Mahmud Jamal

The appellants were convicted by a jury of second degree murder following the shooting death of the victim in a restaurant washroom.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting surveillance video of the appellants at a motel with a firearm on the night prior to the shooting as prior discreditable conduct evidence, and whether the jury was properly instructed as to its permissible uses.

The majority of the Court of Appeal had found no error in the admission or instruction, while the dissenting judge would have ordered new trials.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeals substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, affirming the convictions.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault at trial and appealed on the basis that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons regarding factual findings about the complainant's evidence and erred in assessing the credibility and reliability of that evidence.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal majority dismissed the appeal and affirmed the conviction, with one justice dissenting in favour of a new trial.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, counsel for the appellant raised the same grounds of insufficient reasons and errors in law in assessing the complainant's evidence.

The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the reasoning of the majority of the Court of Appeal.

The appellant was charged with the historical offence of indecent assault arising from an incident in which a five-year-old complainant touched the accused's penis at his invitation after witnessing him masturbate.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that while the element of indecency was established, there was no assault because the accused had not directly and intentionally applied force to the complainant.

The Court of Appeal for British Columbia set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, holding that the trial judge erred by misinterpreting the intentional application of force requirement.

On further appeal, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the appeal, holding that when an adult intentionally precipitates sexual contact with a child, the elements of sexual assault are satisfied regardless of whose physical movement initiates the contact.

The Court declined to follow the English authority of Fairclough v. Whipp, finding it not authoritative in Canada.

The appellant challenged the constitutional validity of s. 68 of Saskatchewan's Correctional Services Regulations, 2013, which sets a balance of probabilities as the applicable standard of proof in inmate disciplinary proceedings.

The majority held that the proceedings constitute an offence punishable by imprisonment within the meaning of s. 11 of the Charter because disciplinary segregation and loss of earned remission are functional forms of imprisonment, thereby overruling R. v. Shubley.

The majority further held that s. 68 infringes s. 11(d) of the Charter by permitting findings of guilt without proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and that this infringement is not saved by s. 1 because an obvious Charter-compliant alternative exists.

The dissent would have dismissed the appeal on the basis that Shubley remains good law and that neither the criminal in nature nor the true penal consequence prong of the Wigglesworth test is satisfied by Saskatchewan's inmate disciplinary proceedings.

The appellant sought to uphold a provincial spending limit restricting third party political advertising to $600,000 in the year before a fixed-date election, while political parties faced no limits in the first six months of that period.

The majority held that the spending limit infringes s. 3 of the Charter by creating an absolute disproportionality in the political discourse, allowing political parties to drown out third party voices during a critical democratic period.

The majority further held the limit could not be saved under s. 1 as it failed the minimal impairment stage.

Two sets of dissenting judges would have allowed the appeal, finding the limit did not infringe s. 3 of the Charter on the evidentiary record, with the dissenters disagreeing on whether an expressive component exists within s. 3.

The appellant sought to strike paragraphs from the respondents' judicial review application challenging the issuance of uranium exploration permits, arguing the paragraphs constituted an abuse of process in light of two prior actions.

The Court confirmed that the abuse of process doctrine, while applicable to Indigenous litigants, must be assessed with regard to the unique context of Aboriginal rights litigation.

The status of a stayed prior action is not dispositive of whether the Crown has knowledge of an asserted Aboriginal claim sufficient to trigger the duty to consult.

Overlap between a general duty-to-consult action and a specific judicial review application does not, without more, threaten the integrity of the adjudicative process.

Case management, rather than striking pleadings, is the appropriate remedy where there is a risk of inconsistent outcomes from parallel proceedings.

The appellant was convicted by jury of second degree murder and assault with a weapon following charges of first degree murder and assault with a weapon.

The appellant appealed his second degree murder conviction on the ground that the trial judge failed to mention the mens rea required for manslaughter in jury instructions and in answering the jury's questions about that offence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal found the trial judge's instructions and answer were sufficient, as the accused had conceded guilt for manslaughter.

The dissenting judge at the Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred by inadequately answering the jury's questions about manslaughter, creating a reasonable possibility that jurors misunderstood the mens rea required for second degree murder.

A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal substantially for the reasons of the majority of the Court of Appeal, with one justice dissenting.

The appellant was involved in a car chase with two men and called his adult son to assist, instructing him to bring a firearm.

The confrontation culminated in the appellant's son fatally shooting both men; the son was convicted of second degree murder and manslaughter.

The appellant was convicted by jury of manslaughter as a party to his son's offences, on the basis that he formed a common unlawful purpose with his son to possess a weapon for a dangerous purpose and to commit assault.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in charging the jury by providing insufficient direction on the elements of the common unlawful purpose offences, misdirecting the jury on party liability, and improperly instructing on the co-conspirators' exception to the hearsay rule.

