Justin Gregory Necpal

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a Mareva injunction (asset freezing order) against several defendants, alleging a complex commercial fraud involving misappropriated funds, illicit acquisition fees, and kickbacks across multiple real estate development projects.

While the court found a strong prima facie case of fraud against the defendant Lee regarding his receipt of concealed acquisition fees, it found no such case against the other responding defendants.

Ultimately, the court dismissed the motion against all defendants because the plaintiffs failed to establish a real risk of asset dissipation, irreparable harm, or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the extraordinary remedy.

This is a supplementary decision to the Court of Appeal's judgment allowing the appeal in part.

Following the release of the main decision, the respondent requested that funds paid into court by the appellants as security for costs be paid out to the respondent.

The appellants did not oppose this request.

The court ordered that the funds held by the Accountant of the Superior Court of Justice be paid out to the respondent.

On appeal from a trial judgment dismissing the appellants' action for breach of contract and repudiation.

The appellants, who operated methadone treatment clinics, hired the respondent physician under a contract requiring her to remit 45% of OHIP billings and containing a non-competition clause.

Following the dissolution of the appellants' joint venture with another clinic operator, the respondent continued working at the jointly-operated clinics.

The trial judge found the contract frustrated by intervening events and that the non-competition provision was not breached.

The appellants appealed, arguing errors in the frustration analysis and interpretation of the non-competition clause.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings on frustration and contractual interpretation but allowed the appeal in part, awarding the appellants $8,194.59 for underpayment during the period prior to the alleged repudiation.

The appellant sued the respondents for unjust enrichment after providing engineering services for a power generation facility and not being paid by the contractor, N-SCI.

The motion judge struck the claim against the Starwood Defendants under Rule 21.01(1)(b), finding that the contract between the Starwood Defendants and N-SCI constituted a valid juristic reason for the enrichment, and denied leave to amend.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge properly considered only the statement of claim, correctly applied the law on juristic reasons, and reasonably exercised his discretion in denying leave to amend a speculative pleading.

The moving defendants sought to strike the statement of claim against them under Rule 21.01(1)(b) in an action arising from unpaid engineering invoices relating to a power generation project.

The plaintiff advanced unjust enrichment against parties that had contracted with an intermediary defendant, but the court held the pleaded contracts constituted valid juristic reasons for the alleged enrichment.

The court rejected the submission that breach of contract would make the enrichment manifestly unjust for pleading purposes and found no basis to add a new allegation of contractual invalidity.

The claim against the moving defendants was struck without leave to amend, with partial indemnity costs.

An employer sought declarations that a senior executive’s employment agreement requiring six months’ written notice of resignation was valid and enforceable.

The employee resigned and intended to join a competitor before the notice period expired, arguing the contract violated the Employment Standards Act, lacked consideration, functioned as an unlawful non‑compete, and that he had “Good Reason” to resign without notice.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the executive had accepted the promotion and contract, the notice provision did not breach the ESA, and the clause was not equivalent to a non‑competition covenant because the employee remained employed and paid during the notice period.

The employee also failed to establish a material alteration of duties or to comply with contractual procedures for asserting “Good Reason.” The court declared the contract binding and confirmed the six‑month notice period applied.

Following earlier reasons on a motion, the court addressed the issue of costs under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act and Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The applicant sought partial indemnity costs based on a bill totalling over $15,000.

The court reviewed the parties’ submissions, deleted certain claimed items not directly related to the motion, and considered the principle that costs should be fair and reasonably expected by the unsuccessful party rather than strictly reflecting actual expenditures.

After comparing both parties’ proposed bills of costs and exercising its discretion, the court fixed a reduced amount.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded to the moving party in the sum of $10,000 inclusive of fees, disbursements, and HST.

The applicant sought an order compelling the respondent to answer questions during an Ontario examination conducted pursuant to a Letter of Request issued by a California court in a civil securities fraud action.

The respondent refused to answer numerous questions, invoking the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution due to concerns that her answers could be used in a potential U.S. criminal investigation.

The court held that evidentiary procedures under a Letter of Request are governed by Canadian law, not foreign constitutional protections.

Concerns regarding the potential use of compelled testimony in U.S. criminal proceedings were matters for the American courts to determine.

The respondent was therefore required to answer the questions notwithstanding the asserted Fifth Amendment privilege.

In a certified class proceeding alleging a price-fixing conspiracy in the market for DRAM (dynamic random access memory) devices contrary to Part IV of the Competition Act and related torts, the representative plaintiffs sought court approval of a negotiated settlement with one defendant.

The settlement required the settling defendant to pay $5.75 million for the benefit of class members in Ontario, British Columbia, and Québec and to provide extensive cooperation in the ongoing litigation against non-settling defendants.

The agreement also included a bar order preventing contribution and indemnity claims against the settling defendant while permitting discovery cooperation and proportional liability determinations at trial.

Applying established class action settlement approval principles, the court concluded the settlement was fair, reasonable, and in the best interests of the class.

The settlement approval order was granted.

The appellant appealed an order staying and dismissing his action against the respondents as an abuse of process.

The motion judge found that the appellant's claims were barred by a broad release contained in a Plan of Compromise and Arrangement under the CCAA that restructured the Canadian market for Asset-Backed Commercial Paper (ABCP).

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, agreeing that the release clearly captured the appellant's claims and that it would be unjust to allow his claim to proceed in isolation after he had participated in the CCAA proceedings and voted in favour of the Plan.

The Attorney General of Canada appealed an order regarding the compellability of two witnesses and the disclosure of certain memoranda, asserting public interest immunity and deliberative secrecy under s. 37 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that while certain paragraphs of one memorandum contained statements of fact not covered by deliberative secrecy, the trial judge erred in finding the public interest in disclosure outweighed deliberative secrecy for the remaining information.

The court restricted the scope of questioning and excluded another memorandum from evidence entirely.

During a hearing to review a decision of the Toronto Stock Exchange regarding HudBay Minerals Inc.'s proposed acquisition of Lundin Mining Corporation, HudBay and Lundin requested confidentiality orders for certain documents filed in evidence.

The Ontario Securities Commission considered the open court principle and the test for confidentiality under section 9(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and the Supreme Court's decision in Sierra Club.

The Commission granted confidentiality for documents that were not relevant to its decision on the merits, including handwritten notes and a financial presentation.

However, it ordered that relevant documents, such as special committee minutes and an engagement letter, be made public, subject to minor redactions for third-party sensitive information.