Laura B. Stewart

The applicant insurer appealed an arbitrator’s decision concerning loss transfer reimbursement under s. 275 of the Insurance Act after paying statutory accident benefits to its insured following a motorcycle accident caused by the respondent insurer’s insured.

The arbitrator concluded that the applicant insurer had grossly mishandled the accident benefits file and unreasonably paid substantial benefits, including delayed insurer examinations and excessive settlement amounts.

As a result, the arbitrator reduced the amount recoverable from the respondent insurer.

The court held that the arbitrator’s findings involved mixed fact and law and were entitled to deference unless unreasonable.

Finding ample evidence supporting the arbitrator’s conclusions, the court declined to interfere and upheld the reduced indemnity award.

The defendants brought a motion to lift a stay imposed in 2001 pending determination of a right-to-sue application before the Workplace Safety and Insurance Appeals Tribunal and sought dismissal of the action for delay.

The self-represented plaintiff requested that the stay continue while she pursued reconsideration or judicial review of the tribunal decision.

The court held that the stay should be lifted because the tribunal decision constituted a final determination and further proceedings should not delay the civil action.

However, despite the long history of delay, the court declined to dismiss the action, finding that the existing documentary record would permit a fair trial and that the defendants had consented to the stay and delayed bringing the motion.

The action was restored to the trial list with expedited pre-trial and trial dates.

The applicant sought an interim costs order under Rule 24(12) of the Family Law Rules requiring the respondent to advance funds for anticipated questioning and litigation expenses relating to spousal support and property equalization claims.

The court emphasized that the discretion to award interim costs must be exercised to ensure procedural fairness and a level playing field.

The court found the applicant failed to demonstrate financial need or provide sufficient evidence of anticipated legal expenses.

Evidence showed the applicant was receiving spousal support, benefitting from a partner’s contribution to household expenses, had taken a recent vacation, and had chosen to return to school instead of seeking full-time employment.

In the absence of detailed cost estimates or a bill of costs, the court declined to order interim costs but left open the possibility of a renewed motion with fuller evidence.

The defendants moved to vary a previously granted Mareva injunction that capped restrained assets at $1.6 million, seeking removal of certain real properties from the injunction based on updated valuation evidence.

The plaintiff did not dispute the valuations but raised concerns regarding outstanding mortgages on some properties and sought to restructure the injunction so that it first applied to one defendant’s assets before reaching another’s.

The court accepted evidence that the mortgages were either discharged or easily dischargeable and concluded that the total value of remaining restrained assets exceeded the $1.6 million cap.

The injunction was varied to permit mortgage discharges and to remove specified properties from the schedule while maintaining sufficient assets under restraint.

The plaintiff’s cross-motion to prioritize enforcement against particular defendants’ assets was dismissed.

The plaintiff contractor sued a corporation and its director for breach of contract arising from unpaid plumbing and drainage services.

The parties had orally settled the debt by reducing the amount owed and arranging repayment through a loan amortization schedule, but no written settlement agreement or personal guarantee was executed.

The plaintiff alleged the director personally guaranteed repayment of the corporate debt.

The court found the evidence did not establish that the director promised a personal guarantee.

In any event, any such oral guarantee would be unenforceable under s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds because it was not in writing and signed.

In a supplementary endorsement following earlier reasons, the court addressed issues arising from submissions on costs in a garnishment proceeding.

The parties disputed whether certain payments constituted “wages” under the Wages Act, which would significantly affect the amount of judgment potentially recoverable through garnishment and the proportionality considerations relevant to costs.

The court directed the parties to address whether the characterization issue could be determined by a Master on reference or should be decided immediately by the judge.

Counsel were instructed to confer and advise whether they could agree on the issues or wished to provide written submissions or argue the matter in open court.

The plaintiff, a Toronto lawyer and community volunteer, brought a defamation action against a newspaper and journalist over an article questioning transparency in the handling of donations from a charity concert organized to raise funds for victims of the 2008 Sichuan earthquake.

The court held that, read in context, the article did not convey a defamatory meaning about the plaintiff.

