Mark L. Edwards

The defendant, Daniel Costa, was charged with perjury for making a false statement under oath to homicide detectives.

The Crown conceded that Costa could not be convicted of perjury due to the application of s. 131(3) of the Criminal Code, as he was not legally required, permitted, or authorized to make the statement.

The Crown then sought to continue the prosecution on the basis that attempt to obstruct justice was an included offence of perjury as described in the indictment.

The court denied the Crown's request, finding that attempt to obstruct justice was not necessarily included in the perjury charge as worded, and that the accused did not have fair notice of this potential charge.

In a medical malpractice claim where liability was admitted by Dr. Singh, the defendant brought a motion for updated documentary disclosure from the plaintiffs regarding damages.

The plaintiffs resisted, arguing the demands were excessive and disproportionate.

The court applied the principles of relevance and proportionality under the Rules of Civil Procedure, granting some production requests (e.g., updated OHIP summaries, tax returns, family doctor records, primary treating specialists) while denying others deemed unnecessary or marginally relevant (e.g., welfare records, non-primary psychological treatment records, sweeping hospital records, private activity records).

The court emphasized the need for cooperation, communication, and common sense in litigation, shifting the cost of obtaining ordered records to the defendant.

The Regional Municipality of York sought an order of mandamus with certiorari in aid to quash a disclosure order made by a Justice of the Peace and to compel the continuation of a trial.

The disclosure order required the prosecution to provide information on previous charges against the respondent from 1995 and 1996, which the applicant argued constituted a collateral attack on unappealed 2013 orders to comply under the Building Code Act.

The court found that the disclosure order was indeed a collateral attack on the 2013 orders, which the respondent had failed to appeal, and therefore granted the applicant's request.

The plaintiff, involved in two motor vehicle accidents, accepted Rule 49 offers from two sets of defendants.

The court was tasked with determining the appropriate award of partial indemnity costs and disbursements, and their apportionment between the defendants.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs at $37,500 plus HST and disbursements at $45,000 inclusive of HST, and ordered the defendants to pay these costs equally, rather than proportionally to their settlement offers.

The appellant appealed his voyeurism conviction, challenging the trial judge's finding of "explicit sexual activity" and the treatment of a witness's statement as an informal admission.

The court dismissed the appeal, affirming that one photograph unequivocally depicted explicit sexual activity and that the trial judge correctly considered the witness's "acknowledged evidence" as an informal admission in the context of a directed verdict motion.

The Crown applied for an order under section 486.2(2) of the Criminal Code to permit the adult complainant, S.L., to testify behind a screen or outside the courtroom in a sexual assault trial.

The application was based on the complainant's expressed discomfort and anxiety at seeing the accused while recounting intimate and sexual history.

The court, considering factors under section 486.2(3) including the nature of the charges and the relationship, granted the order for S.L. to testify behind a screen, finding it appropriate and without prejudice to trial fairness or the accused's right to cross-examination.

Nuzhat Mamoon, a first offender, was convicted of defrauding eight vulnerable individuals of $98,400 through a breach of trust, leveraging her perceived status as a wealthy, religious businessperson and her charitable organization.

The court considered aggravating factors including the duration, planning, number of victims, significant impact on victims, and abuse of community regard.

Mitigating factors were limited to no prior record.

The court rejected a conditional sentence, imposing 18 months' incarceration, a three-year probation order with specific prohibitions, and a restitution order for the full amount.

The defendant, K.M., charged with sexual offenses, brought a motion for a mistrial, alleging violations of his Section 14 Charter rights and Section 650 Criminal Code rights due to inadequate simultaneous interpretation services during his trial.

K.M. claimed one interpreter, Mr. To, failed to provide continuous, precise, or contemporaneous translation.

The Crown argued K.M. was bilingual or, alternatively, that the defence failed to prove Mr. To's interpretation was deficient, citing poor audio recording quality and compromised objectivity of the defence's expert witness.

