Children's Aid Society

This trial decision addresses parenting time, decision-making responsibility, and child support between common-law parents.

The court found the respondent engaged in coercive and controlling behavior by unilaterally withholding the child and making unsubstantiated Children's Aid Society (CAS) reports.

While declining to order equal shared parenting due to logistical distance, the court expanded the applicant's parenting time and granted him final decision-making authority for health and medical matters, with the respondent retaining decision-making for education.

The court also determined the applicant's income for child support, set post-application arrears, and ordered ongoing child support, declining to order retroactive support for a period where the respondent's unilateral actions pre-empted a shared parenting plan.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order for reunification therapy between herself and the parties' 15-year-old daughter, C, with the respondent covering expenses.

The court, applying the five-factor test from Leelaratna v. Leelaratna, dismissed the motion.

The judge found no compelling expert evidence to support the therapy, noted the interim stage of the proceedings, and emphasized C's views as a mature minor, who was not willing to voluntarily participate at this time.

The court concluded that forcing reunification therapy would not be in C's best interests and preferred an organic approach to mending the relationship.

This high-conflict family law motion concerned the respondent mother's request to travel to Pakistan with the parties' seven-year-old son without the applicant father's consent, and to compel the father to consent to the child's passport renewal.

The applicant opposed, alleging abduction risk and citing safety concerns from Canadian travel advisories.

The court dismissed the mother's motion, finding the risks to the child's safety and security, coupled with the difficulty of return from a non-Hague Convention signatory country, outweighed the travel's benefits.

The applicant's cross-motion for Office of the Children's Lawyer involvement was deemed premature.

The appellant, convicted of domestic assault and breaches of orders, appealed the non-communication order prohibiting contact with his child, who was present during the assault.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, upholding the non-communication orders during incarceration and probation.

The court found the orders warranted due to the traumatic circumstances and prior family court orders, clarifying that any future contact with the child would be determined by family court or the Children's Aid Society based on the child's best interests.

In this personal injury action, the defendants sought production of the complete and unredacted file of the Family and Children’s Services of Frontenac, Lennox and Addington (FCS) concerning the plaintiffs from 2014 to present.

The plaintiffs opposed, arguing it was a fishing expedition and that the utility of the records would be tangential.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the burden for production of such highly intrusive records is high, and the prejudicial effect of disclosure greatly outweighed any potential benefit to the defendants, especially given that the information sought was likely of tangential relevance.

The plaintiff, a declared vexatious litigant, commenced an action against the defendants, who were employees of the Children's Aid Society, without obtaining the required leave from a Superior Court judge.

The defendants requested dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule 2.1.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found that the plaintiff was subject to a vexatious litigant order under s. 140(1) of the Courts of Justice Act and had instituted the proceeding without leave.

Consequently, the action was dismissed.

This decision addresses two motions: a request for costs by A.V. against the Durham Children's Aid Society due to procedural missteps regarding police records, and a motion by the children's maternal great grandparents for party status.

The court dismissed A.V.'s costs claim, finding that the Society had taken ameliorative steps and that a costs order would transfer public funds without further achieving the objectives of costs.

The court also dismissed the great grandparents' motion for party status, concluding they were not statutory parents and did not meet the discretionary test under Rule 7(5) of the Family Law Rules, citing concerns about delay, lack of a clear plan, and potential for increased family conflict.

The appellant mother sought costs against the Children's Aid Society of Toronto (CAS) for a second appeal to the Superior Court of Justice, which became moot after the CAS withdrew its protection application in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The case involved conflicting interim orders between the two courts and concerns about the CAS's conduct in investigation and presentation of its case, including failing to meet with the mother and withholding relevant information from the OCJ.

The court found the CAS acted unfairly and unreasonably, justifying a costs award, despite the general exception for government agencies in child protection cases.

The parties sought a consent order compelling Toronto Children's Aid Society (CAS) to expedite the disclosure of a file and staff report for an upcoming case conference, citing CAS's backlog.

The court refused to grant the order, stating that it would not intervene in CAS's internal workflow or prioritize disclosure requests without a justiciable issue, proper notice to CAS, and a legal basis for such an order.

The judge noted that a court order is not a means to circumvent institutional issues or to give plausible deniability to CAS for prioritizing certain cases.

The Children's Aid Society of the Region of Peel appealed a lower court order that required it to hire a third-party professional supervision service for supervised home visits.

The Society argued that this requirement contravened s. 94(6)(c) of the Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017 (CYFSA), which prohibits compelling the Society to provide financial assistance or purchase goods/services for supervision orders.

Applying a correctness standard of review, the court found that the lower court's order did indeed contravene s. 94(6)(c) by obligating the Society to purchase services.

The appeal was allowed, and the impugned provision of the order was set aside.

The Ottawa Children's Aid Society and Kristine Pearce brought a Rule 21 motion to dismiss an action and strike the statement of claim filed by the plaintiff, M. E.-H. The defendants argued the action constituted an abuse of process as an impermissible collateral attack on prior child protection orders, and alternatively, that the statement of claim disclosed no reasonable cause of action.

The plaintiff alleged negligence, Charter breaches, misfeasance in public office, breach of confidentiality, nervous shock, and defamation, stemming from the apprehension of his children and the subsequent child protection proceedings.

The court granted the defendants' motion, dismissing the action on both grounds, finding it to be an abuse of process and that the claims lacked a reasonable cause of action, particularly noting that a Children's Aid Society owes no duty of care to parents in child protection matters.

