Linda R. Rothstein

The child, who was the subject of a high-conflict custody and child protection dispute, ran away and sought assistance from a legal clinic.

The father obtained an urgent motion order restraining the legal clinic and its lawyer from representing or contacting the child.

The legal clinic and the child appealed.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by conflating a child's right to standing in a proceeding with their fundamental right to seek independent legal advice.

The court held that children are entitled to seek legal advice without permission from their parents or the court.

Following a successful appeal of a summary judgment order, a dispute arose regarding the settling of the court's order on costs.

The respondents argued that a portion of the motion judge's costs order related to a support motion should remain intact.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the appellant that the motion judge had awarded a global amount for all motions, which were intertwined.

The court clarified that the entire costs award below was set aside and reserved to the trial judge.

The plaintiffs brought a consolidated motion for leave to appeal five orders of the motion judge.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motions for leave to appeal.

The court awarded costs of $5,000 to a non-party student who reasonably participated in the motion.

The court also awarded elevated costs of $20,000 to the defendants, noting the plaintiffs filed voluminous materials of over 4,500 pages and improperly adduced fresh evidence through counsel's affidavits.

A case management conference was held to set procedural directions for an upcoming appeal before a three-judge panel of the Divisional Court.

The court ordered the hearing to proceed via video conference and provided detailed instructions for the creation of a password-protected electronic drop box for document filing.

Directions were also given regarding the formatting of electronic documents, hyperlinking of authorities, and the potential for a motion to quash the appeal to be heard by the appeal panel.

The plaintiffs filed affidavits containing confidential information about a minor child (Student Q) and her family, breaching a prior confidentiality order (Penny Order).

The defendants and Student Q's family successfully moved to have these affidavits removed/redacted.

This endorsement addresses the costs of that motion.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct reprehensible and deserving of reprimand, rejecting their arguments of inadvertence and access to justice without evidence of impecuniosity.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded to Student Q's family, and reduced costs to the defendants, totaling $41,633.44, payable by the plaintiffs.

This is a costs endorsement following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' motion for recusal of the case management judge.

The plaintiffs alleged actual and perceived bias, which the court found to be unsubstantiated.

The defendants sought substantial or partial indemnity costs for their opposition to the recusal motion.

The court awarded the defendants partial indemnity costs, finding their participation necessary and appropriate, and rejected the plaintiffs' arguments for no costs based on access to justice or financial hardship without evidentiary support.

The court declined to award substantial indemnity costs as a reprimand for unsubstantiated bias allegations, emphasizing that costs awards should be reasonable and not punitive.

The moving parties sought to object to the responding parties including their factums from the court below in their motion record for leave to appeal.

The Divisional Court issued a supplementary endorsement clarifying that anything before the court below may form part of the record on a motion for leave to appeal, and there was nothing improper about including the factums.

The court declined to reconsider its decision on the motion for leave to appeal, noting that its decision did not turn on the responding parties' factums.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal two interlocutory orders.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding parties.

The court issued supplementary reasons regarding a motion for disclosure of non-parties to whom the plaintiffs had disseminated unredacted litigation documents identifying minor defendants.

Despite the plaintiffs' failure to provide submissions and their stated intent to seek leave to appeal, the court proceeded to decide the outstanding issue.

The court found that the plaintiffs had breached an interim publication ban and engaged in a strategy to release minor defendants' identities to the press.

To ameliorate the harm and ensure the efficacy of the publication ban, the court ordered the plaintiffs to disclose under oath the names and contact details of all recipients of the identifying documents.

The appellant wife sought damages for conspiracy against her husband and his family, alleging they diverted business proceeds to reduce her support payments.

The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the conspiracy claim and awarded substantial costs against the wife.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by improperly bifurcating issues, misapplying the tort of conspiracy in the family law context, and making palpable factual errors regarding critical evidence.

The Court emphasized that the tort of conspiracy is a valuable tool to deter non-disclosure and ensure collectibility of judgments in family law.

The appeal was allowed, the partial summary judgment and associated costs orders were set aside, and a new trial was ordered before a different judge.

The court heard urgent motions to seal the file and ban publication of minor parties' identities in a bullying lawsuit.

The plaintiffs, Mother Doe and Jane Doe, initially sought broad protection but then released unredacted pleadings to the press, identifying the minor defendants.

The court found the plaintiffs' conduct reprehensible, rejecting their late-filed affidavits and expunging other materials.

Applying the Dagenais/Mentuck test, the court granted a publication ban protecting minors' names, school attendance dates, and family details, but allowed publication of ages, grade levels, and general details of alleged bullying and harm, as these were deemed not to identify the minors to the general public.

Substantial indemnity costs were awarded against the plaintiffs due to their abusive litigation tactics and breaches of court orders.

