J. Penman

The defendants were convicted of recklessly discharging a restricted firearm, and one defendant was additionally convicted of drug trafficking and other firearm offences.

The court determined that the five-year mandatory minimum penalty applied to the discharge offence.

After considering aggravating factors, mitigating factors including harsh pre-sentence custody conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre, and the principle of totality, the court sentenced Mr. Jama to five years (reduced to four years, three months, and three weeks after credit) and Mr. Farah to a total of six years and 10.5 months (reduced to two years less a day after credit, plus probation).

The five defendants were charged with numerous offences including drug trafficking, firearms possession, discharging a firearm, and criminal organization offences arising from a lengthy police investigation known as Project Patton.

The Crown relied heavily on intercepted communications.

The court found several defendants guilty of various drug trafficking and firearms possession charges, as well as discharging a firearm in relation to a March 24, 2018 shooting.

However, the court acquitted the defendants of attempted murder, the April 30, 2018 shooting, and the criminal organization charges, finding insufficient evidence of structure to constitute a criminal organization and reasonable doubt regarding the identity of the shooter in the April incident.

The accused, charged with first-degree murder, brought an application to adduce evidence of a third-party suspect.

The defence sought to call witnesses and introduce video surveillance to establish that another resident of the victim's building had animus, motive, and opportunity to commit the murder.

The court applied the McMillan test and found that the proposed evidence established a sufficient connection between the third party and the crime.

The application was granted, as the probative value of the evidence outweighed its slight prejudicial effect.

The applicant sought certiorari to quash his committal to stand trial on charges including robbery and firearms offences.

The sole issue was the sufficiency of the eyewitness identification evidence.

The principal witness had only a brief, dark observation of the assailants while intoxicated, and her subsequent in-dock identification was tainted by prior conversations and a flawed photo line-up.

The Superior Court found that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded her jurisdiction by committing the applicant to trial where the identification evidence was so frail and uncertain that it amounted to no evidence at all.

The application was granted and the committal was quashed.

The accused was charged with break and enter, child abduction, sexual assault, and sexual interference arising from the nighttime abduction of a child from a residence.

On a voir dire, the defence challenged the admissibility of DNA samples and two police statements, alleging breaches of ss. 7, 8, and 10(b) of the Charter and arguing the statements were involuntary.

The court found the accused was not psychologically detained during the initial police interview and that his statement and consent DNA sample were voluntary and informed.

The court also held there were no Charter breaches in relation to counsel rights or the right to silence during the later custodial interview.

Both the statements and DNA evidence were ruled admissible.

The accused was charged with breaking and entering, abduction, sexual assault, and sexual interference after a five-year-old child was taken from her grandparents' home in the middle of the night and assaulted in a nearby backyard.

The case was entirely circumstantial, relying heavily on DNA evidence found on the child's pyjama top and the flight path of the suspect.

The defence argued that the child's father or a neighbour committed the offences, pointing to the child's out-of-court statements implicating her father.

The court applied the W.(D.) principles, rejected the alternative suspect theories, and found that the DNA and circumstantial evidence proved the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

Following guilty pleas to sexual interference, child luring, and making child pornography involving a 15‑year‑old complainant, the Crown sought a dangerous offender designation and indeterminate detention.

Extensive psychiatric and psychological evidence established that the offender suffered from antisocial personality disorder with psychopathic traits, severe substance dependence, and a high actuarial risk of violent and sexual recidivism.

The court found the offence of sexual interference constituted a serious personal injury offence and that the offender demonstrated a pattern of repetitive behaviour showing failure to restrain conduct and a likelihood of causing injury or severe psychological harm in the future.

Although one statutory pathway for dangerous offender status based on persistent aggressive behaviour was not proven, the criteria under s. 753(1)(a)(i) of the Criminal Code were satisfied.

The court concluded that neither a determinate sentence nor a long‑term supervision order would adequately protect the public and imposed an indeterminate sentence.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the killing of his intimate partner.

The court was required to determine the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, considering the offender’s character, the circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendation.

The evidence established that the offender repeatedly struck the victim with a baseball bat in her home and subsequently attempted to access her bank account while leaving her gravely injured.

Aggravating factors included the brutality of the attack, the breach of trust in an intimate relationship, and the offender’s post‑offence conduct.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for fifteen years.

During a jury trial for murder, the defence sought to cross‑examine the deceased’s daughters about threatening phone calls, visits by unidentified individuals, and safety precautions allegedly taken due to the accused’s drug‑related associations.

The defence argued the evidence was relevant to show animus against the accused and challenge the credibility of their testimony regarding the relationship between the accused and the deceased.

The Crown objected, arguing the questioning was an indirect attempt to introduce previously excluded third‑party suspect evidence.

The court held that while defence evidence may be excluded only where its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its probative value, the proposed cross‑examination carried a significant risk of inviting the jury to speculate that unidentified drug associates committed the murder.