The court found that K.M. did require an interpreter but was not fully candid about his English proficiency.

The court dismissed the mistrial motion, concluding that the defence did not meet its onus to establish that the interpreter failed to meet the required standards, largely due to the unreliable evidence from the poor-quality recordings.

The delay caused by the motion was attributed to the defendant.

During a trial for sexual offences, the defence sought to cross-examine the 13-year-old complainant's mother about her history of sexual abuse, arguing it might be relevant to how the mother advised her daughter on protection against unwanted sexual overtures.

The Crown objected on grounds of relevance, asserting the complainant learned of her mother's history only after disclosing the allegations against the accused, and that an individual's prior sexual history is irrelevant to credibility.

The court ruled that the mother's history of sexual abuse was not relevant to the complainant's credibility or to any "street-proofing" advice she might have received, especially given the complainant's lack of prior knowledge of her mother's history.

The defence's request to question the mother on this topic was denied.

In a medical malpractice action concerning a child with significant disabilities, the plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment for future care costs, housing costs, and the OHIP subrogated claim, relying on the defendants' expert evidence.

Concurrently, the defendant Dr. Singh sought orders for further discovery, a further defence medical assessment, and production of the plaintiffs' expert's file.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment, reasoning that it would not genuinely streamline the upcoming trial as the plaintiffs intended to present their own expert evidence on damages, thus requiring the defence experts to still be called.

The court granted the defendant Dr. Singh leave for further limited discovery and a further defence medical assessment due to changed circumstances and the need for trial fairness.

Additionally, the plaintiffs' expert was ordered to provide an affidavit detailing all relied-upon materials.

No costs were awarded for any of the motions.

The plaintiff, a high school student, sued her coach, principal, and school board for negligence after sustaining a knee injury during track and field practice.

The court found that the defendants met the standard of care of a careful and prudent parent, and that the plaintiff's current physical condition and occupational aspirations were not causally related to the injury.

The plaintiff's claim was dismissed.

The applicant sought an order to release seized funds for legal fees and a declaration that s. 462.37(3) of the Criminal Code violates Charter rights if applied to such fees, creating a conflict of interest for counsel.

The Crown resisted, arguing lack of jurisdiction and prematurity for the constitutional issue.

The court found jurisdiction to release the funds, distinguishing previous case law, and determined the applicant had no other means to pay.

However, the court dismissed the declaratory relief, deeming the constitutional question premature as several contingencies must occur before s. 462.37(3) could apply, and emphasized that an offender truly unable to pay a fine in lieu of forfeiture would not face incarceration.

The offender was convicted of multiple firearms-related offences including firearm trafficking, knowing unauthorized possession, possession contrary to a prohibition order, and breach of recognizance.

The court considered constitutional challenges to the mandatory minimum sentence under s. 99(2) of the Criminal Code and to s. 719(3.1), which restricts enhanced credit for pre-sentence custody.

Relying in part on the reasoning in R. v. Nur, the court held that the three‑year mandatory minimum for firearm trafficking under s. 99(2) violated s. 12 of the Charter because the provision could capture licensing-type conduct with minimal moral culpability and impose a grossly disproportionate sentence.

The court rejected the challenge to s. 719(3.1) and applied limited enhanced credit for pre‑sentence custody.

The offender received a global sentence of four years and six months' imprisonment, subject to credit for time served.

Following a prior summary judgment decision finding that a settlement had been reached between the parties, the defendants brought a motion to adduce fresh evidence concerning the date on which two settlement cheques were negotiated.

The moving parties relied on Rules 52.10 and 59.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and argued that bank statements showing the cheques were cashed earlier than assumed would materially affect the findings regarding their intention to be bound by the settlement.

The court held that the proposed evidence could have been obtained and presented with reasonable diligence during the original summary judgment motion and therefore did not satisfy the requirements for admitting fresh evidence under the Palmer test.

The court further concluded that, even if admitted, the evidence would not have changed the outcome because the defendants never demanded repayment of the funds after the plaintiff proposed revised payment terms.