In any event, the defendants established the defences of substantial truth, fair comment on a matter of public interest, and responsible communication.

The court also found no evidence of malice and concluded that the plaintiff had not proven any meaningful reputational harm.

A judgment creditor brought a motion seeking payment from a garnishee under a notice of garnishment relating to funds earned by a judgment debtor through sales activities.

The garnishee argued that the debtor did not work for it but rather for a separate corporate entity operating from the same premises.

The court held that the evidence demonstrated the debtor effectively worked for the garnishee by selling its products using its systems and receiving payment for those sales.

As garnishment is an equitable remedy, the court found that the garnishee could not avoid the creditor’s judgment by structuring the relationship through another entity.

Judgment was granted against the garnishee for payments made during the garnishment period, with an accounting ordered to determine the precise amount owing.

The plaintiff sought continuation of a Mareva injunction freezing assets in a civil fraud action alleging an international investment scheme involving silicon germanium transactions.

The defendants opposed continuation of the injunction, sought to expunge FINTRAC materials and a U.S. criminal complaint from the motion record, and alternatively requested that the plaintiff post security for the undertaking as to damages.

The court held that hearsay evidence contained in a U.S. criminal complaint was admissible on a motion under Rule 39.01(4) and that the FINTRAC report was properly disclosed through the RCMP and was both relevant and admissible.

The court found a strong prima facie case of fraud, a risk of dissipation of assets, and no material non‑disclosure.

The Mareva injunction was continued and no order for security was imposed.

Following a 20‑day trial in which the plaintiffs obtained judgment exceeding $2.3 million against their insurance broker for failure to procure appropriate coverage, the court determined issues relating to the calculation of the judgment, costs, and interest.

The plaintiffs had delivered a Rule 49 offer to settle for $1.95 million plus interest and costs, which was less than the amount ultimately awarded at trial.

Applying Rule 49.10 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to partial indemnity costs up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity costs thereafter.

Considering proportionality, the conduct of the parties, the length of the trial, and duplication arising from a change of counsel, the court reduced the plaintiffs’ claimed costs and fixed total costs at $475,000 plus disbursements.

The plaintiff appealed a master's order striking portions of his statement of claim that referenced information and documents arising from a police public complaint investigation.

The defendants cross‑appealed the refusal to strike additional paragraphs and the decision not to award costs.

The court held that sections 83 and 95 of the Police Services Act render information and documents generated through the public complaints process privileged and inadmissible in civil proceedings.

The master correctly applied the statutory confidentiality provisions and relevant authority in striking the impugned allegations while allowing certain contextual paragraphs to remain.

Both the appeal and cross‑appeal were dismissed.

The applicant sought an order under the Partition Act compelling the sale of jointly held commercial property.

The respondents resisted, arguing that broader litigation between the parties concerning their business relationship and compensation was already underway and was inextricably connected to the ownership and financial treatment of the property.

The court held that although co‑owners generally have a prima facie right to compel partition or sale, such relief should not be granted where related disputes affecting entitlement remain to be determined.

Because the property formed part of wider disputes over compensation and corporate interests among former business associates, the court concluded that determining the sale issue in isolation would be inappropriate.

The application was consolidated with the existing actions so the property issue could be resolved alongside the broader disputes.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order requiring a bank to restore funds removed from a frozen account after the bank allowed the freeze to lapse.

The plaintiffs relied on Rule 60.11(9) of the Rules of Civil Procedure and the court’s inherent jurisdiction to compel restoration of the account to its prior state.

The court held that the requested relief could not be granted on a summary motion because the bank was not a defendant in the action and issues such as duty of care, causation, and potential set-off would require a full civil proceeding.

The court concluded that the appropriate remedies would be a contempt motion or a separate action for damages.

The motion was therefore dismissed without prejudice to pursuing those remedies.

Following a prior finding of civil contempt for breaching a court order, the court addressed the appropriate sanction for the contemnor.

The moving parties sought incarceration, arguing that a monetary penalty would have little practical effect.