The court therefore ruled the prejudicial effect outweighed the limited probative value and prohibited the cross‑examination.

During a murder trial, the defence advised that the accused intended to testify that he witnessed another individual commit the killing.

The defence argued that such evidence could be introduced without a formal third-party suspect application, relying on appellate authority concerning direct confessions by third parties.

The Crown submitted that the anticipated testimony should have been raised during the earlier third-party suspect application already dismissed by the court.

The court held that the law was unclear as to whether the rule permitting direct evidence of a third party’s confession without a formal application extends to testimony by an accused alleging another person committed the offence.

The judge indicated a preliminary inclination to permit the evidence but required the defence to provide a written outline of the proposed allegations to be put to the third party to ensure a sufficient nexus existed before making a final ruling.

In a second‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce multiple autopsy photographs depicting the deceased’s injuries.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly graphic and unnecessary given admissions regarding the cause of death, the injuries, and the expert pathologist’s conclusions.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis described in R. v. P.(R.) and R. v. Handy, the court held that several close‑up images of the head and face were extremely graphic and their probative value was diminished by the defence’s proposed admissions.

Those photographs were excluded, while less prejudicial images illustrating the body’s condition and certain injuries were admitted to assist the pathologist’s testimony.

The ruling balanced the evidentiary value of visual evidence against the risk of reasoning prejudice for the jury.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit antemortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding the accused’s drug use, theft, and deterioration of their relationship, as well as evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under traditional state-of-mind exceptions and the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability under authorities including R. v. Khelawon.

Most statements from close family members and trusted confidants were admitted as evidence of the deceased’s state of mind and the relationship context relevant to motive and identity.

Statements from casual acquaintances lacking sufficient indicia of reliability were excluded.

Evidence of the accused’s drug use and related conduct was largely admitted as contextual relationship evidence, while certain items, including a prior push and some duplicative or prejudicial evidence, were excluded.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to adduce evidence suggesting that two third parties were responsible for the killing.

The court considered whether the proposed evidence established a sufficient nexus between the third parties and the offence to meet the “air of reality” threshold for third‑party suspect evidence.

Applying the principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court held that there was no evidence of motive, opportunity, propensity, or other connection linking the proposed suspects to the homicide.

The alleged inconsistencies in their statements and cell phone records did not reasonably support an inference of involvement and amounted only to speculation.

The application to introduce third‑party suspect evidence was dismissed.

Sentencing of three defendants involved in a drug project investigation.

Quan Chan Lao pleaded guilty to multiple counts of trafficking and conspiracy to traffic cocaine and methamphetamine, receiving a net global sentence of 5 years and 11 months after pre-trial custody credit.

Joseph Nestorovski was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic 1 kilogram of cocaine and sentenced to 6 years imprisonment.

Khuan Minh Mac was found guilty of conspiracy to traffic 2 kilograms of methamphetamine and sentenced to 7 years imprisonment.

The court emphasized denunciation and deterrence for serious drug offences.

The defendants applied for leave to cross-examine the affiant and sub-affiant on an application for authorization to intercept private communications, in the context of a Garofoli challenge.

They argued that investigative necessity had not been established and that police prematurely resorted to wiretap authorizations instead of pursuing conventional investigative techniques such as surveillance, informant development, and tracking orders.

The Crown opposed the request, submitting that the authorization materials fully described the investigative steps taken and that cross-examination was unnecessary.

The court held that there was no basis to permit cross-examination, noting there was no suggestion the affiant misled the authorizing judge and that the Garofoli review would proceed based on the existing materials.

The application for cross-examination was dismissed.

The accused brought an application seeking a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter after approximately 34.5 months in custody awaiting trial on multiple drug and firearm trafficking charges arising from a large multi‑accused investigation.

Applying the framework from R. v. Morin and R. v. Askov, the court examined the allocation of delay between inherent time, defence actions, Crown conduct, and institutional delay.

The court found the prosecution involved complex multi‑accused proceedings, extensive disclosure, a preliminary inquiry including a Dawson application challenging wiretap authorizations, and multiple defence‑initiated adjournments and counsel changes.

Institutional delay was determined to be within acceptable limits and much of the elapsed time was attributable to inherent or defence‑related factors.

The applicant failed to establish significant prejudice beyond the normal hardships of pre‑trial custody.

The application for a stay of proceedings was therefore dismissed.

The accused was charged with first degree murder after stabbing his landlord to death.

The sole issue at trial was whether the accused should be found not criminally responsible (NCR) on account of mental disorder under section 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Two forensic psychiatrists testified that the accused suffered from paranoid schizophrenia or a delusional disorder, and that his actions were driven by persecutory delusions.

The court applied the test from R. v. Oommen and concluded that, on a balance of probabilities, the accused's mental illness prevented him from knowing that his actions were morally wrong at the time of the offence.

The accused was found not criminally responsible.