The Court of Appeal for Alberta held that the trial judge's jury instructions contained no prejudicial error and upheld the convictions.

The Supreme Court of Canada unanimously dismissed the appeal, substantially adopting the majority reasons of the Court of Appeal of Alberta.

The Crown appealed an acquittal in a sexual assault case, challenging trial rulings on text message evidence and admission of prior sexual history evidence under s. 276 of the Criminal Code.

A majority of the Supreme Court of Canada agreed substantially with the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal majority and dismissed the appeal.

Two judges would have allowed the appeal, concluding the trial judge erred in admitting prior sexual history evidence and that the error materially affected the acquittal.

Appeal concerning the scope of corrective powers conferred on the Youth Division of the Court of Québec under s. 91 para. 4 of the Youth Protection Act, which empowers the tribunal to order the correction of a situation where a child's rights have been encroached upon during social intervention.

The Court held that the tribunal's mandate is to render individualized and particularized justice based solely on the interests and rights of the child whose situation has been referred to it, and that preventive corrective measures are valid only if: the child is at risk of the encroachment recurring; the measure can effectively help prevent recurrence; and the measure is related to protecting the interests and rights of that specific child.

The Court further confirmed that the tribunal also holds a non-binding power of recommendation anchored in the text, scheme, and object of the YPA.

Since the young person had reached the age of majority and was no longer subject to social intervention, no corrective order was made.

The appellant was convicted of drug trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking after police, without a warrant, used an arrested drug dealer's seized cellphone to impersonate him and continue a text message conversation with the appellant, luring him to deliver heroin laced with fentanyl.

The majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the text message conversation, the warrantless search was justified by exigent circumstances under s. 11(7) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act because the police faced an urgent situation calling for immediate action to prevent the imminent trafficking of fentanyl to protect public safety and it was impracticable to obtain a warrant.

Karakatsanis, Martin and Moreau JJ. dissented, finding no exigent circumstances and that the evidence should have been excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The appellant was convicted of robbery and having his face masked with intent to commit an indictable offence, based primarily on the recognition evidence of an unsavoury Vetrovec witness.

The appellant argued the trial judge failed to apply the requisite scrutiny to the unsavoury witness's evidence.

The majority held that the trial judge recognized the Vetrovec dangers, applied the requisite scrutiny, and was entitled to accept the recognition evidence without corroboration upon finding it credible and reliable.

The dissent would have allowed the appeal on the basis that the conviction arose from a failure to apply sufficient scrutiny, particularly given that the alleged confession was recounted only after the witness had already identified the accused from surveillance footage.

Successive tripartite agreements were entered into by the governments of Canada and Quebec and an Indigenous band council to establish and maintain an Indigenous police force serving the First Nation's community.

Government funding proved inadequate to ensure the maintenance of the police force, resulting in accumulated operating deficits totalling $1,599,469.95 over four years.

The band council sought reimbursement on both a contractual basis under Quebec civil law (good faith under arts. 1375 and 1376 C.C.Q.) and a public law basis grounded in the honour of the Crown.

The Supreme Court of Canada (8-1) dismissed the appeal, finding that the provincial government's refusal to renegotiate funding upon renewal of the agreements constituted both a breach of good faith under Quebec civil law and a breach of the obligation to act consistently with the honour of the Crown.

The remedy was grounded in reconciliatory justice rather than corrective justice alone, and the provincial government was ordered to pay its share of the accumulated deficits ($767,745.58) as a measure to restore the honour of the Crown and place the parties back on the path to reconciliation.

The Crown appealed acquittals on trafficking in persons and receiving a material benefit from trafficking, where the trial judge had characterized evidence of the accused's regular violence and threats of violence toward the complainant as past discreditable conduct evidence, limiting its relevance to a mere contextual backdrop.

The Supreme Court majority held that this was an error of law because such violence, covered by the indictment's time period and locations, was directly relevant to the actus reus of trafficking under s. 279.01(1) of the Criminal Code — it could establish that the accused exercised control, direction, or influence over the complainant's movements, and could satisfy the definition of exploitation in s. 279.04.

The majority further held this error might have had a material bearing on the acquittals by undermining the trial judge's credibility assessment of the complainant.

The acquittals were set aside and a new trial ordered.

Côté and Rowe JJ. dissented, finding the error did not have a material bearing on the acquittals given the trial judge's detailed credibility findings and the absence of evidence linking the violence to the complainant's provision of sexual services.

The appellants, owners of coal-fired electric power generation facilities, challenged the vires of provincial linear property assessment guidelines that denied them additional depreciation on account of an off-coal agreement they had entered into with the Crown.

The appellants argued the guidelines violated the common law rule against administrative discrimination and were inconsistent with the purposes of the enabling statute.

The Court held that the reasonableness standard of review presumptively applies to vires challenges to subordinate legislation, as set out in the companion case.

