Sherilyn J. Pickering

The applicant, who was catastrophically impaired after being struck by a vehicle as a pedestrian, sought attendant care benefits of $6,000 per month.

The adjudicator determined the applicant was entitled to attendant care benefits at a rate of $1,529.96 per month, finding that she required assistance with routine personal care and complex hygiene but did not require around-the-clock supervisory care.

However, the adjudicator held that the benefits were not payable because the applicant had not actually incurred the expenses, and the insurer had not unreasonably withheld or delayed payment to justify deeming the expenses incurred.

Claims for an award and interest were dismissed.

The appellant was injured when the public transit bus she was riding stopped abruptly, throwing her forward.

She sought statutory accident benefits, which were denied by the Licence Appeal Tribunal under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act because the bus did not collide with another vehicle or object.

On appeal, the appellant argued she constituted 'any other object' under the statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain wording and context of the provision require the object to be outside the vehicle, and a bus does not collide with a person inside it.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to correct the misnomer of several John Doe defendants, identifying them as specific treating physicians and a wound care provider (ParaMed).

The underlying action involved allegations of medical malpractice relating to the development and failure to treat the deceased's bedsores at various care facilities.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add parties after the expiry of the strict two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the pleadings were drafted with sufficient particularity such that the 'litigation finger' pointed squarely at the proposed defendants, and that a properly informed defendant would have recognized they were the target of the allegations.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendants.

The appellant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying her catastrophic impairment benefits.

The Divisional Court found that while there was no breach of procedural fairness, the Adjudicator's findings regarding the appellant's whole person impairment under Criterion 6 of the AMA Guides were unreasonable.

Specifically, the Adjudicator unreasonably dismissed evidence of double vision, peripheral neuropathy, and medication side effects.

The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter to the LAT for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision dismissing his application for Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) as statute-barred.

The LAT found that the insurer's May 3, 2021 letter constituted a clear and unequivocal denial of benefits, triggering the two-year limitation period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court upheld the LAT's decision, finding no error in its application of the limitation period or its refusal to extend the time to appeal.

The court also rejected the appellant's arguments regarding discoverability and the impact of subsequent correspondence from the insurer.

The respondent insurer requested a reconsideration of a preliminary issue decision which found that the applicant was an 'insured person' under the Schedule because she and the catastrophically injured person were sisters.

The respondent argued the Tribunal erred in fact and law, asserting the evidence supported a finding that they were cousins.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding that the respondent improperly attempted to re-weigh evidence and raise new case law that was not presented at the initial hearing.

The applicant was injured when the TTC bus she was riding made a sudden stop, causing her to strike the interior of the bus.

The bus did not collide with any external object.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits, arguing that she herself constituted 'any other object' with which the bus collided under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act.

The Tribunal rejected this argument, finding that the ordinary meaning of the provision requires the public transit vehicle to collide with an object external to it.

As the bus did not collide with an external object, the applicant is barred from claiming accident benefits.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, moved for an order requiring the plaintiff’s accident benefits insurer to produce a file relating to a 2011 motor vehicle accident, arguing its relevance to a 2017 accident at issue in the present action.

The court found the moving party failed to establish either the relevance of the documents or that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without them, and dismissed the motion.

The court also awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The applicant, a minor, sought statutory accident benefits for psychological injuries arising from a motor vehicle accident involving her cousin.

The respondent insurer denied benefits, arguing the applicant was not an 'insured person' under the Schedule because cousins are not listed family members.

The Tribunal applied the modern approach to statutory interpretation and found that the applicant's mother had a de facto parent-child relationship with the cousin, making the applicant and the cousin 'sisters' for the purposes of the Schedule.

The Tribunal concluded the applicant is an insured person and eligible for benefits.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding her entitlement to attendant care benefits and home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following a 2010 motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued LAT erred in determining the applicable hourly rates, assessing her need for supervisory care, denying home modifications, and violating her Charter equality rights by distinguishing between mental and physical impairments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law, as LAT correctly applied the 1996 Schedule rates, provided adequate reasons for preferring the respondent's expert evidence, and appropriately applied the reasonable and necessary test for home modifications.

