Benita Wassenaar

The appellant, Jordan Osborne, appealed his first-degree murder conviction on two grounds: the voluntariness of his police statement and alleged abuse of process by the Crown.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's finding that the police statement was voluntary, concluding that no implicit inducement or misrepresentation rendered it involuntary, and that the confession was made due to the strength of the case.

The court also dismissed the abuse of process argument, finding no inconsistency in the Crown's position at trial compared to a co-accused's guilty plea, and no compromise to trial fairness or judicial integrity.

The appellant appealed his conviction for attempted murder, arguing the trial judge failed to properly scrutinize eyewitness identification evidence alongside alternative suspect evidence, and erred in his treatment of the victim's prior descriptions.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge properly analyzed the identification and alternative suspect evidence holistically.

Although the trial judge erred in law by treating the victim's prior descriptions of the gunman's tattoos as admissible hearsay to prove their truth, the Court applied the curative proviso, finding the error harmless given the multiple, interlocking, and mutually reinforcing non-erroneous reasoning pathways that supported the conviction.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging trial judge errors in the jury charge regarding the W.(D.) instruction on consent and the consideration of absence of injury.

The Court of Appeal found no misdirection, affirming that the trial judge's consent instruction, read holistically, was not misleading, and that the absence of injury was not a contradiction given the complainant's testimony and lacked a common sense inference of injury from pain alone.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of first degree murder by a jury and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed.

On further appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, the majority allowed the appeal on the ground that the trial judge erred by failing to instruct the jury on the relevance and permitted use of evidence relating to the accused's mental health when charging on the element of intent for murder.

The majority found no error in the trial judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction regarding after-the-fact conduct evidence.

The conviction was set aside and a new trial ordered.

Kasirer J. dissented, finding the jury charge adequate in light of all the circumstances.

The appellant, D.W., appealed his conviction for sexual assault, sexual interference, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge erred in admitting improper reply evidence.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's decision to admit the reply evidence.

The court held that the appellant's testimony regarding compliance with bail conditions took on added significance, justifying the Crown's reply evidence.

The appellants, Dellen Millard and Mark Smich, appealed their convictions for the first-degree murder of Laura Babcock.

The Crown's theory was that Millard killed Babcock due to a love triangle, and Smich assisted him, including by incinerating her body.

The Court of Appeal dismissed all conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's jury instructions regarding reasonable doubt, party liability, after-the-fact conduct, or the use of rap lyrics as adopted admissions.

However, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Bissonnette, the court allowed the sentence appeals solely to quash the consecutive parole ineligibility periods imposed under s. 745.51 of the Criminal Code.

Dellen Millard and Mark Smich appealed their first-degree murder convictions for the death of Timothy Bosma.

The appeals raised issues concerning the admissibility and jury instructions on bad character evidence in a joint trial with antagonistic defences, jury instructions on planning and deliberation, and the propriety of closing addresses by the Crown and co-counsel.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's decisions regarding evidence admissibility, jury instructions, or the sufficiency of corrective instructions for closing arguments.

The appellant, a youth at the time of the offence, appealed his conviction for first-degree murder and his sentence as an adult to life imprisonment with a ten-year parole ineligibility period.

The conviction appeal raised issues regarding the admission of text messages, the reasonableness of the verdict, the lack of a Vetrovec warning, and jury instructions.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors by the trial judge and concluding the verdict was reasonable.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in relying on unproven aggravating factors to impose an adult sentence.

The Court of Appeal upheld the adult sentence, finding the Crown had rebutted the presumption of diminished moral blameworthiness and that a youth sentence would be insufficient to hold the appellant accountable.

The appellant, Dellen Millard, appealed his conviction for the murder of Wayne Millard and his sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no merit in his arguments regarding the unreasonableness of the verdict, including the trial judge's reliance on a dangerous witness, the sufficiency of alibi evidence, and cellphone findings.

The court upheld the trial judge's findings, emphasizing the overwhelming evidence supporting the conviction.

The sentence appeal was granted, and the s. 745.51 order was quashed, though the sentence otherwise remained intact.

The appellants were convicted of second degree murder and kidnapping after a missing cocaine shipment led to the execution-style killings of two men.

On appeal, they challenged the trial judge's jury instructions regarding prior discreditable conduct, a Vetrovec caution, a third-party suspect defence, and the elements of aiding.

One appellant also appealed the denial of a severance application and his 23-year parole ineligibility period.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible errors in the jury instructions or the refusal to sever the trials.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the parole ineligibility period was proportionate to the gravity of the offences.