The Court found the guidelines did discriminate against parties to off-coal agreements but that such discrimination was authorized by necessary implication under the broad ministerial power to establish valuation standards and regulations respecting specifications and characteristics of designated industrial property.

The appeal was dismissed, the guidelines being intra vires and consistent with the statutory purposes of ensuring current, correct, fair and equitable assessments.

The appellant challenged the vires of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, enacted by the Governor in Council under the Divorce Act, arguing that the GIC exceeded its authority because the Guidelines require the payer parent to bear a greater share of child-related costs than the recipient parent.

The Supreme Court held that the reasonableness standard under the Vavilov framework presumptively applies when reviewing the vires of subordinate legislation, and that the 'irrelevant, extraneous or completely unrelated' threshold from Katz Group is no longer good law.

Applying reasonableness review, the Court concluded that the Child Support Guidelines fall within the GIC's extremely broad statutory authority under s. 26.1 of the Divorce Act and are therefore intra vires.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Crown appealed from the Quebec Court of Appeal's decision remitting the respondents' files to the Court of Québec for preliminary inquiries.

The respondents were each charged with historical sexual offences against a child which carried a maximum of 10 years' imprisonment at the time of commission, but for which the maximum was later increased to 14 years.

Before charges were laid, each respondent appeared in court and reserved their election as to mode of trial; neither requested a preliminary inquiry until after the 2019 amendment to s. 535 of the Criminal Code came into force, restricting preliminary inquiries to accused persons charged with offences punishable by 14 years or more.

A five-judge majority dismissed the appeal, albeit by different routes: Côté and Rowe JJ. held the right vested at the time charges were laid; Kasirer J. (Jamal J. concurring) held the right vested when the accused reserved their election as to mode of trial with the court's approval; and Martin J. held the date of the offence governs temporal application.

The four-judge dissent (Karakatsanis J., Wagner C.J., O'Bonsawin and Moreau JJ.) would have allowed the appeal, concluding the right vests only when a request for a preliminary inquiry is made, and that the new rule applies where no such request was made before it came into force.

On the interpretive question, Côté and Rowe JJ. held that the 14-year threshold in the new s. 535 is tied to the seriousness of the offence and not to the accused's personal maximum jeopardy, while Karakatsanis J. and Martin J. held the accused must personally face a maximum of 14 years.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a head-on collision.

The sentencing judge imposed discretionary driving prohibition orders under s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether s. 320.24(4), enacted by Bill C-46, authorizes a driving prohibition upon conviction for criminal negligence offences (ss. 220 and 221), which are not enumerated in that provision.

The majority held that driving prohibitions imposed were unlawful because the criminal negligence offences are not enumerated in s. 320.24(4), the included offence machinery does not extend to imply punishments, and Parliament's deliberate textual evolution of the provision supports exclusion of general criminal negligence offences.

Four judges dissented, holding that a finding of guilt for a principal offence necessarily entails findings of guilt for all lesser included offences and that the exclusion produces an absurd result.

The appellant investors, who participated in a Ponzi scheme operated by a one-person corporation, sought to have the trustee in bankruptcy's unjust enrichment claims statute-barred under Ontario's Limitations Act, 2002 by attributing the directing mind's knowledge of illegal interest and commission payments to the corporation.

The majority held that the corporate attribution doctrine applies to one-person corporations on the same purposive, contextual, and pragmatic basis as to other corporations, and that courts retain discretion to decline attribution when it would undermine the purposes of the laws engaged — here, the limitations and bankruptcy regimes.

In concurrence, a separate judge held that resort to the common law corporate attribution doctrine was unnecessary because the codified agency rules in s. 12 of the Limitations Act, 2002 provided a complete answer, and that the claims were not discoverable until the trustee was authorized by the court to bring them.

All judges agreed that the investors were disentitled from equitable set-off for lack of clean hands, that the referral agreements were illegal contracts at common law, and that one appellant was not dealing at arm's length with the corporation.

The appellants, including the directing mind of two family-owned construction companies, participated in a false invoicing scheme that drained tens of millions of dollars from the debtor companies prior to insolvency.

The trustee in bankruptcy and monitor applied under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act to recover the false invoice payments as transfers at undervalue on the basis that the debtor companies intended to defraud, defeat, or delay creditors.

The Supreme Court held that insolvency is not a prerequisite to establishing fraudulent intent under s. 96(1)(b)(ii)(B), and that the directing mind's fraudulent intent was properly attributed to the debtor corporations.

The Court confirmed that the corporate attribution doctrine must be applied purposively, contextually, and pragmatically, and that the fraud and no benefit exceptions to corporate attribution do not apply in the context of s. 96 of the BIA because applying them would undermine the creditor protection purpose of that provision.

Appeal dismissed.