Sexual assault

The appellant appealed his sexual assault conviction, arguing the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding his semen found on a towel worn by the complainant.

The appellant claimed the semen was present because he was having an affair with the complainant's mother, who used the towel to clean him.

The trial judge rejected this evidence, finding no affair existed and the explanation implausible.

The Court of Appeal found no misapprehension of evidence, concluding the trial judge's findings were open to her and the inconsistencies regarding the towel's location did not undermine the DNA evidence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a home invasion at a university residence and sentenced to nine years' imprisonment.

On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred in jury selection, misdirected the jury on reasonable doubt, and that the verdict was unreasonable.

He also appealed his sentence, arguing the trial judge misapprehended an expert opinion on his likelihood of re-offending.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's jury screening or instructions, and upheld the sentence as eminently fit given the gravity of the offence and the appellant's extensive criminal record.

The appellant appealed his jury convictions for sexual assault and assault against his spouse.

He argued the trial judge erred by failing to give a limiting instruction regarding evidence of his controlling behaviour and by failing to caution against cross-count reasoning.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the contextual evidence was relevant to the issue of consent and that a cross-count reasoning caution was unnecessary because the physical and sexual assaults were inextricably linked.

The appellant appealed his conviction and sentence for sexual assault.

The trial judge had accepted the seven-year-old complainant's evidence despite inconsistencies, relying on the child's description of the assault and his subsequent protective behaviour.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no misapplication of the law and holding that the trial judge's credibility findings were entitled to deference.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the trial judge made no error in principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual exploitation, sexual assault, and uttering a threat, arguing the trial judge made three errors in the jury charge.

The appellant contended the trial judge failed to provide a Villaroman instruction regarding circumstantial evidence, failed to instruct on a motive to fabricate, and failed to instruct that the accused did not have to explain the complainant's motives.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that a Villaroman instruction was not required as the case was not wholly or substantially circumstantial, and that the trial judge properly instructed the jury on the burden of proof without reversing it.

The Crown appealed a 5.5-month conditional sentence imposed on the respondent for the sexual assault of an intoxicated, sleeping complainant.

The trial judge had imposed the conditional sentence largely to avoid collateral immigration consequences that would trigger the respondent's deportation.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by failing to properly weigh deterrence and denunciation, and by using immigration consequences to impose a sentence outside the appropriate range.

The sentence was varied to 5.5 months of incarceration, though the respondent was not required to serve further time as the conditional sentence had already been completed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of sexual interference and incest against his daughter.

The offences occurred over a five-year period starting when the victim was eight years old, involving approximately 50 incidents of sexual intercourse accompanied by violence and threats.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence, noting the profound breach of trust and severe psychological impact on the victim.

The offender was sentenced to 8 years' imprisonment, reduced to 93 months after credit for pre-trial custody, along with ancillary orders including a life weapons prohibition and SOIRA registration.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against his 20-year-old step-daughter.

The allegations arose from an incident where the accused gave the complainant a massage, during which he allegedly touched her private parts without consent.

The court assessed the credibility of the complainant, the accused, and the accused's wife.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be credible and reliable, while rejecting the accused's denials due to inconsistencies, poor memory, and collaboration with his wife.

The accused was found guilty of sexual assault.

The accused, an adult firefighter, was charged with sexual assault and sexual interference against the 14-year-old daughter of a fellow firefighter.

The Crown relied on the complainant's testimony and electronic communications between the parties.

The court found significant inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence, particularly when contrasted with the testimony of her friend, an independent witness.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court concluded that while the accused's denials were not entirely credible, the totality of the evidence left a reasonable doubt.

The accused was acquitted on all counts.

The applicant, a professional photographer charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation involving four aspiring models, applied to sever the counts so they could be tried separately.

The Crown intended to bring a similar fact application.

The court found that three of the complainants alleged severe conduct (intercourse and vaginal touching) and were allegedly connected through the applicant's former partner, making a joint trial appropriate.

However, the fourth complainant alleged less severe conduct (touching breasts), had no connection to the others, and the applicant did not intend to testify in her case.

The court severed the fourth complainant's case from the other three to prevent undue prejudice and protect the applicant's right to silence.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting the complainant following a drug deal gone wrong.

Both the accused and the complainant were crack cocaine users and provided conflicting accounts of the events, with the accused denying the assault and claiming a panic attack prevented consensual sex.