The appellant was convicted of first-degree murder after strangling a man during a sexual encounter in a park.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the trial judge made several errors in the jury instructions, specifically regarding the required state of mind for murder, the appellant's mental health, intoxication, the application of reasonable doubt to exculpatory statements, and after-the-fact conduct.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the jury charge, when read as a whole and in the context of the trial, properly equipped the jury to decide the case and contained no reversible errors.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent for second-degree murder, where the trial judge found the respondent acted in self-defence.

The Crown argued the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider the whole of the evidence, making an unsupported factual finding, failing to undertake a contextualized reasonableness inquiry, and not considering the risk to third parties.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no overriding error in the trial judge's holistic consideration of evidence and self-defence factors, despite acknowledging a minor factual error that did not materially impact the verdict.

The court reiterated that appellate courts cannot reweigh evidence or hear appeals from unreasonable acquittals.

The appellant sought leave to appeal his sentence for second-degree murder, arguing that the sentencing judge erred in principle by equating his moral blameworthiness to that of a first-degree murder offender and made a palpable error in finding his mental illness played no contributing role.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the sentencing judge's assessment of high moral blameworthiness given the premeditated nature of the original plan to kill his ex-wife and the attack on her uncle.

The court also upheld the finding that the appellant failed to establish a causal link between his depression and the murder, noting shortcomings in the psychiatric evidence.

The appellant, Shawn Clyke, appealed his convictions for assault and assault causing bodily harm, arguing that the Crown's closing submissions at trial contained serious improprieties that rendered his trial unfair.

The Court of Appeal found that the Crown's closing submissions improperly invited the jury to engage in propensity reasoning, used inflammatory language to evoke sympathy for the complainant and revulsion for the accused, and attempted to bolster the complainant's credibility through unsupported theories and personal endorsement.

Despite the trial judge's corrective instructions, the cumulative effect of these improprieties was deemed to have prejudiced the appellant's right to a fair trial, particularly given the non-overwhelming nature of the Crown's case.

The appeal was allowed, convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Justice that had dismissed an application for certiorari.

The appellant sought certiorari to quash a provincial court judge's decision to commit him to trial on a charge of first-degree murder.

The Court of Appeal agreed with the application judge that there was a sufficient basis in the evidence for a properly instructed jury to convict on the charge.

The appellant, Jeremy Reddick, appealed his convictions for second degree murder and assault with a weapon, alleging errors in the trial judge's jury instructions concerning after-the-fact conduct, intoxication, and the permitted use of his spontaneous utterance "They jumped me." The Court of Appeal found that while some instructions could have been more thorough, they did not amount to reversible error or cause a substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice, particularly given the lack of objection at trial and the overall context of the case.

The appeal was dismissed.

Mitchell Dubros appealed the dismissal of his certiorari application, which sought to quash his committal for trial on a charge of obstructing justice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's decision, affirming that a preliminary inquiry judge's determination of evidentiary sufficiency is owed great deference.

The court held that there was "any evidence" to meet the threshold for committal, specifically evidence of threats made to dissuade witnesses, which constitutes obstruction of justice under s. 139(3) of the Criminal Code, and that the mental element of the offence was sufficiently established.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant, Siaka Camara, appealed his convictions for firearms offences and assault, and his global sentence of nine years imprisonment.

The appeal challenged the trial judge's admission of hearsay and bad character evidence, and the exclusion of an exculpatory utterance.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal from conviction, finding the evidence properly admitted or its admission caused no substantial wrong, and the appeal from sentence, finding no error in principle given the appellant's recidivism and the gravity of the offences.

The appellant appealed convictions for attempted murder, assault of a police officer with intent to resist arrest, and firearm offences.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeals for attempted murder and assault police, finding the trial judge erred in inferring specific intent for attempted murder given the circumstances (distance, lack of motive, possibility of unintended target) and erred in convicting for assault police based on recklessness rather than specific intent.

The firearm convictions were upheld.

The aggravated assault charge, previously stayed, was remitted to the trial judge for conviction and sentencing.

The appellant appealed his conviction for second degree murder following a fatal stabbing in his apartment building.

He argued the trial judge erred by admitting his statement to police as voluntary, alleging an oppressive atmosphere and improper inducements, and by providing an inadequate jury instruction on self-defence regarding his role as the initial aggressor.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the police conduct was not oppressive and the trial judge's jury instructions correctly equipped the jury to assess the reasonableness of the appellant's actions in self-defence.