Roger A. Pinnock

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and arson in the death of his intimate partner.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased about their relationship, failing to give a limiting instruction regarding bad character evidence, and permitting lay opinion evidence from firefighters about his demeanour at the scene.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the hearsay statements were properly admitted under the state of mind exception, a bad character limiting instruction was unnecessary given the specific directions provided, and the demeanour evidence was admissible lay opinion.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder and indignity to human remains after confessing to undercover officers during a 'Mr. Big' operation.

He appealed his convictions, arguing the confession was obtained through police coercion amounting to an abuse of process under the Hart framework.

He also appealed his 17-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge reasonably concluded the police conduct was not coercive and the appellant's will was not overborne.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was not demonstrably unfit given the horrific nature of the crimes and the aggravating factors.

The appellant was convicted of second-degree murder after stabbing his neighbour in a rooming house.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by admitting hearsay statements made by the deceased victim to third parties, which suggested the appellant had previously assaulted and stalked her.

The Court of Appeal found that the hearsay statements lacked sufficient indicia of reliability and should not have been admitted under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

Because the improperly admitted evidence was central to the Crown's case on intent and animus, the appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and importing cocaine, but the jury could not reach a verdict on a trafficking charge.

During deliberations, the jury asked if a guilty verdict on importing required a guilty verdict on trafficking.

The trial judge answered 'no' without further explanation, contradicting his earlier instructions that the key issue for all charges was whether a specific transfer of cocaine occurred.

The Court of Appeal held that this incomplete and unhelpful response compromised trial fairness and left the jury adrift to assess conflicting bases of culpability.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault and sentenced to five years' imprisonment, with pre-sentence custody credited on a 1:1 basis.

The sentencing judge denied enhanced credit on the mistaken belief that the appellant's bail had been revoked.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found this was a material factual misunderstanding.

Applying the principles from Summers, the Court held the appellant was entitled to enhanced credit of 1.5:1, as there was no evidence to rebut the inference that he had lost eligibility for early release.

The appeal was allowed and the sentence reduced accordingly.

The appellant appealed the probation conditions imposed following a conviction for breach of probation, arguing that the requirements to remain in Ontario and report weekly were improper.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the sentencing judge properly exercised their discretion.

The conditions were necessary to monitor the appellant, particularly because the underlying breach occurred while he was outside the province, and did not unduly restrict his mobility rights since he could seek permission to travel or vary the reporting frequency.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder, arson, and rendering an indignity to a body after he and two accomplices tortured the victim and burned down the house to conceal the crime.

On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in dismissing an application for the production of a Crown witness's third-party psychological records, and in his jury instructions regarding accomplice evidence (Vetrovec warning) and fabricated statements.

The Court of Appeal found that while the trial judge erred at the first stage of the third-party records analysis, production would not have been ordered at the second stage.

The court also found the jury instructions were adequate and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant applied to re-open his sentence appeal and introduce fresh evidence regarding the immigration consequences of his 26-month sentence for fraud over $5,000.

The fresh evidence demonstrated that a sentence of two years or more would deprive him of the right to appeal a deportation order.

The Court of Appeal granted the application, admitted the fresh evidence, and reduced the sentence to two years less a day, noting the appellant's long-term residence in Canada, family ties, and lack of connections to his homeland.

The accused appealed his convictions for drug and firearms offences, arguing arbitrary detention and racial profiling.

The Crown appealed the sentence, challenging the trial judge's finding that s. 719(3.1) of the Criminal Code, which limits pre-sentence custody credit to 1:1 when bail is denied primarily due to a previous conviction, violates s. 7 of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals.

The Court upheld the conviction, finding no arbitrary detention or racial profiling.

On the sentence appeal, the Court held that s. 719(3.1) violates the principle of proportionality in sentencing under s. 7 of the Charter by subjecting identically placed offenders to different periods of incarceration based on bail outcomes, and is not saved by s. 1.

The provision was declared of no force and effect.

The appellant, who had a long-standing history of mental illness, was found NCRMD on a charge of assault with a weapon after chasing his neighbour with a pick axe.

