David Baker

The appellant, Valerie Jacob, a recipient of Canada Pension Plan Disability Benefit (CPP-D), challenged the eligibility criteria for the Canadian Emergency Response Benefit (CERB) and Canadian Recovery Benefit (CRB) during the COVID-19 pandemic.

She argued that the $5,000 income threshold and the exclusion of CPP-D from eligible income sources violated her equality rights under s. 15(1) of the Charter.

The application judge dismissed her claim.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal found that the income threshold and the exclusion of CPP-D did constitute a breach of s. 15(1) due to their disproportionate impact on disabled workers.

However, the Court further concluded that this breach was justified as a reasonable limit under s. 1 of the Charter, given the emergency context of the pandemic and the government's need for a simple, fast mechanism for benefit delivery, along with subsequent ameliorative measures like relaxed Employment Insurance rules.

The appeal was dismissed, and no costs were ordered.

The applicant, Valerie Jacob, challenged the $5,000 income eligibility criteria for the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (CERB), Canada Recovery Benefit (CRB), and Canada Recovery Sickness Benefit (CRSB), asserting it violated her section 15(1) Charter right due to her physical disability.

The court applied the two-step test from R. v. Sharma, finding that the applicant failed to demonstrate a disproportionate impact based on disability (first step) and that the criteria did not reinforce, perpetuate, or exacerbate disadvantage (second step).

The court concluded the $5,000 threshold was not arbitrary, being based on a minimum workforce attachment benchmark, and applied equally to disabled and non-disabled individuals who did not meet it.

The application was dismissed without costs.

Roch Longueépée, largely successful in his appeal, sought partial indemnity costs from the University of Waterloo and the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario found Longueépée entitled to costs against the University, fixing them at $25,000.

The court also awarded costs against the HRTO, fixed at $7,500, because its arguments on the standard of review and request for a five-judge panel expanded the scope of the appeal, even though its position was not taken in bad faith.

The applicant, a former postsecondary student with disabilities, brought a Charter application challenging the constitutionality of the Canada Student Loans Program (CSLP) and the Ontario Student Assistance Program (OSAP).

The applicant argued that the 'time in study' structure of the programs disproportionately burdened students with disabilities, who often take longer to complete their studies and thus accrue more debt.

The court found that while the legislation establishing the CSLP did not violate s. 15(1) of the Charter, the operation and administration of the program infringed the applicant's equality rights by failing to redress the additional debt she accrued due to her disabilities.

The court held that this infringement was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The court granted declaratory relief and ordered the return of monies paid by the applicant pursuant to the unconstitutional operation of the CSLP, but denied her request for Charter damages.

The plaintiffs, autistic children and their parents, commenced a proposed class proceeding alleging the provincial government and several school boards failed to provide or fund Applied Behavioural Analysis therapy and related services within Ontario’s education system, contrary to the Charter.

After earlier rulings struck most causes of action and the Court of Appeal limited the remaining claims, the plaintiffs moved to discontinue the proceeding under s. 29 of the Class Proceedings Act.

The court reviewed the legal framework governing discontinuance of proposed class proceedings, focusing on whether the discontinuance would prejudice putative class members.

Finding no evidence of improper purpose, prejudice to class members, or objection from notified parties, the court approved the discontinuance on consent and without costs.