The applicant sought statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident, disputing the denial of treatment plans for a bio-feedback assessment, occupational therapy assessments and services, and assistive devices.

The Tribunal found the occupational therapy assessment and portions of the occupational therapy services and assistive devices to be reasonable and necessary, noting that some devices were duplicative of those already provided to the applicant's spouse.

The claim for the bio-feedback assessment was dismissed as the applicant failed to establish entitlement to the denied portion.

The Tribunal also denied the applicant's request for a special award, finding the insurer's conduct was not unreasonable.

The appellant, a firefighter who responded to the 2018 Toronto van attack, sought statutory accident benefits for psychological impairments resulting from witnessing the aftermath.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied the claim, finding the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because the rental van was used as a weapon and the firetruck did not directly cause the injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator made no error of law in applying the purpose and causation tests, and rejected the appellant's Charter argument regarding discrimination against mental injuries.

The applicant was injured in a motorcycle accident and sought various statutory accident benefits, including the cost of a replacement helmet, visitor expenses, assistive devices, and the unapproved balances of numerous treatment plans.

The Tribunal found that a helmet constitutes clothing under s. 24(1) of the Schedule and awarded its replacement cost.

The Tribunal also awarded a portion of the claimed visitor expenses that were supported by evidence.

However, the claims for assistive devices and the unapproved balances of the treatment plans were dismissed, as the applicant failed to prove they were reasonable and necessary or that they had been submitted to his extended health care provider.

The claim for a special award was also dismissed.

The applicant sought attendant care benefits and several treatment plans for psychological, chiropractic, and occupational therapy services following a motor vehicle accident.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal dismissed the application, finding that the applicant failed to prove the benefits were reasonable and necessary.

The Tribunal preferred the respondent's insurer's examination reports over the applicant's medical evidence, noting significant contradictions between the applicant's own examination under oath testimony—where she reported being largely independent and emotionally well—and the severe impairments documented by her assessors.

The defendants, Turgut Askar and Beck Taxi Ltd., brought a motion to change the trial venue from Barrie to Toronto.

The plaintiff, Leela Rampersad, opposed the motion.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that Toronto was a "substantially better" venue given the location of the motor vehicle accident, the residences of the parties and most potential witnesses, and the plaintiff's connections to Toronto for employment and medical treatment.

The only connection to Barrie was the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The appellant insurer appealed a preliminary issue decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) regarding whether the respondent's slip and fall incident constituted an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The LAT intervened to raise a preliminary issue regarding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, confirming that appeals lie only from final decisions of the LAT to prevent fragmentation and delay.

The court also declined the parties' joint request to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against TD Canada Trust, arguing errors regarding the availability of summary judgment in civil jury actions, the exclusion of expert evidence, and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Hryniak test for summary judgment applies equally to civil jury actions, the motion judge properly excluded the expert evidence, and the process was procedurally fair.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a personal injury action from Barrie to Toronto.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was brought late and for tactical reasons.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the defendants failed to raise the issue until after the pretrial conference and that transferring the action to Toronto would result in significant delay in securing a trial date.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiffs' action, the defendant TD sought partial indemnity costs of $231,077.50.

The plaintiffs argued for a reduction based on the principal plaintiff's impecuniosity, the novelty of the case, and excessive time claimed.

The court found that while the plaintiff's financial circumstances warranted some moderation, the novelty of the case did not justify a reduction as basic negligence principles applied.

The court also found some of TD's claimed time excessive, but noted the plaintiffs' conduct caused significant delay.

The court awarded TD costs of $130,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

At the outset of a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved to exclude expert evidence based on a brain SPECT scan used to diagnose a traumatic brain injury (TBI).

The court held that using a SPECT scan to diagnose TBI and distinguish it from anxiety or depression constitutes novel science.

Applying the reliable foundation test from R. v. J.-L.J., the court found the methodology had not been tested, lacked peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.