At his initial hearing before the Ontario Review Board, the Board ordered his detention in a secure forensic unit.

The appellant appealed, arguing for a conditional discharge.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the Board did not give adequate consideration to whether a conditional discharge was the least onerous and least restrictive disposition in the circumstances, and directed the Board to reconsider its decision.

The appellant appealed convictions for sexual assault and sexual interference arising from allegations by a child complainant.

The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in law by treating the appellant's failure to give an immediate unequivocal denial to a vague police allegation as a basis to reject his testimony, and by applying different standards of scrutiny to the complainant's evidence and the defence evidence.

While the court rejected the argument that the verdict was unreasonable, it found the credibility analysis legally flawed and capable of producing a miscarriage of justice.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed his conviction, arguing that the Crown's closing address to the jury undermined the principle of jury unanimity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the argument was contrary to established jurisprudence and noting that the only live issue at trial was consent.

The appellant appealed his conviction for first-degree murder, arguing that the trial judge erred in admitting police investigative narrative evidence and that the Crown improperly cross-examined him on his alibi, infringing his right to silence.

The Court of Appeal held that the investigative narrative evidence was properly admitted in reply because the defence had attacked the integrity of the police investigation.

The Court also found that while some of the Crown's cross-examination and jury address regarding the appellant's right to silence and false alibi were problematic, the trial judge's instructions adequately protected the appellant's fair trial rights.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of second degree murder following a stabbing during a drug deal.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge made errors in instructing the jury.

The Court of Appeal found two significant errors: failing to provide a limiting instruction on the hearsay portion of a witness's police statement, and improperly instructing the jury that post-offence conduct could be considered in determining the appellant's state of mind for murder versus manslaughter.

The cumulative effect of these errors required a new trial.

The appellant appealed his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender, arguing the trial judge erred by failing to consider the long-term offender (LTO) option.

The appellant also introduced fresh evidence of a 2010 risk assessment showing rehabilitation progress.

The Court of Appeal applied the curative proviso and dismissed the appeal, finding no reasonable possibility the trial judge would have imposed an LTO order in 1998 even with the fresh evidence.

The court noted that the appellant's progress should be assessed by the Parole Board, not through a new sentencing hearing.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching involving a minor.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the timing of the assaults, failed to properly apply the W.(D.) test, ignored evidence about his apparel, and misapprehended video evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's credibility assessments and application of the W.(D.) test were sufficient and supported by the evidence.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for a sexual offence.

He argued the trial judge erred by relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements, treating his non-cooperation with police as consciousness of guilt, misapplying reasonable doubt regarding his physical limitations, and ignoring exculpatory portions of his statement.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the prior statements for credibility, properly addressed the physical limitations, and considered the exculpatory statement.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed as no error was found in the sentence imposed.

The applicant brought motions to re-open two appeals that had been dismissed as abandoned due to non-attendance and non-compliance.

The first motion related to a summary conviction appeal, which the court dismissed because it did not meet the test for leave to appeal.

The second motion related to a conviction appeal for failing to comply with a court order.

The court dismissed the second motion, finding that the explanation offered for the non-attendance and non-compliance was cast into serious doubt by information before the court, and it would not be in the interests of justice to re-open the appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for incest and sexual assault, as well as his four-year concurrent sentences.

He argued the trial judge provided insufficient reasons, shifted the burden of proof, and misapplied the W.D. test for credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's reasons demonstrated a firm grasp of the evidence, properly applied the burden of proof, and accurately reflected the W.D. framework.

The sentence was also upheld as the finding of a pattern of assaults was reasonable.

A criminal lawyer appealed a contempt conviction arising from his failure to appear with his client at a peremptory disposition hearing.

The Court of Appeal held that counsel non-appearance is not per se criminal contempt and that the fault element requires at least indifference to obligations to the court and client.

The trial judge erred by cutting off evidence about arrangements made for an associate to attend and by relying on prior non-appearances by the lawyer and others in his firm without proper notice.

The conviction was quashed and an acquittal entered because, on the uncontested affidavit record, the conduct did not amount to criminal contempt.