The court emphasized that imprisonment for civil contempt is a remedy of last resort and considered mitigating factors including the contemnor’s written and in‑person apology and stated willingness to make restitution.

A suspended sentence was imposed with conditions including compliance with all court orders, fulfillment of undertakings in the apology letter, community service, and surrender of firearms.

Homeowners sued their insurance broker alleging negligence and breach of contract after a burglary resulted in the theft of a safe containing jewellery and cash exceeding insurance policy limits.

The broker had placed policies that limited jewellery coverage to $10,000 without advising the plaintiffs of the limitation or recommending additional coverage.

The court held that an insurance broker who assumes responsibility for a client’s insurance program must review the client’s circumstances, identify coverage gaps, and advise on available insurance products.

The broker failed to meet the standard of care by not conducting a proper review, failing to warn of jewellery coverage limits, and failing to recommend scheduling valuable items.

The court found that the plaintiffs would have obtained adequate coverage if properly advised and rejected arguments of contributory negligence.

Damages were assessed based on the coverage that likely would have been obtained, subject to deductions for premiums and amounts already paid.

Two plaintiffs brought motions for summary judgment in related actions alleging breach of oral contracts for the provision of equipment and personnel for municipal snow removal services.

The plaintiffs asserted that the agreements were fixed‑term contracts for five years that were prematurely terminated, while the defendants argued the arrangements were terminable at will.

The court found the evidentiary record contained significant conflicts regarding the formation and terms of the alleged oral agreements, the circumstances of termination, and issues of damages and mitigation.

Questions of credibility and potential personal liability of corporate principals also required factual assessment.

The court held that these genuine issues for trial made the actions unsuitable for summary judgment.

The defendant psychologist brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a professional negligence claim arising from a psychological assessment conducted for litigation purposes.

The plaintiff alleged negligent misdiagnosis and damages stemming from being labelled as suffering from a delusional disorder.

The court held that professional negligence claims require qualified expert evidence establishing the applicable standard of care and causation.

The plaintiff relied on reports from individuals not qualified to provide expert opinions on the standard of care of a psychologist practising in Ontario and none addressed breach or causation.

In the absence of admissible expert evidence, the claim had no reasonable prospect of success and was dismissed.

The respondents in an application for assessment of solicitors’ accounts brought a motion to consolidate that application with a related action seeking payment of outstanding legal accounts and enforcement of a retainer agreement.

The moving parties argued consolidation under Rule 6.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure would avoid multiplicity of proceedings because both matters involved overlapping issues relating to the retainer agreement and the accounts rendered.

The court held that the issues raised in the assessment application were comparatively straightforward and could be determined efficiently through the application process rather than a lengthy trial.

Consolidation would likely create delay and additional expense and would undermine the expeditious process contemplated for assessments under the Solicitors Act.

The motion to consolidate was therefore dismissed.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking orders authorizing a receiver to take possession of a residential property, evict occupants, and secure the property following findings of fraud in earlier proceedings.

A responding party brought cross-motions seeking a declaration that the property constituted a matrimonial home under the Family Law Act and requesting related relief to prevent enforcement against the property.

The court held that the transfer of the property to the responding party had already been determined at trial to be a fraudulent conveyance intended to defeat creditors, and that the responding party could not reopen factual issues after declining to testify or adduce evidence at trial.

The court further found that the responding party had consented to the mortgage transactions and that the Family Law Act did not protect the property from the plaintiffs’ tracing remedies arising from fraudulently obtained funds.

The motion was granted and the cross-motions were dismissed.

The Attorney-General sought forfeiture of insurance proceeds under the Civil Remedies Act, 2001 following the killing of the insured by the beneficiary, who had been found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder.

The court held that the insurance proceeds constituted property acquired as a result of unlawful activity within the meaning of the statute because they became payable as a consequence of the killing.

However, the court concluded that ordering forfeiture would be clearly not in the interests of justice.

Given the absence of moral blameworthiness associated with a finding of not criminally responsible, the lack of deterrent value, and the respondent’s personal circumstances, forfeiture would be manifestly harsh.

The application for forfeiture was therefore dismissed.