B. Juriansz

The appellant appealed her conviction for 'over 80' impaired driving.

She was pulled over and the officer smelled alcohol, but delayed making an Approved Screening Device (ASD) demand for 13 minutes until confirming a device was available, resulting in a total 22-minute delay before the test was administered.

The summary conviction appeal judge found the trial judge erred in concluding the test was administered 'forthwith' under s. 254(2) of the Criminal Code.

The delay resulted in breaches of the appellant's rights under ss. 8, 9, 10(a), and 10(b) of the Charter.

Additionally, the police's failure to preserve in-car camera footage breached her s. 7 right to disclosure.

Applying the Grant framework, the appeal judge excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), set aside the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol concentration over 80 mg.

He argued his s. 10(b) Charter rights were violated because police did not inform him he could consult duty counsel in his native language, Vietnamese, despite objective signs of his limited English comprehension.

The Superior Court of Justice found that 'special circumstances' existed, triggering an obligation for police to inform the appellant of his right to access counsel in his language of choice.

The failure to do so constituted a s. 10(b) breach.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under s. 24(2), allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and entered an acquittal.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for operating a motor vehicle with blood alcohol exceeding the legal limit following a RIDE stop.

The trial judge excluded breath test results under s.24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of ss.8 and 9 because the officer had not personally self-tested the approved screening device before administering the roadside test.

On appeal, the court held that the trial judge erred in concluding that the officer lacked reasonable grounds and that a self-test of the device was not a legal requirement.

The appellate court further held that the trial judge misapplied the framework in R. v. Grant when excluding reliable breath evidence.

The appeal was allowed, the breath test evidence admitted, and a conviction entered with the matter remitted for sentencing.

The Crown appealed an acquittal for impaired operation of a motor vehicle, arguing that the trial judge improperly relied on a roadside statement by the accused to explain erratic driving observed by police.

The reviewing court assumed, without deciding, that the trial judge may have made improper use of the statement.

However, the Crown failed to meet the heavy burden of demonstrating that any such error could reasonably have affected the verdict.

The evidence of impairment was equivocal and key alleged indicators were not supported by cruiser video evidence.

The acquittal was therefore affirmed.

The offender was convicted by a jury of second degree murder in the killing of his intimate partner.

The court was required to determine the appropriate period of parole ineligibility under ss. 745 and 745.4 of the Criminal Code, considering the offender’s character, the circumstances of the offence, and the jury’s recommendation.

The evidence established that the offender repeatedly struck the victim with a baseball bat in her home and subsequently attempted to access her bank account while leaving her gravely injured.

Aggravating factors included the brutality of the attack, the breach of trust in an intimate relationship, and the offender’s post‑offence conduct.

Balancing aggravating and mitigating factors, the court imposed life imprisonment with parole ineligibility for fifteen years.

During a murder trial, the defence sought to adduce evidence suggesting that two third parties were responsible for the killing.

The court considered whether the proposed evidence established a sufficient nexus between the third parties and the offence to meet the “air of reality” threshold for third‑party suspect evidence.

Applying the principles from Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence, the court held that there was no evidence of motive, opportunity, propensity, or other connection linking the proposed suspects to the homicide.

The alleged inconsistencies in their statements and cell phone records did not reasonably support an inference of involvement and amounted only to speculation.

The application to introduce third‑party suspect evidence was dismissed.

In a second‑degree murder trial, the Crown sought to introduce multiple autopsy photographs depicting the deceased’s injuries.

The defence objected, arguing the photographs were highly graphic and unnecessary given admissions regarding the cause of death, the injuries, and the expert pathologist’s conclusions.

Applying the probative value versus prejudicial effect analysis described in R. v. P.(R.) and R. v. Handy, the court held that several close‑up images of the head and face were extremely graphic and their probative value was diminished by the defence’s proposed admissions.

Those photographs were excluded, while less prejudicial images illustrating the body’s condition and certain injuries were admitted to assist the pathologist’s testimony.

The ruling balanced the evidentiary value of visual evidence against the risk of reasoning prejudice for the jury.

In a second-degree murder prosecution, the Crown sought to admit antemortem hearsay statements made by the deceased to friends and family regarding the accused’s drug use, theft, and deterioration of their relationship, as well as evidence of prior discreditable conduct.

The court considered the admissibility of the statements under traditional state-of-mind exceptions and the principled approach to hearsay, assessing necessity and threshold reliability under authorities including R. v. Khelawon.

Most statements from close family members and trusted confidants were admitted as evidence of the deceased’s state of mind and the relationship context relevant to motive and identity.

Statements from casual acquaintances lacking sufficient indicia of reliability were excluded.

Evidence of the accused’s drug use and related conduct was largely admitted as contextual relationship evidence, while certain items, including a prior push and some duplicative or prejudicial evidence, were excluded.