Kirk W. Munroe

This case involves a custody dispute over two children, aged 12 and 9, between their biological mother and their aunt and uncle who had cared for them for seven years.

The applicants (aunt and uncle) sought sole custody, while the respondent (biological mother) sought the return of her children.

The court applied the "best interests of the child" principle under the Children's Law Reform Act, considering factors such as emotional ties, children's preferences, stability of the home environment, and parenting ability.

The court found the applicants provided a stable home and the children preferred to remain with them.

The respondent's credibility and stability were questioned.

The court granted sole custody to the aunt and uncle, established a detailed access schedule for the mother, and ordered her to pay child support and a share of special expenses.

The court also maintained a previous order prohibiting the mother from engaging the children in activities contrary to the applicants' religious beliefs during access, finding her motivation to be spiteful rather than religious education.

The plaintiff, Dan Bailey, brought a wrongful dismissal action against his former employer, Milo-Food & Agricultural Infrastructure & Services Inc., and its CEO, Geetu Pathak, after receiving two years' working notice of termination.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim, arguing that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were statute-barred as the limitation period commenced on the date notice was given (March 18, 2013), not the last day worked (March 22, 2015).

The court granted the motion in part, holding that the wrongful dismissal and severance pay claims were indeed statute-barred, consistent with established jurisprudence that the limitation period begins when notice of termination is received.

However, claims for intentional infliction of mental distress and human rights violations were not struck, as they were based on ongoing conduct throughout the notice period and thus fell within the limitation period.

The plaintiffs, former employees of an automobile dealership, sued police and others for damages after a criminal investigation led to the dealership's closure and their job loss.

The defendants moved for an order striking out the plaintiffs’ Statements of Claim.

The court dismissed the negligent investigation claim, finding no private law duty of care owed by police to employees of a suspect.

It granted leave to amend for civil conspiracy and misfeasance in public office claims, but struck other intentional tort claims without leave.

The accused, charged with serious criminal driving offences following a fatal train-minivan collision, brought a motion for a stay of proceedings alleging multiple breaches of ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter.

The accused argued that the Crown and police failed to preserve evidence, including a witness statement, train black box data, train video, the minivan, and a 911 call recording.

The accused also alleged pre-charge delay, late disclosure, and reliance on faulty expert evidence.

The court systematically reviewed each allegation, applying the tests for lost evidence and abuse of process.

The court found no unacceptable negligence by the police or Crown, noting that much of the evidence was never in their possession or was lost in the normal course of business by third parties.

The court concluded there was no prejudice to the accused's right to a fair trial and dismissed the motion.

The accused was driving a minivan with his four children when he failed to stop at a railway crossing and collided with a freight train.

Two of his children died and a third suffered serious injuries.

The accused was charged with criminal negligence and dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death and bodily harm.

The court found that while the accused's conduct did not amount to the wanton or reckless disregard required for criminal negligence, his failure to heed warning signs and stop for the visible and audible train constituted a marked departure from the standard of care.

The accused was found guilty of dangerous operation of a motor vehicle causing death and bodily harm.

The accused was arrested for sexual assault.

At the police station, officers conducted a warrantless penile swab search while the accused was completely naked, without readvising him of his right to counsel.

The accused brought a motion to exclude the DNA evidence obtained from the swab, alleging violations of his rights under ss. 8 and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found that while a penile swab can be a lawful search incident to arrest, the manner of the search violated s. 8 due to lack of privacy, unnecessary complete nudity, and poor record-keeping.

The court also found a s. 10(b) violation because the police failed to provide the accused with an additional opportunity to consult counsel before conducting the new, non-routine penile swab procedure.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court concluded that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute and excluded the penile swab evidence.

The accused was charged with possession of child pornography after his roommate discovered illicit images on his computer and turned the computer and several disks over to the police on multiple occasions.

The accused brought a motion to exclude the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, arguing that the police conducted unlawful warrantless seizures, that the roommate acted as a police agent, and that the subsequent search warrants were invalid.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the warrantless seizures were authorized by common law and statute, the roommate acted independently and not as a state agent, and the search warrants were validly issued with sufficient specificity and reasonable grounds.

During a trial for possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking, the Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert witness on the consumption and distribution of fentanyl.

The defence challenged the officer's admissibility, arguing a lack of necessity, qualifications, and independence due to his involvement in the execution of a search warrant in the case.

Applying the Mohan and White Burgess frameworks, the court found the officer was qualified and capable of fulfilling his duty to the court, given his minor role in the investigation.

The officer was accepted as an expert, but prohibited from opining on the ultimate issue of whether the accused possessed the drugs for the purpose of trafficking.

During a criminal trial for trafficking in a controlled substance and possession of property obtained by crime, the Crown sought to qualify a police officer as an expert in street drug slang.

The defence challenged the admissibility of the proposed expert evidence on the basis of lack of independence and inadequate expertise linking slang terms to specific controlled substances.

Applying the Mohan framework and the Supreme Court’s guidance in White Burgess, the court found that although the officer possessed experience with drug slang, his substantial involvement in the investigation created a realistic concern about his ability to act as an independent and impartial expert.

The court concluded that the Crown failed to establish the independence requirement on a balance of probabilities.

The proposed expert evidence was therefore excluded.