The defendants and the non-party family of Student Q brought a motion to remove and/or redact certain affidavits and exhibits filed by the plaintiffs, citing breaches of a prior confidentiality order (the "Penny Order") protecting minor children's identities and confidential school records.

The court found that the plaintiffs' affidavits contained information identifying Student Q and other minor students, and that the confidential school records required enhanced protection.

The court granted the defendants' primary relief, striking the main affidavit and ordering its removal, imposing strict protocols for future filings, and directing the plaintiffs to retrieve and destroy copies of the affidavit disseminated to non-parties.

The plaintiffs brought an urgent motion for the recusal of the case management judge, Kimmel J., alleging actual and perceived bias.

The grounds for recusal included a perceived racist attack by opposing counsel against the plaintiff Mr. Rogerson, the judge's alleged annoyance with the plaintiffs and their counsel, making orders beyond jurisdiction, and adopting an investigative role.

The judge dismissed the motion, finding no compelling evidence of actual bias or a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The court emphasized that subjective perceptions of bias are insufficient and that the high burden on the moving party to demonstrate a real likelihood of bias was not met.

The judge also noted that displeasure with a ruling or judicial admonishment for non-compliance does not constitute grounds for recusal, and that litigants are not entitled to choose their judge.

The defendants brought an urgent motion to remove, redact, and seal affidavits and exhibits filed by the plaintiffs to protect the confidentiality of minor students.

The plaintiffs brought a cross-motion for the case management judge's recusal, which was dismissed.

The plaintiffs then sought an adjournment of the defendants' motion due to late filings.

The court granted the adjournment on the condition that the entire court file be sealed temporarily, balancing the urgency of protecting minors' privacy interests against the open court principle, particularly given the operational constraints imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiffs sought to dismiss the defendants' proposed motion as not urgent, frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01(2) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court reviewed the plaintiffs' arguments and found that the defendants' motion was urgent and not frivolous on its face.

The judge rejected the plaintiffs' request for dismissal, ruling that the motion met the requirements of the Notice to the Profession and was to be heard on its merits.

The plaintiffs brought a class action alleging that the defendant financial institutions breached their trust and fiduciary duties by failing to disclose markup fees charged on foreign currency conversions in registered accounts.

The parties brought cross-motions for summary judgment on the common issues, and the defendants moved for decertification.

The court found that the defendants breached the trust agreements by failing to disclose the amount of the markup fees.

The court ordered an accounting of profits to be determined at a reference, emphasizing the need to deter fiduciary misconduct.

The court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for an elevated interest rate and punitive damages, and dismissed the defendants' motion to decertify the class action.

An online retailer of prescription eyewear based in British Columbia appealed an application judge's decision that found it was in breach of Ontario's Regulated Health Professions Act by dispensing prescription eyewear to Ontario customers without involving Ontario-licensed health care providers.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the application judge erred in determining that sufficient constitutional connection existed between the respondent's online sales and Ontario's regulatory scheme.

The court held that while delivery of prescription eyewear falls within the continuum of dispensing activities, the mere delivery of product ordered online and processed in compliance with British Columbia's regulatory regime does not establish sufficient connection to apply Ontario's controlled act provisions to an out-of-province supplier.

The court emphasized that the discrete act of delivery has primarily a commercial aspect rather than a health care one, and that applying Ontario's legislation would effectively grant a monopoly over the importation of prescription eyewear into Ontario.

The Children's Lawyer for Ontario appealed a Divisional Court decision upholding an Information and Privacy Commissioner's order that the Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) had custody or control of the Children's Lawyer's litigation records relating to child clients, and therefore such records were subject to freedom of information access requests under FIPPA.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Children's Lawyer operates independently from MAG with respect to her core functions of representing children, and therefore MAG does not have custody or control of child client records.

The court emphasized the importance of confidentiality in the Children's Lawyer-child relationship to the proper functioning of the legal system and the best interests of children.

The applicant dentist sought judicial review of an interim order by the College's Inquiries, Complaints and Reports Committee (ICRC) suspending his licence without a hearing.

The suspension followed criminal charges in Florida for indecent exposure.

The Divisional Court quashed the suspension, finding the ICRC's decision unreasonable because there was no evidence that the applicant's conduct was likely to expose his patients to harm, the ICRC improperly relied on a 1994 complaint, and it failed to provide reasons for rejecting uncontradicted expert psychiatric evidence and the applicant's offer of a monitoring term.

The applicant, a Justice of the Peace facing a judicial misconduct complaint, brought a motion for a temporary stay of the Hearing Panel's proceedings pending his application for judicial review of the Complaints Committee's decision to refer the matter to a hearing.

The respondent brought a cross-motion to quash the judicial review application for prematurity.

The court held that the judicial review application was manifestly premature, as all of the applicant's arguments could be raised before the Hearing Panel.

The court also dismissed the motion for a stay, finding that the applicant failed to meet the test for a stay of proceedings.