The court applied the W.(D.) framework to assess credibility and found significant reliability issues with both principal witnesses' testimonies, including inconsistencies in the complainant's account and delayed disclosure.

Ultimately, the court concluded the evidence was sufficiently unreliable to prove the allegations beyond a reasonable doubt, resulting in an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his summary convictions for sexual assault, assault, and mischief, arguing the trial judge misapprehended the evidence and reversed the burden of proof.

The Superior Court of Justice found that the trial judge made several material misapprehensions of the evidence that were central to his negative assessment of the appellant's credibility.

The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering, abduction, sexual assault, and sexual interference after a five-year-old child was taken from her grandparents' home in the middle of the night and assaulted in a nearby backyard.

The case was entirely circumstantial, relying heavily on DNA evidence found on the child's pyjama top and the flight path of the suspect.

The defence argued that the child's father or a neighbour committed the offences, pointing to the child's out-of-court statements implicating her father.

The court applied the W.(D.) principles, rejected the alternative suspect theories, and found that the DNA and circumstantial evidence proved the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused, an anesthesiologist, was charged with 21 counts of sexual assault against female patients under his care during surgeries.

The Crown alleged that the accused used the cover of surgical draping and the patients' state of conscious sedation to commit the assaults undetected.

The defence argued that the assaults were physically impossible, could not have occurred without detection, and that the patients' memories were unreliable due to drug-induced hallucinations.

The court rejected the defence arguments, finding that the accused had the opportunity to commit the offences and that the drugs administered do not cause sexual hallucinations.

Relying on the objective improbability of coincidence as similar fact evidence, the court found the accused guilty on all 21 counts.

The accused was charged with sexual assault and sexual exploitation of his 16-year-old daughter.

The complainant testified that she awoke to her father sexually assaulting her after a night of drinking.

The accused denied the allegations, claiming he was elsewhere in the house and that incriminating Facebook messages sent from his account were authored by someone else.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court rejected the accused's evidence as not credible, accepted the complainant's evidence, and found the accused guilty on both counts.

The accused applicant sought extraordinary relief to quash a preliminary inquiry into a sexual assault charge and have it recommence before a different judge.

The applicant argued the preliminary inquiry judge created a reasonable apprehension of bias by expressing a tentative view on the sufficiency of the evidence and then continuing the inquiry as a discovery in his absence.

The Superior Court granted the application, finding that while expressing a tentative view alone does not create bias, proceeding as a discovery immediately afterward gave the appearance of a firm view.

Furthermore, the court held that under the Criminal Code, a preliminary inquiry judge must be present to hear the evidence and cannot allow the inquiry to proceed in their absence without consent.

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against a friend of his daughter.

The Crown conceded there was insufficient evidence for one count, resulting in an acquittal.

On the remaining count, the complainant alleged the accused provided her with alcohol until she was highly intoxicated and then sexually assaulted her at his camp.

The accused denied the allegations.

Applying the W. (D.) framework for assessing credibility, the trial judge found the complainant's evidence problematic and contradicted by the agreed statement of facts from the accused's daughter.

The court concluded the Crown failed to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and acquitted the accused.

The appellant, a store manager, was convicted of sexually assaulting a 16-year-old employee.

He appealed the conviction, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were deficient and failed to explain why his evidence was rejected and the complainant's evidence was accepted.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court agreed, finding that the trial judge's reasons were largely conclusory, misapprehended important defence evidence, and failed to address significant inconsistencies in the complainant's testimony.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The accused was charged with one count of sexual assault following an incident at his apartment.

The complainant alleged that the accused forced intercourse and digitally penetrated her, while the accused denied any sexual contact, claiming he only physically struggled to remove her from his home.

The court assessed the credibility of both parties, applying the W.(D.) framework.

Relying on the complainant's credible testimony, corroborating physical evidence including damage to the apartment, and DNA evidence linking the accused to a condom found at the scene, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault.

The Crown brought a pre-trial application under s. 714.1 of the Criminal Code to allow the complainant to testify by video link.

The charges of sexual assault and uttering death threats dated back to 1996.

The accused had caused approximately 16 years of delay by fleeing the country and repeatedly changing counsel.

The complainant, who had attended previous preliminary hearings and trial dates, refused to attend in person again.

The court granted the application, finding that the exceptional history of delay caused by the accused justified permitting the video link testimony to ensure the trial could proceed on its merits.