This ruling addresses two motions to strike portions of a statement of claim brought by the plaintiffs, Jayelle and Sarel Alafi, against midwives and the Children's Aid Society of Algoma (CAS).

The Alafis sued for negligence, negligent misrepresentation, negligent infliction of mental suffering, intrusion upon seclusion, misfeasance of public office, and Charter s. 7 breaches, following the apprehension of their newborn child.

The court struck Mr. Alafi's negligence claims against the midwives related to their scope of practice, finding no duty of care owed to a non-patient third party.

The court also struck the plaintiffs' negligence claims against the CAS, reaffirming that the CAS's duty is solely to the child.

However, the court dismissed the CAS's motion to strike the plaintiffs' s. 7 Charter claims, finding it not plain and obvious that these claims would fail, particularly regarding the right to security of the person in child protection contexts.

Portions of the midwives' motion were adjourned for further submissions.

The Applicant father sought supervised parenting time with his three children after the Respondent mother alleged sexual and physical abuse against him.

Two police investigations and two Children's Aid Society (CAS) investigations found the allegations not credible, and no charges were laid.

The mother opposed the motion, citing the children's disclosures and a need for more counselling.

The court granted the father interim supervised parenting time, emphasizing the lack of corroboration from police and CAS, and the mother's failure to provide specific particulars of the children's statements.

The court ordered incremental supervised visits with the assistance of mutual friends as supervisors and requested CAS support for logistics and child preparation.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual interference against two young sisters.

He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in dismissing his application for third-party records from the Children's Aid Society (CAS) and in making credibility determinations.

He also sought leave to appeal his sentence.

The majority of the Court of Appeal set aside the convictions and ordered a new trial, finding that the CAS records were likely relevant to credibility and motive to fabricate and should have been reviewed by the trial judge.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The applicant father sought a temporary variation of a final parenting order, requesting primary residence and decision-making authority for the children, citing the respondent mother's manipulative behavior, false allegations, and obstruction of the children's therapeutic services.

The respondent mother opposed, bringing a cross-motion for OCL involvement.

The court found a material change in circumstances and that the existing equal time-sharing arrangement was intolerable due to the high conflict and the children's deteriorating emotional and developmental issues.

The court granted the father primary residence and decision-making authority, finding the mother's lack of insight and self-centered decisions detrimental to the children's best interests, and declined OCL involvement.

The appellant, J.G., appealed a 15-year-old verdict of not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder (NCRMD), seeking to substitute convictions for the original charges.

J.G. argued the NCRMD finding was unreasonable due to insufficient medical evidence and that the process was procedurally unfair.

The court reviewed the evidentiary record, including psychological and psychiatric assessments, noting the consensual nature of the original NCRMD verdict.

The court found that there was sufficient evidence to support the NCRMD finding, particularly given the consensual nature of the proceedings and the medical opinion that J.G. lacked the capacity to appreciate the nature and quality of his acts when agitated.

The court also found no procedural unfairness warranting a new trial, noting J.G.'s representation by counsel and the support of the Children's Aid Society.

The appeal was dismissed.

This is a triage endorsement during the COVID-19 pandemic concerning an urgent motion brought by the applicant father for expanded access to his two young children.

The court, having prior familiarity with the custody/access dispute, noted that the Children's Aid Society (CAS) no longer deemed full supervision necessary and could no longer provide supervision due to reduced operations, resulting in the father having no in-person access.

Given that the police investigation against the father did not result in charges and CAS's changed position, the court found the father's issues potentially urgent.

The endorsement set a schedule for the respondent mother to file responding materials and for the applicant father to file a reply, including an updated letter from CAS, before the matter is scheduled for a judge to formally determine urgency and make necessary orders.

The applicant father brought an urgent motion during the COVID-19 suspension of court operations to reinstate his access to his two children, aged 9 and 11.

The mother had unilaterally terminated a long-standing joint custody and access arrangement, citing the children's concerns about COVID-19 and a recent trip to Mexico.

The Children's Aid Society had previously closed a file regarding unverified allegations against the father and expected the family to follow the existing order.

The court, acting as Triage Judge, determined the matter was potentially urgent due to the sudden interruption of a generous timesharing arrangement.

The motion was allowed to proceed, with timelines set for the mother to file responding materials.

The judge emphasized the overwhelming caselaw presumption that parenting arrangements should continue during COVID-19 unless health or safety issues are proven.

The applicant mother brought an urgent motion seeking to restore court-ordered access to the child, which the respondent father had unilaterally suspended.

The father alleged the mother violated a condition regarding her partner's presence, despite a Children's Aid Society investigation finding the allegations "not verified." The court, acting as Triage Judge, found the matter "potentially urgent" given the ongoing denial of access and scheduled it for a full hearing, setting timelines for responding materials.

The court also provided guidance on issues to be addressed at the hearing, including CAS recommendations, reconciliation counselling, and the impropriety of self-help remedies for non-compliance with orders.

The respondent father sought leave to bring an urgent motion for a shared, week-about residency schedule for the two children, alleging the applicant mother's mental health issues, inability to parent both children, and defiance of an existing court order.

The court, acting as a triage justice during the COVID-19 pandemic, determined that the matter met the definition of urgency as it related to the children's well-being and alleged retention of a child, allowing the motion to proceed with directions for filing materials.