residential property of the individual defendants in relation to an alleged unpaid debt exceeding $24,000.

The plaintiff alleged diversion of trust funds under Part 2 of the Construction Lien Act and relied primarily on an affidavit asserting belief that the defendants were liquidating assets and leaving the jurisdiction.

The court held that a Mareva injunction is an extraordinary remedy requiring a strong prima facie case and evidence of a real risk of asset dissipation.

The affidavit evidence amounted only to unsupported belief and did not meet the required threshold.

The court also found no reasonable claim to an interest in land sufficient to justify a certificate of pending litigation.

A self-represented litigant sought to continue several proceedings and requested rescission of a prior order declaring him a vexatious litigant and requiring leave before commencing or continuing proceedings.

The court refused an adjournment request based on alleged hearing difficulties after finding adequate accommodations had been provided.

The court found the applicant’s affidavit contained multiple factual inaccuracies, including misstatements about disciplinary findings and appellate rulings.

The applicant had also failed to pay numerous outstanding costs orders.

The court held that the requirements for relief under Rule 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure were not met and declined to exercise discretion under s. 140(4) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The defendant brought a motion seeking to transfer the venue of a personal injury action from Barrie to Sudbury following a motorcycle accident that occurred in Sudbury.

The moving party argued that most lay witnesses and the plaintiff resided in the Sudbury area, while the plaintiff resisted the transfer citing potential delay, expert witnesses located in Toronto, and counsel’s office in Barrie.

Applying Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the applicable Practice Direction, the court conducted a holistic assessment of factors including location of events, witnesses, convenience, costs, and availability of court resources.

While several factors favoured Sudbury, the court held that the moving party failed to demonstrate that Sudbury was “significantly better” than the plaintiff’s chosen venue.

The court emphasized the plaintiff’s right under the Rules to select the trial venue and declined to interfere with that choice.

The plaintiff sought leave to appeal an order granting multiple defendants security for costs in underlying litigation.

The motion relied on Rule 62.02(4)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that the order would deny access to justice because the plaintiff corporation was impecunious.

The court found the plaintiff failed to demonstrate credible impecuniosity, noting financial records did not account for more than $2 million previously received from expropriation compensation and land sales.

The court held there was no good reason to doubt the correctness of the security for costs order and the proposed appeal did not raise issues of general importance.

Leave to appeal was therefore refused.

The appellant appealed a summary conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg.

The appeal argued that the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter application because the arresting officer relied on an approved screening device (ASD) fail result after several error messages appeared.

The appellant submitted that the officer’s misunderstanding of the device’s error codes undermined reasonable grounds for the arrest and subsequent breath demand, contrary to ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter.

The court held that the Crown was not required to prove the ASD was functioning perfectly, only that the officer reasonably believed it was working properly.

The trial judge’s credibility findings regarding the officer were entitled to deference and supported the conclusion that reasonable grounds existed.