The motion to adduce fresh evidence was dismissed.

The applicant sought orders in the nature of mandamus directing a justice of the peace to render a sentencing decision within a reasonable time and to accept proposed guilty pleas in several Provincial Offences Act matters.

The justice of the peace had accepted a guilty plea in one matter but reserved sentencing for approximately nine and a half months, and reserved for nearly a year whether to accept guilty pleas in four other matters despite joint submissions between the prosecution and defence.

The court held that the delay in sentencing risked infringing the accused’s right under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms to be sentenced within a reasonable time.

It further found that the refusal to accept the proposed guilty pleas lacked a legal basis and did not reflect a proper judicial exercise of discretion.

Orders of mandamus were issued directing the justice of the peace to deliver the sentencing decision and to accept the proposed guilty pleas and enter convictions.

The owner of a residential subdivision development brought a motion under s. 44(2) of the Construction Lien Act to vacate multiple construction liens upon posting security.

The project contractor had abandoned the project and later became bankrupt, leaving several subcontractor lien claims totaling approximately $2.9 million.

The court held that the owner’s exposure to subcontractor liens could not exceed the amount potentially owed to the contractor under the contract.

After resolving a dispute regarding corrected payment certificates issued by the project consultant, the court determined the correct unpaid certified amount and fixed the security required to vacate the liens accordingly.

The court also determined that security for costs should be calculated based on the owner’s potential contractual exposure rather than the aggregate value of all lien claims.

The applicant municipality sought judicial review after a justice of the peace quashed a certificate of offence for a Highway Traffic Act charge on the court’s own motion during an early resolution proceeding.

The issue was whether the justice of the peace committed a jurisdictional error by quashing the certificate without a motion from the defendant.

The court held that under s. 36 of the Provincial Offences Act, objections to defects on the face of a certificate must be raised by the defendant through a motion to quash, and that the justice of the peace had no authority to initiate such a motion where the defendant was present.

The decision to quash the certificate was therefore a clear error of law and contrary to established precedent.

Orders of certiorari and mandamus were granted, restoring the proceeding and directing that a new early resolution meeting be scheduled.

During a case conference in a long-standing civil proceeding, the court addressed procedural delays relating to pending appellate proceedings and non-compliance with orders from the Court of Appeal.

Acting as case management judge, the court fixed a timetable for a motion by an insurer to strike the statement of claim.

The court scheduled the motion hearing and a further case conference to address procedural issues potentially affecting the hearing date.

Directions were also provided concerning the procedure and deadline should the self-represented plaintiff pursue a motion for judicial recusal.

The moving party sought multiple orders including permission to file a new application seeking rescission of a prior order declaring him a vexatious litigant under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act, release of assets connected to prior family proceedings, recovery of personal and business property allegedly held by the respondent, permission to proceed with other civil litigation, and removal of the respondent’s counsel of record.

The court noted that the moving party had previously been declared a vexatious litigant and that the order had been upheld on appeal.

The court found that the requested relief was barred by outstanding costs orders and prior rulings in related proceedings, and that the issues had already been litigated without any material change in circumstances.

The motion was therefore denied in its entirety and the court reiterated that the moving party could not commence or continue proceedings without complying with existing orders.

The court further directed the moving party to cease emailing court staff and to conduct any court business through the proper filing office.

In a medical malpractice action arising from the labour and delivery of an infant plaintiff, the defendant physician admitted breaching the standard of care and causing neurological impairment.

The dispute concerned the proper form of judgment following the admission of liability and the terms of a proposed advance payment.

The court determined the wording of the judgment to reflect the admission while limiting liability to damages causally linked to the physician’s negligence, with damages to be assessed at trial.

The court ordered an advance payment of $300,000 to be used for specified care and accommodation needs of the infant plaintiff and directed that the payment be credited against any eventual damages award.

No costs were awarded due to the good‑faith nature of the dispute between counsel.